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he evolution towards fully autonomous vehicles (AVs) is set to considerably reduce road 
accident rates, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and liberate time spent driving. The 
transition is also expected to significantly disrupt the risk and liability landscape as humans 
are disconnected from the driving task. New, unfamiliar and unquantified risks will emerge 
and the increasing levels of automation will likely see a redistribution of liability. 
Consequently, insurance companies and regulatory bodies often lag behind in the identification, 
analysis, response and management of emerging risk structures. Traditional risk models are reactive 
by nature and inhibited by the lack of historical data relating to the likelihood or consequences of 
automated vehicle accidents or adverse events. Moreover, the risk structure of automated vehicles 
will continue to evolve, demanding proactive and adaptable risk assessment methodologies. This 
Thesis contributes novel, proactive methodologies to address these limitations and overcome the 
inadequacies of conventional, reactive risk assessment approaches. In particular, we posit that 
telematics data are especially suited to address these problems and demonstrate the efficacy of 
telematics-based risk assessment methodologies utilising several machine learning models to process 
the sensor generated data for proactive risk assessment. 
Chapters 2 and 3 comprehensively review the risk structure of semi-autonomous vehicles (SAV) and 
propose novel methodological approaches to processing vehicle telematics data and quantifying SAV 
risks for general risk assessment and risk pricing applications. These chapters focus primarily on semi-
automation risk assessment and split risk structures.  Namely, as control alternates between human 
to autonomous system, risk will migrate between technological and human related vulnerabilities. 
Novel machine learning methodologies are presented to extract telematics-based risk factors and 
generate risk scores or model frequency and severity distributions.  Chapter 4 postulates a unique 
machine learning-based risk assessment methodology to quantify the risk exposure of semi and fully 
AVs  relative to human benchmarks. Using telematics data, this approach allows practitioners and 
academics to quantify AV risk against a particular risk group of human drivers proactively. Finally, 
Chapter 5 proposes a unique risk management methodology  that model “behavioural hotspots” using 
telematics data gathered from 46 study participants in Ireland and geostatistical machine learning 
tools. The result are used to create a novel risk-aware path planning algorithm for autonomous 
vehicles.  
The proposed methodologies and resulting applications contribute to field of automated vehicle risk 




manufacturers and regulators, tasked with quantifying and ensuring the safety of automated vehicles. 
Each chapter in this Thesis represents a peer-reviewed journal article with a minimum and maximum 
























1.   Introduction 
 
1.1     Introduction 
Connected and autonomous vehicles are an evolving and disruptive technology with the potential to 
considerably reduce road accidents rates and greenhouse gas emission, improve travel efficiency and 
liberate time spent driving. At the same time, the emergence of automated driving will yield new and 
unfamiliar risks. In many instances, the automated system can be far more effective than human 
drivers. AVs have the ability to sense their surrounding environment, identify objects types, reason 
about the evolving environment and safely plan routes (Campbell et al., 2010). They are immune to 
human susceptibilities, currently the leading source of vehicle accidents. That said, they do not 
currently possess the skill of an experienced driver. Technological risks will ensue where human error 
was once the primary concern. Although automation is expected to make driving considerably safer, 
there still exists a multitude of challenges and risks impeding deployment. In particular, the ability to 
underwrite and quantify emerging  risks across the levels of vehicle automation to facilitate the 
provision of mandated insurance policies and ensure safety standards.  
As human input is progressively removed from the driving task, technological risks will surface. 
Although they are expected to considerably improve accident rates, they will not eliminate them as 
new potential threats will become more prevalent. Safety is often considered the single biggest 
concern surrounding driving automation (Gordon and Lidberg, 2015). To date, problems relating to 
scene understanding, localization, control, trajectory optimization and higher-level planning decisions 
remain considerable open challenges. Real-world conditions amplify these problems further due to 
the complexity and variability of the driving task (Fridman et al., 2017). At the moment, humans 
remain an integral part of safety-critical decisions. Still, technology is outpacing policy. Regulation 
surrounding safety standards, liability and insurance lag behind technological advancement. At the 
core of this, quantifiably measuring AV safety is crucial to the public adoption, societal acceptance and 
widespread deployment of this technology (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018a). This thesis explores this 
problem space and each chapter contributes novel insights and methodological approaches to address 
the challenges surrounding risk assessment in an evolving and unfamiliar transportation landscape. In 
particular, telematics-based approaches are explored, discussed in more detail in sections below. 
This thesis postulates that telematics-based approaches are especially suited to the challenges 
surrounding the quantification of emerging AV risks, particularly as vehicle automation evolves over 
time. Telematics can be broadly described as the transmission of sensor generated data to and from 
a vehicle and is used in several applications including risk and road safety analysis. Sensors can range 
from global positioning systems (GPS) to accelerometers and gyroscopes to more advanced sensors 
such as cameras, LIDARs and radars if available. Telematics has been used to underwrite, quantify and 
risk manage in the context of human drivers but not from the perspective of autonomous driving and 
the varying levels of vehicle automation. This thesis bridges this gap in the literature by extending and 
advancing human-based telematics methodologies to semi and fully autonomous vehicles.  
This chapter is intended to provide context to the problem space surrounding AV risk assessment. It 
is an interdisciplinary problem requiring closer collaboration between manufacturers, insurers, 
regulators and policymakers to better understand, quantify and manage emerging autonomous 
technology risks. Extant literature surrounding these challenges is limited and rarely addresses the 
task of risk assessment from the perspective of manufacturers, insurers and regulators jointly. This 
thesis proposes novel methodologies to quantify emerging risk as they develop across the levels of 
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vehicle automation. In the following sections, we highlight the overarching motivation, research 
objectives, related literature and research contributions.  
 
1.2     Research Motivation 
Problem Space 
It is incumbent on Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), insurers and policy makers to be able 
quantify and manage risks posed by the increasing level of vehicle automation. The safe deployment, 
societal acceptance and handling of future claims demands a comprehensive understanding of the risk 
landscape. Current risk practices rely on sufficient historical accident data and knowledge to 
underwrite and model quantifiable and insurable risks. Reactive by nature, traditional methods will 
prove ineffective in an evolving transportation risk landscape. Currently, autonomous technologies 
are in their infancy and as a result, we have a limited understanding of the risk exposures. This inhibits 
our ability to derive statistically meaningful results and will persist until vast amounts of autonomous 
driving experience is acquired. This is a time consuming, costly and likely infeasible approach to the 
problem. The deployment and acceptance of AVs will be driven by OEMs and insurers ability to 
quantify these emerging technology risks and demonstrate their safety before deployment. This is a 
difficult task, demanding proactive alternatives to risk assessment.  
The evolving liability landscape poses significant threats to OEMs, insurers and regulators who are 
tasked with delivering safe and reliable technology. In particular, the shifting liability regime exposes 
OEMs to considerable losses. Liability is expected to transition from human driver to vehicle and OEMs 
(Gurney, 2017). This becomes increasingly more prominent as we move closer to full autonomy. 
Moreover, technological advancements are expected to significantly disrupt the insurance industry as 
increased vehicle safety inevitably translates into lower claims losses, premiums and a shrinking motor 
insurance marketplace (Sheehan et al., 2017). New lines of insurance will be required in place of 
current motor insurance policies including product liability, product recall liability (Murphy et al., 
2017b), reputational and cyber security coverages. Given the shifting liability ecosystem, the 
deployment of autonomous technologies will hinge on the ability to transfer risks to insurers and 
reinsurers in preparation for future claims losses. This requires a robust means of assigning liability as 
vehicle automation progresses. At particular levels of vehicle automation, we will observe split risk 
profiles where the autonomous system and human driver periodically alternate control of the vehicle, 
shifting liability in real-time. Risk assessment methods must incorporate this liability regime.  
Societal acceptance of autonomous technologies will hinge on the premise that they will be 
considerably safer than human drivers. Thus, it is also imperative for risk assessment methods to be 
able to quantitatively compare the performance of AVs to human drivers. A primary motivation for 
the advancement of AVs is that they will be safer than conventional vehicles reducing both the 
frequency and severity of road accidents (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018a). As a result, the average human 
driver has become a popular benchmark for comparing AVs against (Nees, 2019). In this vein, risk and 
safety should be considered in both absolute terms and relative to human drivers (Fraade-Blanar et 
al., 2018a). Much of the discourse around AV safety emphasises the “safer than a human driver 
criterion” (SHDC) It will also become important to compare against human risk groups with different 
levels of experience and safety records, particularly risk groups deemed safest (Koopman and Wagner, 
2017, Nees, 2019). At an individual level, the acceptance and adoption of AVs may require a more 
compelling performance than the average human driver, given that the majority of drivers believe 
they are safer than average (Nees, 2019). This requires quantitative approaches capable of proactively 
comparing AV safety relative to different groups of human drivers. How “typical” or “excellent” driver 
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are characterised needs to also be determined (Koopman and Wagner, 2017). Consequently, an 
appropriate method to quantitatively evaluate the performance of AVs against human drivers is 
necessary. These methods need to move beyond traditional risk assessment so that comparative 
estimates can be derived at earlier stages of development and deployment.  
There are a multitude of challenges surrounding AV safety and risk assessment, generating significant 
impediments to their deployment and public adoption (Koopman and Wagner, 2017). We explore 
these challenges throughout the thesis.  In particular, the challenges we consider revolve around: 
1. Limited driving experience and accident history. With sparse historical data, examining and 
quantifying the evolving exposures proves challenging. To derive credible datasets, billions of 
autonomous miles could be required (Munich Re, 2016, Kalra and Paddock, 2016). AVs are 
expected to be safer than the average driver and so accidents will be rare. It will likely take an 
impractical amount of driving history to derive statistically significant safety estimates using 
traditional reactive risk modelling approaches. 
 
2. Evolving risk exposures across the varying levels of vehicle automation. We will see later in this 
Thesis that technological risks intensify as the level of automation increases and that particular 
levels possess distinct and unique risks. The risk trajectory across the level of automation is an 
important feature and temporal considerations need to be factored in. For instance, lower levels 
of vehicle automation require a human driver in-the-loop, limiting technological risks.  
 
3. Split risk structures pose significant impediments. This relates to situations where control of the 
vehicle can be regularly swapped between autonomous systems and human driver generating 
human-interaction risks. This leads to split risk and alternating liability profiles. This is explained 
in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3 of this Thesis.  
 
4. The inherent complexities of the autonomous systems make accurate risk assessment difficult. 
Systems rely on sophisticated and multi-faceted components with interdependent relationships. 
Autonomous systems can be broadly categorised into perception, decision-making and control 
and different vehicles have varying hardware compositions. The technology is not yet fully 
developed and continuously evolving. Moreover, the use of machine learning (ML) based 
algorithms increases risk uncertainty. ML has considerably accelerated autonomous vehicle 
capabilities but most ML algorithms hinge on the extensiveness of the training dataset and training 
approaches. The decision-making process of ML systems are often inexplicable to humans and 
impossible to reverse engineer and often considered black boxes (Koopman and Wagner, 2017).  
 
Research Contribution 
The emergence of autonomous technology risks, coupled with the challenges described above 
demands alternative approaches to the problem to quantify and manage AV risks. This thesis proposes 
alternative, supplementary and data-driven risk assessment methodologies that can be widely 
adopted by all stakeholders. Emphasis is placed on telematics-based approaches using ML techniques 
through Naturalistic Driving Studies (NDS) as a means of addressing and overcoming some of the 
challenges described above. We posit that telemetry data from NDS can bridge the knowledge gap 
created by scarce historical data. The goal of this thesis is to support the safe and timely introduction 
of AVs by taking a step towards understanding the evolving risk landscape.   
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Utilising telematics data can potentially overcome the challenges described above. As we explain in 
more detail in the subsequent chapters, telematics-based approaches (i) offer proactive risk estimates 
potentially reducing the level of autonomous miles required, (ii) can be applied and compared across 
the levels of vehicle automation, (iii) can accommodate the split risk structure by using continuous 
measurements and (iv) allow us to estimate the risks based on objective driving data without in depth 
knowledge of the underlying fault. The fundamental contributions of this thesis are founded on the 
application of telematics-based methodologies applied to the varying levels of vehicle automation 
using a range of machine learning techniques. A number of insurers offer telematics based solutions 
to more accurately underwrite and quantify human-based risks and we extend this premise to 
automated technologies, formulating novel methodologies to measure absolute AV risks and risk 
levels relative to human counterparts.   
The proliferation of vehicle sensors and automated technologies has led to the substantial expansion 
and availability of vehicle telematics data. Telematics is the transmission of data to and from a moving 
vehicle and with this, surrogate risk measurements can be extracted. The granularity and scope of 
such data offers a nuanced approach to risk modelling vehicles across the range of automation levels. 
It allows insurers to expand pricing mechanisms to include actual driving data, improve claims handling 
and better manage and control risk exposures. Telematics driving data provides an objective means 
of risk profiling based on actual driving exposure. Traditional methods rely on static risk proxies which 
become ineffective in an emerging risk landscape.  Without prior knowledge or historical experience, 
traditional methods fail.  
Vehicle telematics allows us to derive surrogate measures of risk. These surrogate risk measurements 
can tell us when, where and how well drivers operate. This is currently the state-of-the-art in driver 
risk assessment, increasingly being adopted within the insurance industry for this purpose. Traditional 
approaches, using crash records, are reactive by nature. They require a sufficient number of accidents 
to occur before results can be acquired and actions taken. To overcome insufficient crash data, 
considerable research has explored surrogate measures of risk which correlate with accident 
frequencies (Tarko, 2018). To determine how much safer AVs are and modify pricing mechanisms, we 
need sufficient historical data to compare humans and AVs. Telematics data offers a reliable and 
accelerated approach to quantifying the risk variations between human and AV. For instance, we can 
identify safe and unsafe driving behaviour for both human driver and artificial agent. Typically, data 
includes miles driven, speed, hazard avoidance and near-misses, weather information and crash data 
(Munich Re, 2016). It can enable insurers and OEMs to effectively evaluate the performance of both 
Human and autonomous systems. In particular, this will be important while control can be swapped 
periodically between human driver and autonomous system. This approach likely requires closer 
collaboration between manufacturers and insurers who have greater access to historical human-
related accident data and actuarial expertise in risk modelling.  
Telematics enables a proactive approach to monitoring, quantifying and managing AV risks. To achieve 
this, meaningful safety measurements need to be extracted from the streams of telematics data. 
Fraade-Blanar et al. (2018a) identify 3 categories of safety/risk measurements: 1) The first relates to 
system implementation and standards. This is low-level analysis of specific components and 
algorithms and so forth. 2) Lagging measures relate to accidents including the frequency and severity 
of outcomes. 3) Leading measures are surrogate measures of risk and relate to antecedent accident 
behaviours including driving infraction, disengagements and roadmanship (i.e. driving behaviour) 
(Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018a). This Thesis focuses on latter, leading measures. Infractions and unsafe 
behaviours are likely to be far more frequent than accidents, requiring less cumulative miles to derive 
statistically significant comparisons between conventional and autonomous vehicles (Fraade-Blanar 
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et al., 2018a). Moreover, with leading measures, preliminary knowledge or understanding of the 
underlying technical risk is not necessary. The ability to extract this information is fuelled by telematics 
capabilities. Comprehensive risk profiles can be obtained by combining all three safety measurements.   
Analysing AV risks will likely rely heavily on the collection and interpretation of vast amounts of sensor 
generated data. ML-based algorithms are capable and efficient means of handling and utilising the 
large amounts of structured and unstructured data. ML techniques have grown considerably with 
advancements in computing power and the growing availability of “big data”. This Thesis draws on 
different machine learning algorithms in the following Chapters. These chapters delve into more detail 
surrounding each method used and the advantages of these methods.  
 
1.3     Thesis Objectives 
This thesis explores alternative and proactive approaches to quantifying/measuring and managing 
emerging AV risks outside conventional risk frameworks. The purpose is to support the safe and timely 
deployment of automated technologies by proposing proactive approaches to underwriting and risk 
modelling that insurers, manufacturers and regulators can employ. Emerging risks associated with AVs 
presents a significant challenge to stakeholders. Societal acceptance and regulatory approval of these 
technologies hinges on the ability to quantify and manage the emerging risks. In this regard, each 
peer-reviewed paper in this thesis explores and addresses these issues with respect to the following 
research objectives: 
1. Demonstrate the efficacy of novel telematics-based vs traditional risk models for AV risk 
analysis and further establish driving risk factors applicable across the levels of vehicle 
automation.  
 
2. Establish telematics-based ML techniques to model telematics-based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of vehicle automation.  
 
3. Establish a method to quantitatively measure AV risk relative to human driven risks using 
human-level safety as a unique safety benchmark.  
 
4. Establish a risk management methodology to limit liability and risk exposures for AVs using 
identified risk metrics, extending methods derived in previous objectives.  
 
1.4     Levels of Vehicle Automation 
There are 5 Levels of vehicle automation as defined by the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) (SAE 
International, 2016) and it is important to consider each level and their capabilities to better 
understand the problem space.  Automation levels range from 0 where the human has complete 
control to 5 where the driver is now completely out of the loop. Each automation level yields specific 
benefits and risks and risk modelling approaches need to consider the automation capabilities at each 
level. The different levels are explained below (SAE International, 2016, Englund et al., 2016, Gordon 
and Lidberg, 2015):  
 Level 0 – No Automation : There is no degree of automation and the human driver is responsible 
for all aspects of the driving task. Risks associated with Level 0 are completely human oriented 
including fatigue, distraction, aggression, driving under the influence and so forth. Most research 
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in the domain of driving safety would relate to Level 0 vehicles and there is substantial historical 
data available to facilitate risk estimations.  
 
 Level 1 – Driver Assistance: Driver assistance technologies are available to assist in lateral or 
longitudinal control but not simultaneously. This includes steering, braking or accelerating 
support. The human must always monitor the driving environment and perform fall back driving 
tasks. These systems offer assistance but the human must always be in control. Examples might 
include Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) to assist in speed control, adapting its speed relative to the 
vehicle in front,  where steering and road monitoring tasks remain with the driver. Lane Keeping 
Assistance (LKA) is also currently available. Using cameras, the vehicle finds it position relative to 
lane lines and keeps the car within the lane. With ACC and LKA, the driver can override at any time 
and full responsibility still resides with the driver. Other functions might include Autonomous 
Emergency Braking (AEB) which brakes under safety-critical situations and a number of driver 
warning systems (e.g. pedestrian and vehicle detection). Numerous studies have investigated the 
impact of driver assistance systems on driving safety [cite 1, 2 & 3]. Moreover, driver assistance 
systems are becoming more  common in newer vehicle models making risk assessment more 
straightforward than higher levels of automation.  
 
 Level 2 – Partial Autonomy: One or more driver assistance systems are available. Namely, the 
vehicle is capable of controlling both steering and accelerating/decelerating simultaneously. 
Analogous to Level 1, the human driver must monitor the environment at all times, placing 
responsibility with the human. Moreover, the human is prepared to perform fall-back driving 
tasks. Partial autonomy might include a combination of ACC and LKA to maintain speed and lane 
keeping. Other systems include autonomous parking systems and pedestrian avoidance systems.  
 
 Level 3 – Conditional Automation: Level 3 is capable of performing both steering and 
acceleration/deceleration tasks as well as monitoring the driving environment. It can perform all 
aspects of the dynamic driving task autonomously. This presents a significant step beyond level 3 
as the driver can now justifiably  disengage from the driving task. However, fall-back performance 
of dynamic driving tasks still remains with the human driver. This requires the driver to be ready 
to retake control as per levels 1 and 2 but it is more complex at level 3. A drivers readiness, the 
time it takes for a driver to regain control and the actual transfer of control all present unique risks 
and distort responsibility and liability allocations. We spend a significant portion of this Thesis 
exploring the risk structure associated with Level 3 automation given the unique risks it presents. 
As we transition to Level 3, responsibility and liability become more complex and a split risk 
structure will emerge. Specifically, humans and autonomous systems will periodically transfer 
control within a single journey, triggering two distinct risk structures at varying times of the 
journey. Telematics-based approaches are particularly suited to this problem as they enable 
continuous monitoring of driving for when the human and autonomous systems are in control.  
 
 Level 4 – High Automation: The vehicle is capable of driving autonomously at all times, even when 
the human driver fails to intervene at the request of the vehicle. The vehicle can transition to a 
minimal risk condition in any circumstance. Although the vehicle can drive autonomously without 
human intervention, they will likely be subject to specific operational design domains (ODD) within 
which they can safely operate. ODDs define the specific conditions the vehicle is intended to 
function in. At Level 4, the vehicle needs to accurately detect when it has encountered a situation 
outside its ODD and  return the vehicle to a safe state (Koopman and Wagner, 2018). ODDs might 
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relate to specific road networks, weather conditions or geo-fenced locations (i.e. within certain 
GPS coordinates).  
 
 Level 5 – Full Automation: The vehicle drives autonomously under all driving conditions without 
ever needing human intervention. A number of manufacturers, such as Waymo, have opted to 
pursue Level 4 and 5 automation and circumvent the risks posed at Level 3. However, these 
levels of automation will likely be subject to much more stringent standards given that the 
human driver is entirely out of the loop.  
 
 
1.5     Risk and Safety Assessment: An Overview 
In this section, we discuss some the different risk assessment approaches, providing context to the 
problem space and supporting the validity of telematics-based methods as an alternative and 
proactive approach to the problem. In this Thesis we use the terms risk and safety interchangeably, 
where safety can be considered a state of low risk. The objective of risk assessment is to determine 
how often, and at what cost, AVs are likely to crash. Risk, in the conventional sense, is modelled by 
compounding frequency and severity distributions. Specifically, the probability of an unfavourable 
events and the severity of the cost/harm incurred given an event (Kalra and Paddock, 2016). 
Numerous approaches, from varying disciplines, have been proposed to test AV and evaluate their 
safety/risk. Testing and validating autonomous systems can be achieved through pre-deployment 
road testing, closed course testing, full vehicle and environment simulation testing, simplified vehicle 
and environment simulation testing and subsystem simulation testing (Koopman and Wagner, 2018). 
With each testing method, safety, performance and risk measurements need to be derived.  
There are a number of views on the level of safety AVs need to acquire before deployment. However, 
to begin to answer that question, we need a statistically significant means of deriving quantitative 
safety results. Directly inspecting accident occurrences through real-world testing is perhaps the most 
statistically meaningful approach. That is, real-world driving with realistic driving interactions, driving 
conditions and driving events. However, as shown by Kalra and Paddock (2016), the number of miles 
needed to statistically validate the safety of AVs in this manner is impossible if the objective is to 
demonstrate AV’s safety prior to public deployment. In fact, Kalra and Paddock (2016) found that it 
would take approximately 275 million “failure-free” autonomous miles to demonstrate a fatality rate 
of 1.09 per 100 million miles, which roughly corresponds to the fatality rate exhibited by humans. 
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to cover all possible traffic scenarios the vehicle might face once 
publically deployed with this approach to testing.  
Leading measures are surrogate measurements of driving behaviours that correlate with accident 
occurrences and include disengagements, driving infraction and roadmanship (i.e. behaviour) (Fraade-
Blanar et al., 2018a). Fraade-Blanar et al. (2018a) recommend policymakers engage in these proactive 
safety measures which include driving infractions, roadmanship (i.e. behaviour) and disengagements. 
Leading measures are important given that they occur far more frequently than accidents and offer 
statistically significant comparisons between conventional and autonomous vehicles at lower stages 
of accumulated miles (Junietz et al., 2018, Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018a, Åsljung et al., 2017). That is, 
inferences can be made regarding the safety of AVs in the development and early deployment stages 
without accumulating unrealistic miles. Surrogate risk metrics can be extrapolated to derive accident 
likelihoods of AV using. Extreme value theory is one approach to model accident frequency rates based 
on the frequency of risky events and the conditional likelihood of a crash (Åsljung et al., 2017, Tarko, 
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2018). Through either real-world, simulation or closed course testing, measures such as behaviour, 
infractions and disengagements can be used as a measure of public safety. 
Disengagements act as a proxy public risk measurement. These represent errors in the autonomous 
system that require the human supervisor to retake control. These occur either due to failings in the 
autonomous system or where the human supervisor deems the AVs actions unsafe and manually 
intervenes. Level 3 automation, in particular, requires the driver to be ready to intervene if the 
automated system is unable to handle the driving task. Disengagements instigated by the system are 
the result of detected abnormalities or failures in autonomous technologies including 
communications, sensors, maps, calibration and hardware errors (Waymo, 2017, Dixit et al., 2016). 
Disengagement reports are ambiguous and unstandardized making comparable analysis between 
vehicle models and manufacturers difficult. For instance, some manufacturer may only accumulate 
miles on structured and safe environments. Moreover, these risk measurements cannot be compared 
to human driven data.  
Infractions and roadmanship derived from telematics data are the focus within this Thesis. It is 
important for regulators, insurers and policymakers, to measure AV safety against conventional 
vehicles (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018a). Surrogate measures of risk such as infractions and roadmanship 
facilitate a comparative analysis between humans and AVs. Infraction are failures to follow road rules 
and roadmanship refers to a measure of driving ability. Establishing safety envelopes are a pragmatic 
means of mathematically defining roadmanship. Safety envelopes are “explicitly stated safety 
requirements” for specific situations such as keeping a particular distance to lane lines or keeping a 
minimum distance to other objects (Koopman and Wagner, 2018, Koopman and Wagner, 2016a). In 
the same manner, Fraade-Blanar et al. (2018a) suggest deriving a safety envelope in order to identify 
safe and unsafe driving actions. Koopman and Wagner (2018) explained that these are much simpler 
specifications rather than examining complex algorithms. Rules are designed violations to these rules 
can be used as a means of measuring safety and performance (Koopman and Wagner, 2018). This can 
be used as a sort of “driver test” to continually monitor the AV and identify unsafe behaviour 
(Koopman and Wagner, 2018). Essentially, rules are designed and we examine when the vehicle 
violates these rules as a means of measuring safety and performance (Koopman and Wagner, 2018). 
Shalev-Shwartz et al. (2017), from Mobileye, designed Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) 
framework, a safety envelope determining safe driving actions for as many possible driving scenarios 
in a multi-agent environment. They provide verifiable safety definitions based on unsafe driving 
violations. This framework essentially mathematically formalises human common sense for a range of 
driving scenarios to ensure vehicle safety. In this Thesis, alternative methods of identifying abnormal 
or unsafe driving are proposed as a means of designing a sort of safety envelope applicable across the 
Levels of vehicle automation. 
Edge-case or corner-case analysis is a popular approach to AV safety assessment. This involves 
identifying uncommon scenarios that a vehicle might encounter on public roads and testing the 
vehicles ability to handle these situations. Typically achieved through closed course or simulation 
testing, this approach exposes the AV to scenarios that might only occur once in several million of 
kilometres. Most driving scenarios observed during test drives (real-world) are common and relatively 
easy for the vehicle to interpret and perform. The motivation behind this approach is that if the vehicle 
can handle these edge-cases safely, then the vehicle should also be able to handle common and less 
complex driving scenarios.  
These methods investigate the vehicle ability to perform a particular task and are called vehicle-level, 
complete or scenario-based testing. They don’t examine the technology components at a lower level. 
However, extant literature also places considerable attention on lower-level and component-based 
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analysis. This is called functionality-based testing and can be split into three broad testing categories: 
sensing/recognition, decision-making and actions (Li et al., 2016). The performance of individual 
components such as perception, localization, path planning, actuation etc. are naturally important to 
consider. For example, Campbell et al. (2010) explained that minor perception mistakes can propagate 
through to the planning component causing near-misses, human interventions or even accidents. For 
example, some perception mistakes discussed in (Campbell et al., 2010) include the autonomous 
systems mistaking a cement barrier for a car. Likewise, the vehicle inexplicably assigned an initial 
velocity to a large bush. With functionality-based testing, components are often evaluated individually 
making statistically significant risk estimates difficult. Moreover, we are lacking a standard benchmark 
to make fair comparisons between manufacturers and vehicle models (Li et al., 2016). Li et al. (2016) 
proposes a safety testing approach incorporating both functionality-based and scenario-based testing 
given these shortcomings.   
Along the lines of functionality-based testing it is also important to consider ML and Deep Learning 
(DL) algorithms. ML and DL systems have been widely adopted in safety-critical perception systems 
given their proven ability to surpass human-level performance in a range of tasks such as image 
classification (He et al., 2016). However, ML systems are fallible and often exhibit unexpected edge 
cases with potentially dangerous consequences. Testing and validating these present a considerable 
challenge and these methods are often considered black boxes. Pei et al. (2017) create DeepXplore, a 
tool for testing real-world deep learning systems based on neuron coverage. It was designed to 
identify erroneous corner-case behaviours that have the potential to cause the AV to crashes. 
Moreover, Tian et al. (2018) built DeepTest, a testing tool based on neuron coverage but generalise 
this approach to include Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN).  
1.6     Thesis Structure 
This Thesis is presented in an “article-based” format and organised around four peer-reviewed journal 
articles. These articles form the structure of the Thesis, each of which is presented within the 
subsequent chapters.  
1.6.1 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 comprehensively reviews the risk structure of semi-autonomous vehicles (SAV) and 
proposes a novel approach to quantify SAV risks utilising telematics data from the vehicle. This 
includes vehicle automation levels 2, 3 and 4 where the driver still plays a role to some degree. SAVs 
will exhibit some unique risks. They allow for periodic switching of control between the human and 
autonomous system, generating a split risk profile. Namely, the risk profile of the vehicle will alter 
periodically between human- and vehicle-centric risks. This emerging risk structure is particularly 
pertinent in Level 3 and demands alternative risk models to contend with this challenge. The chapter 
provides a novel methodology using an unsupervised ML-based multivariate Gaussian (MVG) anomaly 
detection technique. The MVG approach is a novel application that provides both academics and 
practitioners with a more accurate means to quantify SAV risk. The methodology fills a gap in the 
literature by  providing a method to address the split risk structure associated with SAV and provides 
a common methodology to risk assess both human and autonomous system drivers in a unified 
approach.  
The MVG anomaly detection methodology statistically determines anomalous sensor readings 
without any preliminary knowledge of detected outcome. This is the first application of such a 
statistical tool to model anomalous driving patterns for the purpose of risk assessing SAVs. Unlike 
other approaches, the model is not preconditioned to identify specific anomalies and can be 
continually updated. Moreover, the model incorporates implicit correlations between variables. The 
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methodology exploits vehicle telematics data to identify erroneous/anomalous driving actions. Data 
from accelerometer and GPS sensors are used from 6 vehicles in Madrid (Romera et al., 2016). We use 
data from conventional vehicles to demonstrate the proposed methodology. The output of the MVG 
anomaly detection approach is used to generate SAV risk scores based on the relative frequency and 
severity of erroneous or anomalous driving actions. Using leading measures, we evaluate driving risk 
scores without a required knowledge of the underlying technology (or human) related risks. In 
addition, we perform a theoretical assessment of a SAV against the conventional vehicles in our 
dataset. This anomaly detection and risk scoring approach is a novel contribution to the literature as 
it addresses the split risk structure and facilitates direct quantitative comparisons between a human 
and autonomous system in a SAV. It takes a step towards more accurate insurance risk pricing for this 
emerging technology.  
The results in this chapter are based on UAH-DriveSet, a dataset consisting of over 500 minutes of 
naturalistic driving data collected from six drivers in Madrid. This dataset contains three different 
simulated behavioural patterns – normal, drowsy and aggressive. Raw data is gathered from a 
smartphone-based application called DriveSafe and readings from accelerometer and GPS sensors are 
exploited including longitudinal, lateral and vertical accelerations, velocity and velocity over the limit. 
These factors were chosen based on their actuarial significance in human-based risk assessment 
although others can be seamlessly incorporated. The results are split into two hypothetical scenarios: 
1) The vehicle is driven manually and is categorised as level 0-2 automation. Anomalies are modelled 
using the MVG approach and risk scores are calculated for each driver. Anomalies, grouped by severity 
are also geographically modelled. 2) The vehicle is semi-autonomous with autonomous highway 
driving capabilities. Under the assumption that the autonomous system is considerably safer and 
makes considerably less mistakes, anomalies are detected and risk scores are calculated for the SAV. 
The results provide the relative decrease in risk levels for vehicles endowed with some autonomous 
capabilities vs the fully manual vehicles in our dataset. Quantifying the anticipated risk reduction as 
we transition from manual to SAVs is crucial for OEMs and insurers to accurately price the risks and 
prepare for future liability exposures. Ultimately, this paper deviates from previous literature by 
comprehensively reviewing the risk structure of SAVs, extending telematics-based analysis to 
automated technologies and positing an approach to contend with the split risk profile.  
1.6.2 Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, we address SAVs risk analysis for insurance risk pricing and incorporate an alternative 
risk modelling approach that can be used to supplement the proposed anomaly detection 
methodology in chapter 2. This chapter focuses on vehicle automation levels 2, 3 and 4. A unique  
Bayesian Network (BN) model is proposed to model the frequency and severity of AV accident risk 
using telematics data as inputs to the model. This BN statistical risk estimation methodology is 
designed to accommodate emerging risk structures and changing customer demands across the levels 
of vehicle automation. To the best of the authors knowledge, BNs have not been applied in the context 
of SAV risk analysis. BNs are particularly suited to problems with limited and missing data due to their 
ability to update prior beliefs as new information becomes available and incorporate expert 
judgement. These characteristics are valuable given the uncertainty surrounding AV risks and the 
limited availability of accident statistics. Moreover, BNs provide intuitive graphical representations 
illustrating probabilistic relationships between variables. They support straightforward 
communication of risk through these representations whereas other ML models are more difficult to 
interpret.  
The split risk structure associated with SAVs means the likelihood of an accident will fluctuate as 
control is periodically swapped between human and AV. Such a risk structure is beyond the capabilities 
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of standard risk models and underwriting methods and demands alternate approaches. Moreover, 
the shifting liability structure exposes OEMs, tier1 and 2 suppliers and software companies to 
considerable emerging risks. As automation evolves, OEMS will be exposed to new liability channels. 
For instance, allocating liability may depend on whether the driver or the vehicle was in control at the 
time of the accident. Demand for product liability is expected to increase alongside automation 
advancements. However, to facilitate this, underwriting and actuarial pricing methods need to reflect 
the changing risk structures and liability regimes as vehicle automation progressively increases. The 
proposed BN methodology establishes a proactive risk pricing framework to combat these challenges. 
The methodology is a novel application that provides insurers and manufacturers a quantitative 
approach using real-time telematics data to dynamically reassess and quantify both human driver and 
AV risks concurrently for risk pricing and claims reserving.  
BNs are essentially a collection of variables represented by nodes with each node connected by 
directed arcs (arrows), signifying direct dependencies or correlations. Our BN is constructed by 
positing causal and probabilistic dependencies through subjective assumptions. However, the 
structure of a BN can be learned given the availability of telematics datasets. The BN is designed to 
predict accident frequency and severity distributions for an individual driver, human or autonomous 
systems. Common telematics-based variables are chosen including behavioural (braking, accelerating, 
turning patterns etc.), environmental (weather, road type etc.) and exposure (accumulated miles, 
average speed etc.). For behavioural exposures, we adopt the behavioural scoring method of 
Castignani et al. (2015) who scored drivers based on the number of critical events encountered in 
addition to the type and environmental setting surrounding the particular event. A conditional 
probability table (CPT) captures the strength of the relationships between variables. Sixteen variables 
are selected for both autonomous and manual driving. However, they differ with regards to node 
relationships strengths, inherent to CPTs. For instance, an autonomous vehicle exhibiting excessive 
amounts of hard braking may be considered more hazardous than a manual driver exhibiting the same 
level of braking behaviour, thus demonstrating stronger node relationship relative to the manual 
driver.  
Two hypothetical scenarios are presented relating to a single SAV where 1) the human is in control 
and 2) the autonomous system has control. The results provide a theoretical scenario based on 
assumptions regarding a particular human driver and the effects on each variable as an autonomous 
system takes control. An explanation for the changes in each variable due to the introduction of 
automation is provided and the resulting changes in insurance premiums are calculated. Individual 
BNs are established for the human and autonomous system for a single SAV. This approach 
accompanied by real-time telematics data gives academics and practitioners a risk pricing 
methodology that can alternate as control alternates, shifting liability too. The novelty of this chapter 
resides in the unique BN risk pricing framework capable of handling missing or incomplete data and 
addressing the liability and split risk structure challenges associated with SAVs.  
1.6.3 Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 posits a novel methodology to quantitatively measure AV risks against human drivers in a 
more proactive manner than current approaches. The deployment of AVs hinges on the premise that 
they are considerably safer than human drivers. That said the ability of manufacturers, insurers and 
regulators to quantifiably demonstrate this risk reduction, relative to humans, poses a significant 
unsolved challenge. Based on accident frequency and severity distributions alone, it will likely take 
hundreds of millions of autonomous miles to derive statistically meaningful results. This paper 
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explores alternative surrogate measures of risk assessment and posits a novel and proactive means of 
measuring AV driving risk by benchmarking against human driving behaviour, a more familiar and 
quantifiable risk. The methodology provides practitioners and academics a proactive and novel basis 
for comparatively measuring AV risks against human drivers, supporting their safe and timely 
deployment.  
Comparing the safety of AVs to humans drivers is a crucial task for OEMs, regulators and insurers and 
the “safer that a human driver criterion” (SHDC) has become a significant benchmark in AV safety 
analysis (Nees, 2019). In this Chapter, we posit a unique approach that utilises telematics data and 
leading measures to estimate the safety of AVs in the context of the SHDC. Leading measures and 
safety-critical events occur far more frequently than accidents and this frequency enables a more 
proactive comparative assessment with lower quantities of autonomous miles accumulated. Human-
AV comparisons are typically obtained through population-level data meaning that AV are largely 
compared to the “average human driver”  (Nees, 2019). Kalra and Groves (2017) speculated that the 
widespread deployment of AV that were just 10% better than the average human driver could 
potentially save hundreds of thousands of lives. From a utilitarian viewpoint, this may be acceptable. 
However, comparisons against particular human driver risk groups will provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of AV safety. For instance, the safest risk group based on an insurers accident records. 
The approach taken in this paper can be extended to incorporate comparisons between AVs and a 
variety of human risk groups. To achieve this level of analysis, this methodology requires collaborative 
efforts between manufacturers and insurers. 
The methodology is demonstrated in a simulated environment as proof-of-concept. We use three 
virtual environments to apply and test the efficacy of our approach. At the core of the methodology, 
Gaussian Processes (GPs) are employed to model normal driving behaviours and a statistical approach 
to anomaly detection is subsequently used to identify safe and unsafe driving actions. This is a novel 
application of GPs for driver behaviour modelling and anomaly detection. Convolutional Neural 
Networks (CNN) are employed to create an end-to-end model AV to simulate autonomous driving. 
Ten human driver study participants were also instructed to drive, as safe as possible. around these 
simulated tracks. Data collected from these human drivers were used to spatially model normal driving 
behaviours. In particular, we model steering angle and velocity as sensor generated telematics data. 
We subsequently test the performance of a single human driver against our AV as a test case. Based 
on this model of normal driving behaviour, abnormal events were automatically detected  for both 
the AV and human driver and risk scores were calculated based on the frequency and severity of these 
events. The model AV navigated all test tracks successfully without any major incident. However, we 
observed a number of abnormal behaviours that were appropriately detected by our GP anomaly 
detection model. Risk scores incorporated these abnormal events and quantitative comparisons 
between the model AV and test human driver were performed.    
1.6.4 Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 advances a unique methodology to 1) statistically locate behavioural hotspots and model 
road network risk using an unsupervised, geostatistical method called Kernel Density Estimation (KDE), 
2) utilise these results to construct a novel risk-aware path planning algorithm using a modified dijkstra 
algorithm and 3) provide a more proactive means of AV risk assessment using sensor generated spatio-
temporal telematics data. This methodology is a unique contribution to the literature surrounding AV 
risk management and risk assessment. To the authors knowledge, behavioural hotspot modelling and 




To date, AVs have not yet reached human level safety and a number of deployment barriers exist. In 
particular, methods to quantify and manage emerging and unfamiliar technological risks poses some 
of the most significant challenges for manufacturers, insurers and regulators. With limited historical 
data, the capacity to accurately measure the potential risk reduction is restricted. Moreover, careful 
management of these risks will become a central task. A particularly important risk management 
strategy is the appropriate definition of specific operational design domains (ODD) relating to the 
geographical locations and situational circumstances under which the AV is safe to operate in. This 
chapter posits a methodology to identify ‘behavioural hotspots’ and construct a novel risk-aware path 
planning process intended for AVs. The proposed methodology enables AVs, to anticipate and avoid 
hotspots, adapt its behaviour accordingly or prepare to handover control back to the human driver.  
Human traffic accidents often cluster to form hot spots or high-risk locations. Safety-critical driving 
events cluster in a similar fashion. We define high density clusters as behavioural hotspots indicating 
locations with relatively higher frequency of safety-critical driving events. The methodology is applied 
to a cohort of 44 male drivers in Limerick, Ireland involving roughly 274,000 km of driving. Human 
driving data is used as proof-of-concept as AV driving data is not readily available. The experiment 
lasted 6 months and the devices collected a wide array of driving information including lateral and 
longitudinal movements, geospatial and engine information. In this chapter, safety-critical events in 
the form of hard braking and steering manoeuvres are explored. Our dataset consists of approximately 
13,000 and 33,000 hard braking and steering events respectively. KDE is a non-parametric, 
geostatistical machine learning technique used to analyse the spatial patterns of safety-critical events. 
The density estimates based on detected safety-critical events are then incorporated into the path 
planning process to minimise driving risk. We uniquely modify Djisktra’s path planning algorithm in 
such a way that the planned path is based on a weighted combination of obtaining the shortest route 
with the lowest possible risk exposure. Lastly, we propose the use of telematics-based methodologies 
as a more proactive means of quantifying AV risk and demonstrate some preliminary risk analysis 
results relating to our study participants.  
The results of this research are based on human driving but this chapter offers three novel 
contributions towards addressing the problem surrounding risk assessment and risk management of 
AVs: 
i. Detected human-based hotspots can be used by an AV. Unsafe driving of surrounding road 
users affect the safe decision making of AVs. Therefore, the results obtained from this 
research can be used to provide prior information to the AV so as to avoid or prepare for 
higher risk locations.  
ii. Policy and technical considerations surrounding ODDs can be improved by incorporating 
safety-critical events of AVs.  
iii. The use of safety-critical events, rather than accident frequencies, affords a more proactive 
evaluation of AV driving risk. Moreover, it also supports comparative evaluation between 
humans and AVs.  
 
1.7     Thesis Summary 
The advent of semi and fully automated vehicles will transform the risk and liability landscapes, 
bringing new and unfamiliar risks, beyond the capabilities of existing risk analysis and insurance risk 
pricing methods. There are a multitude of challenges and barriers surrounding AV risk assessment 
causing significant impediments to their deployment and societal acceptance. We have identified 4 
key challenges that will have a significant impact on insurance practices and risk assessment methods 
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which include 1) Lack of historical data 2) evolving risk structures across the levels of automation, 3) 
Split risk structures associated with semi-automation and 4) technological complexities that are not 
yet fully developed and continuously evolving, a comprehensive understanding of which are likely 
beyond the capabilities of insurers and regulators. Extant literature surrounding AV risk assessment is 
limited, particularly from the perspective of insurers. Autonomous technology is still in its infancy 
along with the domain of AV risk analysis and AV insurance. This Thesis contributes to this field by 
providing the first comprehensive Thesis relating to the risk analysis of the varying levels of vehicle 
automation and advancing novel methodological approaches and telematics-based solutions to 
addressing many of the problems related to the evolving and disruptive risk landscape.  
The Thesis follows four key objectives, each of which are addressed systematically in at least one peer-
reviewed journal article. Contributions to the literature of AV risk assessment were obtained by  
methodically addressing each objective. These objectives are listed below again: 
1. Demonstrate the efficacy of novel telematics-based vs traditional risk models for AV risk 
analysis and further establish driving risk factors applicable across the levels of vehicle 
automation.  
 
2. Establish telematics-based ML techniques to model telematics-based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of vehicle automation.  
 
3. Establish a method to quantitatively measure AV risk relative to human driven risks using 
human-level safety as a unique safety benchmark.  
 
4. Establish a risk management methodology to limit liability and risk exposures for AVs using 
identified risk metrics, extending methods derived in previous objectives.  
The overarching motivation for this Thesis is to present novel alternative methodologies to address 
the identified key problem areas and overcome the inadequacies of conventional reactive risk 
assessment models. We posit that telematics data are especially suited to address these problems and 
demonstrate this by addressing each of the four outlined research objectives. Several novel 
methodologies were proposed to overcome these limitations and are presented in each subsequent 
chapter. Each chapter represents a peer-reviewed journal article. The proposed methodological 
approaches (i) provide proactive risk estimates (ii) are applicable across the levels of vehicle 
automation, (iii) accommodate the split risk structure and (iv) enable risk estimates based on objective 
driving data without in-depth knowledge of the underlying risk source. The fundamental contributions 
of this thesis center on novel applications of telematics-based methodologies applied across the levels 
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Abstract 
The transition to semi-autonomous driving is set to considerably reduce road accident rates as human 
error is progressively removed from the driving task. Concurrently, autonomous capabilities will 
transform the transportation risk landscape and significantly disrupt the insurance industry. Semi-
autonomous vehicle (SAV) risks will begin to alternate between human error and technological 
susceptibilities. The evolving risk landscape will force a departure from traditional risk assessment 
approaches that rely on historical data to quantify insurable risks. This paper investigates the risk 
structure of SAVs and employs a telematics-based anomaly detection model to assess split risk 
profiles. An unsupervised Multivariate Gaussian (MVG) based anomaly detection method is used to 
identify abnormal driving patterns based on accelerometer and GPS sensors of manually driven 
vehicles. Parameters are inferred for vehicles equipped with semi-autonomous capabilities and the 
resulting split risk profile is determined. The MVG approach allows for the quantification of vehicle 
risks by the relative frequency and severity of observed anomalies and a location-based risk analysis 
is performed for a more comprehensive assessment. This approach contributes to the challenge of 
quantifying SAV risks and the methods employed here can be applied to evolving data sources 
pertinent to SAVs. Utilising the vast amounts of sensor generated data will enable insurers to 
proactively reassess the collective performances of both the artificial driving agent and human driver. 
 
Summary: The Transition to semi and full autonomous driving will be accompanied by new and 
unfamiliar risks. This paper aims to provide a novel means of quantifying these risks based on 
anomalous driving behaviour.  
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The introduction of autonomous driving features will begin to eliminate the leading cause of driving 
accidents – human error. That said, the emergence of new technologies will be accompanied by new 
risks. Future road accidents will hinge on technological vulnerabilities rather than human 
predispositions. In particular, the evolving risk landscape is expected to significantly disrupt the 
insurance industry as increased vehicle safety ultimately translates into lower claims losses, premiums 
and a shrinking motor insurance marketplace (Sheehan et al., 2017). However, risk will not be 
eradicated and the onus of liability will shift towards original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or 
affiliated suppliers (Gurney, 2017), particularly as drivers can justifiably disengage while an artificial 
agent takes control. Currently, the insurance industry relies on experience to quantify and underwrite 
insurable risks. That said, regulation, the ambiguity surrounding autonomous technology risks and lack 
of historical data will demand proactive alternatives to current risk analysis practices. This paper 
addresses the issue of assessing  semi-autonomous vehicle (SAV) risks and posits an anomaly detection 
approach as a way towards utilising the vast amounts of sensor generated data from SAVs. 
 
Telematics, the transmission of sensor generated data to and from a moving vehicle, will enable OEMs 
and insurers to proactively monitor the performance of both the autonomous system and human 
driver. The objective of this paper is to explore the applicability and potential significance of 
telematics-based insurance and risk analysis in an increasingly automated transportation ecosystem. 
Our approach draws on machine learning capabilities that can learn from seemingly complex driving 
data emanating from a suite of sensors. An unsupervised Multivariate Gaussian (MVG) based anomaly 
detection method is employed to dynamically reassess vehicle risks by identifying abnormal driving 
patterns based on accelerometer and GPS sensors. The MVG approach allows us to quantify vehicle 
risks by the relative frequency and severity of observed anomalies and perform location-based risk 
analysis for a more comprehensive overview. This paper utilises manual driving telematics data, 
categorised into normal, drowsy and aggressive behaviours (Romera et al., 2016). The MVG approach 
enables us to distinguish between driving behaviours. In particular, we tentatively evaluate the split 
risk structure associated with SAVs as human and machine periodically switch control throughout a 
single journey (Rao, 2016). This paper deviates from previous research by investigating semi-
autonomous risks and quantifying semi-autonomous risk exposures for insurance risk assessment 
purposes. 
 
The ensuing risk and liability landscape will present an interdisciplinary challenge, demanding closer 
collaboration between OEMs and insurers in order to retain, mitigate and/or transfer risks. Table I 
below demonstrates the Levels of vehicle automation and the projected liability shift to OEMs 
(Sheehan et al., 2017, SAE International, 2016). Demand for product liability, product recall and cyber 
insurance policies are expected to increase, corresponding to the progressive transfer of control from 
human to artificial agent (Murphy et al., 2017a). Vehicle automation can be characterised into those 
that support (assisted) and those that replace (Automated) the driver (ABI and Thatcham Research, 
2017). The transition to Level 3 introduces automated driving where the autonomous system is 
capable of monitoring the traffic environment independently. Such functions include autonomous 
valet parking, traffic jam autopilot and highway autopliot, the impact of which is featured in our results 
(Bengler et al., 2014a). However, risks associated with automated driving reside outside conventional 
insurance practices due to the lack of historical accident data and the innate complexity of AV 
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technology. Currently, driver error is the main source of vehicle risk. Historical driver-centric data 
sources will quickly lose their validity in a fully autonomous environment. At levels 3 and 4, the impact 
of human susceptibilities such as fatigue, distraction and aggression will diminish as vehicle-centric 
vulnerabilities begin to emerge. Software failures, cyber intrusions, sensor faults and human-machine 
interactions (HMI) will become decisive risk factors in road traffic accidents (RTAs).  
 
 
Table I. Levels of Driving Automation and possible liability shift (Sheehan et al., 2017, SAE International, 2016). 
 
In machine learning, the process of identifying “not-normal” events is known as anomaly or outlier 
detection. Effectively, anomalies differ from normal patterns and are rare in nature (Goldstein and 
Uchida, 2016). Several methodologies on anomaly detection and driving risk assessment have been 
proposed in the context of manually driven vehicles. Zhang et al. (2017a) propose “SafeDrive”, a 
context-aware system designed to identify contextual and correlational anomalies for insurance 
purposes. State graphs are employed to model behaviour and determine abnormal driving (Zhang et 
al., 2017a). Castignani et al. (2017) propose an adaptive driving manoeuvre detection system, utilising 
a Multivariate Normal based anomaly detection to detect risky driving manoeuvres. Wu et al. (2014a) 
present a driving behaviour orientated event data recorder (EDR), employing Hidden Markov models 
to identify manoeuvres and fuzzy logic to determine danger levels. Chen et al. (2015b) offer an 
abnormal driving detection and identification system known as “D3”. Support vector machines (SVM) 
were employed to detect abnormal driving events and classify manoeuvres. Castignani et al. (2015) 
propose “SenseFleet”, a smartphone app that utilises fuzzy logic to detect risky manoeuvres and 
calculates a weighted risk score, incorporating the severity levels of contextual factors. To date, the 
extant literature has largely limited itself to human contributions to accident risks. We extend previous 
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research to SAV and AV risk analysis and provide a means of quantifying driving risk exposures of 
manual and semi-auotnomous vehicles. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explores the emerging technology risks 
as we transition from assisted to automated driving. Sections 3 and 4 describes the telematics dataset 
employed followed by our methodological approach to SAV risk assessment. Section 5 presents our 
results in the context of manual and semi-autonomous vehicles. In Section 6 we discuss the proposed 
model and further insurance implications.  
 
Emerging Technology Risks 
The objective of this paper is to implement a novel approach to quantifying semi-autonomous vehicle 
risks through the detection of driving anomalies. However, anomalies stem from fundamental errors 
within the autonomous system that propagate downstream and materialise as hazardous driving. 
Along this vein, this paper further explores the potential hazards that initiate abnormal driving. 
Whereas human driving is typically a symptom of some underlying human error such as aggression or 
distraction, abnormal AV driving is a consequence of technological errors. 
 
To date, limited attention has been given to emerging AV risks in the risk analysis and insurance 
domains. For instance, in the area of motor insurance, traditional risk assessment is predominantly 
based on risk proxies as a reflection of a driver’s true risk exposure. Static underwriting factors include 
driver characteristics – age, marital status, driver license, residence, vehicle use, past claims/driving 
record, traffic violations, occupation, driver training, distance travelled, garage ownership – and 
vehicle characteristics – vehicle make and model, vehicle age, engine capacity, horse power etc. 
(Lemaire et al., 2016). Ultimately, traditional actuarial approaches and risk factors would result in 
drivers of SAVs (lower risk exposure) subsidising the insurance costs of manual vehicle drivers (higher 
risk drivers) (Sheehan et al., 2017).   
 
Usage-Based Insurance (UBI) is a telematics-based alternative whereby dynamic risk factors, based on 
behavioural characteristics and actual driving use or travel exposure, are employed. The two most 
common are Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) and Pay-How-You-Drive (PHYD) (Husnjak et al., 2015) which 
monitor usage patterns and driving behaviour respectively. Telematics-based insurance plans allow 
insurers to dynamically reassess drivers based on behaviour and travel patterns. Emotional state, 
physical state, risk propensity, skill level and external conditions contribute to driving impairment and 
can be objectively monitored from telematics data. In fact, over 90% of vehicle accidents can be 
attributed to human error (Ellison et al., 2015). We extend such approaches to autonomous systems 
to monitor technological errors. The risk structure of a semi-autonomous vehicle is demonstrated in 
Figure 1, characterised under Hardware, Software, Cyber and Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) risks. 
Assessing these risks will likely rely heavily on the collection and interpretation of enormous amounts 





Fig. 1.  Semi-Autonomous Vehicle Risk Structure 
 
2.1 Hardware 
Autonomous vehicles rely on a suite of sensors to monitor and adapt to the surrounding traffic 
environment. In particular, perception and in-vehicle-sensors cooperatively enable a system to 
interpret its situation. Perception sensors allow AVs to “see” the surrounding traffic setting and 
include light detection and ranging (LIDAR), radar, vision sensors, global navigation systems, ultrasonic 
etc. (Bengler et al., 2014b). In-vehicle sensors govern the vehicle state and include accelerometer, 
gyroscope, odometer, steering and more (Sheehan et al., 2017). Safe autonomous driving will 
undoubtedly rely heavily on the accuracy and reliability of vehicle sensors. Damages, faults,  tampering 
or age can lead to deteriorating capabilities (Anderson et al., 2014b, Petit and Shladover, 2015). The 
diagnostics, maintenance and shelf-life of AVs and its safety-critical hardware components will 
become significant underwriting factors (Munich Re, 2016).  
 
Hardware damages and faults will be unavoidable. That said,  autonomous systems require some level 
of fault tolerance or redundancy. Given inoperable or damaged hardware (i.e. sensors, actuators etc.), 
AVs can maintain a limited level of safe control. Identifying unreliable sensors and recalibrating 
accordingly is a complex task (Anderson et al., 2014b) and will be influential risk factors to consider. 
The ability to safely continue (fail-operational) or stop (fail-stop) in the event of any hardware damage 
or fault is referred to as graceful degradation (Anderson et al., 2014b, Koopman and Wagner, 2016a).  
OEMs leverage the capabilities of a range of sensors and the fusion of sensor data negates individual 
weaknesses (Varghese and Boone, 2015). For instance, LIDAR is a favourable sensor due to its accuracy 
and is the primary sensor for Google’s car. However, it is less accurate than radar for detecting speed 
(Varghese and Boone, 2015). If one fails, the AV must recalibrate and continue or stop safely i.e. 
gracefully degrade. Likewise, hardware costs will be a significant risk factor. For example, LIDAR costs 
approximately $70,000 (Varghese and Boone, 2015), increasing claims losses. Conversely, automated 
features might reduce accident severities rates by mitigating damages (Shannon et al., 2017). OEMs 
will employ different arrangements of sensors and the overall fusion accuracy, fault tolerance and cost 
will play central roles in risk analysis. 
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Liability delegation becomes increasingly more difficult as the number of potentially at-fault parties 
grows. OEMs, network provider, security and hardware suppliers and even mechanics may be held 
liable (Koopman and Wagner, 2017). For instance, OEMs will be responsible with informing owners of 
maintenance, replacement and software update requirements (Munich Re, 2016). Alternatively, 
vehicle owners may need to pay more attention to the vehicle condition. However, an average driver 
may be incapable of noticing complex hardware or system faults (Koopman and Wagner, 2017). 
Moreover, failure to update software or illegally modifying their vehicle will preclude owners from 
claiming (Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, 2016). Risk assessors will need to consider 
where liability lies under different accident scenarios. 
 
2.2 Software 
The reliability of an autonomous system effectively hinges on its ability to safely traverse public roads 
and handle virtually any traffic scenario.  AVs rely on machine learning techniques to take in the reams 
of sensor generated data, evaluate the driving scenario and make decisions accordingly. That said, 
machine learning is based on inductive learning and relies on training datasets. For example, 
pedestrian detection systems may consider only people who walk on two legs if datasets excluded 
those in wheelchairs (Koopman and Wagner, 2016a). How systems react to scenarios absent from the 
training set is uncertain. Ultimately, inconceivable or exceptional scenarios will be inevitable. AVs will 
be vulnerable to “unknown unknowns” (Koopman and Wagner, 2017) and it’s expected to take 
hundreds of millions of autonomous miles to statistically validate AV safety (Kalra and Paddock, 2016). 
The level of testing carried out and the robustness of training datasets will shape the risk profile of 
semi and fully autonomous vehicles. 
 
The architecture of an AV system consist of a perception, decision and action layer (Huang et al., 2016). 
The perception layer or “Making sense of the world“ is one of the most difficult tasks of the 
autonomous system given the complexity of road traffic environments (Anderson et al., 2014b). How 
a system interprets the surrounding traffic scenario governs the actions taken and is a safety-critical 
component of autonomous driving. Perception becomes increasingly more difficult under adverse 
driving settings such as weather, lighting and road conditions. Approximately 30% of reported system 
failures of disengagements in Google/Waymo’s autonomous car were the result of perception 
discrepancies (Waymo, 2017). Early deployment of autonomous systems will likely be limited to 
controlled environments or states to negate high risk scenarios. For instance motorway access (no 
traffic lights, distinct road types etc.) or specific conditions (weather, road conditions etc.) limit  
environment variability (Varghese and Boone, 2015, Koopman and Wagner, 2016a).  
 
2.3 Cyber 
Cyber security and cyber-attacks have arguably generated the most interest in the emerging risk 
landscape. With an increasing level of connectivity among vehicles and greater reliance on 
autonomous functions, cyber risk will become a significant threat. Cyber-attacks can ultimately lead 
to data breaches, cyber extortion, privacy violations, system damages, reputational damage and 
ultimately human costs if safety-critical functions are compromised. Koscher et al. (2010) reveal that 
gaining access to a vehicles electronic control unit (ECU) enables hackers to control a range of safety-
critical components including braking. Moreover, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure 
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(V2I) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity are expected to enhance vehicle capabilities but 
will also increase exposure to cyber-attacks. Vehicles that have been compromised could influence 
the decisions of others through V2V communication (Koopman and Wagner, 2017). For instance, 
incapable (damaged etc.) or hacked vehicles could potentially send false information mistakenly or 
maliciously to one another (Alheeti et al., 2015). At a larger scale, cyber terrorism such as the 
largescale immobilisation of vehicles (Yeomans, 2014b) may lead to relatively unquantifiable and 
uninsurable risks. Some high threat cyber-attacks include GPS spoofing, where false GPS coordinates 
are fed into the vehicle, and blinding cameras (Petit and Shladover, 2015).  
 
Cyber security and data protection will become significant risk factors. AVs collect and store large 
amounts of sensitive data. Secure connections will be required as OEMs remotely update on-board 
technologies (Anderson et al., 2014b). External hardware and software extensions induce cyber 
vulnerabilities. In effect, new security and data protection responsibilities will be established (Pillath, 
2016a). Liable parties in the case of cyber events include OEMs, hardware and software suppliers as 
well as network providers. Risk factors will likely encompass the number of attack surfaces within a 
vehicle i.e. through perception sensors, in-vehicle sensors, in-vehicle devices, maps etc. Additionally, 
the likelihood of successful attacks and the level of security and mitigation techniques employed (Petit 
and Shladover, 2015) will need to be considered. The unpredictable nature of cyber events 
necessitates close surveillance of system activity. Currently, intrusion detection systems (IDS) are used 
to identify cyber events by detecting anomalous or malicious behaviour from network traffic data or 
data flowing from the CAN bus (Symantec Corporation, 2017, Alheeti et al., 2015, Narayanan et al., 
2015) and should be incorporated into the risk assessment.  
 
2.4 Human-Machine Interaction 
Assisted driving technologies require some level of human attentiveness. This becomes particularly 
pertinent at level 3 where the vehicle could, at any given time, notify the driver to intervene in order 
to ensure safety. That said, HMI risks will likely lessen considerably at levels 4 and 5. Level 3 requires 
the driver to be ready to intervene if the automated system is unable to handle the driving task. 
Autonomous mode disengagements occur both manually and automatically. The former relates to 
human intervention to ensure safety. Automatic disengagements are the result of detected anomalies 
or failures in autonomous technologies (including communications, sensors, maps, calibration and 
hardware) where the system returns control to the driver (Waymo, 2017, Dixit et al., 2016). That said, 
it becomes natural for the driver to trust the vehicle technology and become complacent. Some OEMs, 
including Google/Waymo and Ford, have already declared their intention to circumvent Level 3 and 
move directly to 4 and 5. Unique to level 3 automation, as indicated by Ford Motors, is “snoozing-
while-cruising” whereby engineers were prone to fall asleep in the driver’s seat due to increasing trust 
for the autonomous system (Naughton, 2017). A drivers “readiness” or reaction time is influenced by 
a number of factors including distraction, fatigue and engagement in non-driving tasks (Martens and 
van den Beukel, 2013).  
 
Some research has suggested that catastrophic claims will increase given cases where both 
autonomous system and human fail to perceive unusual hazards that may have been obvious to 
attentive drivers (ABI and Thatcham Research, 2017). The level of uncertainty surround HMI risks may 
be met with insurer reluctance to cover (ABI and Thatcham Research, 2017). Furthermore, human 
error continues to be a risk factor in Level 3 and 4 automation as manual control remains an option. 
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The difference being, the extent of exposure to human error risks varies between individuals and trips.  
That said, dynamic risk factors that account for both human and artificial agent individually will be 
paramount to ensure accurate risk analysis. 
 
Driving Data  
This paper utilises UAH-DriveSet, a dataset comprising of over 500 minutes of naturalistic driving data 
collected from six drivers in Madrid. They simulated three different behavioural patterns – normal, 
drowsy and aggressive. Each driver was instructed to exhibit the above behaviour on two routes, one 
of which is primarily motorway and the other secondary roads. Normal driving refers to the driver 
behaving as he/she typically would. It is important to note that this may not be the safest he/she could 
have possibly driven. For drowsy behaviour, the drivers were asked to simulate sleepiness which 
would lead to improper road scene monitoring. For aggressive driving, the driver was asked to behave 
as aggressively as possible, without placing the driver at risk of an accident (Romera et al., 2016). Raw 
data is gathered from a smartphone-based application called DriveSafe (Romera et al., 2016). Readings 
from accelerometer and GPS sensors are examined. We extract and employ 5 features for our anomaly 
detection model which are used to detect anomalous vehicle states: 
1) Acceleration Z axis (Longitudinal) 
2) Acceleration Y axis (Lateral) 
3) Acceleration X axis (Vertical) 
4) Velocity 
5) Velocity over the Limit 
 
The choice of factors to include was based on their potential influence to driving risk as per current 
insurance practices. Handel et al. (2014) indicated that acceleration, braking,  absolute speeding, 
relative speeding, cornering, elapsed distance, time of day and location are significant and actuarially 
relevant in the context of driving risk. Given the limited dataset, time of day, driving distance and 
location are excluded. The chosen features encapsulate the actuarially relevant factors outlined by 
Handel et al. (2014). Other available features such as roll, pitch or yaw angles could also be of 
significance(Romera et al., 2016). However, an investigation into the relevant risk factors is currently 
beyond the scope of this research and may vary with autonomous and manual driving. 
 
Each random variable is relatively normal, consistent with our methodological approach. We took the 
log of variable 5 to generate a closer representation of a normal distribution. Our data reflects driving 
patterns of manually driven vehicles. However, the driving task, whether undertaken by man or 
machine remain the same. That is, anomalous vehicle patterns or behaviours, identified from 
accelerometer and GPS sensors, will appear the same regardless of the level of automation. 
 
Methodology 
This paper provides an approach to dynamically assess semi-autonomous vehicles risks based on 
sensor generated telematics data. This approach centres on identifying vehicles deviating markedly 
from modelled normal driving patterns. Telematics data is analysed and anomalies detected per 
second. This real-time analysis of driving patterns supports a more dynamic and transparent means of 
risk pricing for insurers. Drivers/Autonomous systems can be categorised into high and low risk 
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categories at different stages of a journey depending on their behaviour and in particular, how often 
autonomous functionalities are utilised. Effectively, anomaly detection systems can be employed to 
monitor and diagnose autonomous “robots” given the infeasibility to account for all possible hardware 
faults (Khalastchi et al., 2011, Waymo, 2017).  Our methodology is divided into two steps: 
 
1. MVG Anomaly Detection Model 
2. Location-Based Risk Assessment 
 
4.1 Multivariate Gaussian (MVG) Anomaly Detection 
The machine learning, anomaly detection approach follows that of Castignani et al. (2017) who were 
first to apply a MVG model to detect anomalous driving behaviour. We utilise this approach to identify 
anomalies in accelerometer and GPS sensor readings and objectively determine vehicle risk levels. The 
MVG-based anomaly detection approach allows us to identify anomalous sensor readings without any 
preliminary knowledge of detected outcomes (Castignani et al., 2017). That is, the model is not 
preconditioned to identify specific anomalies and can be continually updated. Additionally, this 
approach incorporates correlations between variables. The MVG probability density function (PDF) is 
given by: 
 










(𝑥 − 𝜇)𝑇 Σ−1 (𝑥 − 𝜇)) (1) 
 
The estimated mean of each variable and covariance is denoted by 𝜇 and  𝛴 respectively. For each 
feature vector 𝑥, based on observed combination of values from the selected features, the PDF 
calculates the probability of occurrence and allows us to categorise each observation as common or 
anomalous. Our anomaly detection approach is trained with the dataset associated with normal 
driving behaviour as outlined in Section 3. Training refers to parameterising the model using the 
training dataset. The model is subsequently applied and tested on the entire dataset including drowsy 
and aggressive driving behaviours. Aggressive and drowsy driving patterns are not included in the 
training set as such driving behaviours may have been incorrectly interpreted as normal in our model. 
 
In the initial training phase, the model parameters 𝜇 (variable mean) and  𝛴 (covariance) are estimated 
over the number of observation, denoted 𝑚:  
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The next step is to assign a quantile value 𝑄𝑙𝑖𝑚, which is derived by a cut-off probability value denoted 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚. Observations are classified as anomalous for probabilities below 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚. We set the quantile cut-
off point to be 0.01 or  𝜇 ± 2.5𝜎 as per Castignani et al. (2017). Decreasing 𝑄𝑙𝑖𝑚 would naturally results 
in higher counts of anomalies and vice versa.   𝑄(𝑥) represents the approximate quantile value of the 
features x corresponding to input observations. Once the probability of occurrence is calculated, by 
the density function 𝑝(𝑥 | 𝜇, Σ), the resulting quantile value, 𝑄(𝑥),  is compared to 𝑄𝑙𝑖𝑚.   
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the MVG-based anomaly detection model using two example features in each 
graph for illustrative purposes. 99% of observation are enclosed within the first red line and deviations 
beyond that reflect lower probability areas and anomalous observations. Further deviations are 








, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝(𝑥 | 𝜇, Σ) ≤ 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚
 (4) 
 
An interesting consequence within our model is that some over-speeding, shown in the bottom right 
graph in Figure 2, is considered normal given that a significant portion of driving in our sample set was 
over the limit. Figure 2 illustrates the training data which consists of only normal driving behaviours. 
This might raise the question as to how AVs should behave in mixed-traffic scenarios. For instance, 
should they conform to the surrounding traffic’s driving manner? Given this observation, we also 





Fig. 2. Two Feature Anomaly Detection Models relating to normal driving only. Each figure represents a two-
factor model. 99% of observations are contained within the first red oval in each model. Further out 
enclosures represent examples of lower probability areas and observations are considered anomalous. The 
shape of the red enclosures reflect the positive or negative relationship between variables consistent with the 
MVG approach. 
 
The dataset utilised in this paper is limited and subject to particular biases that wouldn’t necessarily 
represent a larger sample set. For instance, the exceptional level of speeding exhibited in Figure 2 
(bottom right) which evidently creates a bimodal distribution. This shows drivers speeding at three 
times the limit.  However, with a more diverse range of drivers and road types, the effect of such 
outliers would be constrained and we would expect speeding to center around 0 i.e. at the limit. Given 
the limitations of our dataset in terms of sample size and road diversity, a more extensive analysis of 
the particular variables is unwarranted. Moreover, it is also evident from the anomaly detection model 
that these outliers, such as the second peak in the bimodal speeding distribution signifying significant 
over speeding, are considered anomalous which is an accurate and desirable classification. 
Figure 3 further demonstrates the anomaly detection model for a single vehicle based on our 
extracted features. Figure 3 depicts two separate journey segments relating to aggressive driving with 
the applied anomaly detection model. Anomalies are highlighted as red bars that vary in length, 
depending on the severity. Denser red columns indicate sequences of anomalies that represent 
prolonged adverse behaviour such as braking events, speeding etc. The sequence and independence 
of events may prove valuable to evaluating AV risks. For instance, periods of unusually large amounts 
of anomalies may be indicative of a vehicle fault whereas single isolated anomalies may be due to 
temporary  external conditions. Examining the top graph in Figure 3, three notable deceleration events 
(in yellow) are identified as anomalous. Harsh braking events such as these might typically indicate 
how observant or aggressive the driver is (Handel et al., 2014). From an AV perspective, sequences of 
these events may be the case of internal hardware or software errors or faults. From the bottom graph 
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in Figure 3, a dense series of anomalies is observed relating to severe speeding behaviour. The vehicle 
was almost 3 times the limit corresponding to the period of time just as the motorway ends and the 
speed limit falls. 
 
Fig. 3. Detected Anomalies relating to aggressive driving. This figure depicts detected Anomalies of an 
individual journey portion based on our extracted features. This figure represents an extract from a single 
journey. Anomalies are depicted as red bars, which vary in size given the anomaly severity. The left y-axis 
denotes g-force. The right y-axis denotes the log of speeding.  
 
4.2 Location Based Risk Assessment 
Deviations from normal, safe operational behaviour in autonomous mode is due to either temporary 
external circumstances (cyber, HMI’s, environmental etc.) or internal hardware and/or software 
problems as explored in Section 2. The potential risk exposures related to autonomous systems will 
likely be conditionally dependent on the location. That is, faults will depend on the road type, lighting 
conditions, traffic density, pedestrian presence, other road users etc. Thus, we further evaluate high 
risk locations. This approach can provide further insights into how and why autonomous systems fail. 
By knowing when and where the vehicle behaved poorly, insurers and OEMs can reverse engineer the 
symptom (i.e. hazardous driving) and better assess the hardware, software, cyber and HMI risks 
outlined in Section 2. 
 
We define risk as the weighted sum of detected anomalies, accounting for the number and size of 
anomalies or deviations. They are calculated per second to allow OEMs and insurers to continuously 










Where 𝑆𝑡 and 𝑁𝑡 denote the severity and count of anomalies at time t. Figure 4 demonstrates the 
various risk scores for each journey. Scores range from 100 (least risky) to 0 (highest risk level) where 
each additional anomaly decreases a drivers score, reflecting risk exposures due to risky driving 
patterns. For the purpose of this paper, 𝑅𝑡 is an increasing function only. That is, the driver is not 
rewarded for good driving. Equation 4 could be modified to enable 𝑅𝑡 to decrease over time if no 
anomalies have been observed over a particular period of time but this is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
Fig. 4. Various Risk Scores. Individual risk scores calculated per second for each journey. Risk scores are 
between 0 and 100 and recalculated per second.  
 
Intuitively, risk scores would be normalized by distance travelled. That is, drivers/Autonomous 
systems exhibiting anomalous behaviour more frequently are naturally at a relatively higher risk. 
However, there is only two fixed routes of similar distances in our sample dataset and so we did not 
normalize in this fashion. Moreover, as per Joubert et al. (2016), we would normalized our dataset 
relative to the best and worst observed driving behaviours. For instance the worst score is set to 0 
whereas the best is 100 within our [0, 100] risk score range. With this approach, driving risk is 
proportional to others drivers within a portfolio of risks. However, for the purpose of this paper and 
given the limited dataset, we examine raw risk scores only. 
To assess vehicle risk exposures based on location, we map anomalies to their geographic coordinates 
as shown in Figure 5. Location-based risk assessment facilitates the identification of high risk areas 
pertaining to both human and autonomous systems. From the perspective of autonomous driving, 
identifying high risk areas and their corresponding characteristics can provide greater insights into AV 
hazards. That is, road type, road quality, traffic and pedestrian density, weather conditions and typical 
driving patterns can be derived, all of which can exacerbate AV vulnerabilities and play a role in SAV 
risk analysis. For example, software and hardware susceptibilities can be exacerbated due to 
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environmental conditions. Figure 5 demonstrates anomaly and speeding behaviours over two sample 




Fig. 5.  Location-Based Risk Analysis. Figure 5 a) depicts anomalous activity. Green, orange and red represent 
severities up to the 50th percentile, between 50th and 75th percentiles and the 90th percentile respectively. 
Figure 5 b) depicts speeding behaviour. Green, orange and red represent speeding between 100%-110%, 




The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolving transportation risk landscape and quantitatively 
assess the risks of vehicles with semi-autonomous capabilities. Sensor generated, telematics data 
enables insurers to utilise enormous reams of driving data. In particular, when and where autonomous 
mode is (de)activated and human error removed. Blindly employing traditional, reactive risk 
assessment approaches will likely prove inadequate given the variability of human/machine control 
and the limited historical data. Employing telematics data outlined in Section 3, we initially quantify 
the risks associated with vehicles with at most, assisted automation. We subsequently inferred risk 
parameters for vehicles equipped with autonomous capabilities. In particular, we assume 
autonomous highway autopilot is equipped in the early deployment of autonomous technologies and 
we subsequently infer risk scores. For instance, Google’s self-driving car has reported approximately 
0.18 disengagements per autonomous mile (Dixit et al., 2016). Disengagements refer to safety-critical 
errors within the system where the vehicle passes control back to the human driver. Autonomous 
driving removes human error but technological error emerges. That said, disengagement statistics 
indicate that these errors are likely to be less frequent. As a result,  given the limited driving time 
examined within our sample dataset, virtually zero errors or anomalies would be expected. 





5.1 Automation Levels 0 – 2: Assisted Technology 
The MVG model employed enables the identification and localisation of risky driving behaviours as 
shown in Figure 6 below. Figure 6 illustrates aggregated anomalies, by severity, for all normal, drowsy 
and aggressive driving behaviours. Clearly, the number and severity of detected anomalies intensifies 
for drowsy and again for aggressive driving behaviour as expected. Localising risk exposures as such 
enables a more accurate risk analysis of vehicles at any level of automation. 
 
Fig. 6. Location-Based Aggregated Anomalies for each Behavioural Pattern with no Automation. Figure 6 a) 
depicts Normal, b) Drowsy and c) Aggressive driving behaviours. 
 
Table II demonstrates the risk assessment results for vehicle equipped with assisted technologies. That 
is, Level 0, 1 and 2 automation. Risk scores and speeding frequency results are linearly scaled and 
classified by their relative distance to the maximum and minimum observed values, illustrated by their 
colour scale ranging from red (worst) to green (best). Based on this risk assessment, we found that 
driver 1 had, on average, the highest risk exposure (66 out of 100) and greatest proportion of time 
speeding (63% of the time over the limit). The lower half of Table II demonstrates the proportion of 
anomalies and over-speeding behaviour per road type. The majority of anomalies were observed on 
primary link roads whereas the majority of speeding was seen on primary roads. With additional claims 
data, driver can be classified into risk pools associated with particular frequency and severity rates in 






















Table II. Risk Scores and Speeding Results for Level 0, 1 and 2 Vehicle Automation. Risk scores depicted on the 
left are out of 100 (least risky). Speeding frequency represents the proportion of time spend driving over the 
speed limit for each journey. The average result for each driver is displayed. The lower table represents the 
percentage of anomalies and speeding exhibited per road type. 
 
 
5.2 Automation Levels 3 & 4: Split Risk Profiles 
SAVs will see split risk profiles as control is shared between human and artificial agent leading to two 
distinct behavioural patterns. As mentioned, in the early stages of deployment SAV will likely be 
constrained to limited driving conditions. Strict vehicle usage rules may be necessary to minimise the 
risks until enough data and experience has been gathered to statistically validate AV safety. For 
instance, motorways may be better suited given the absence of pedestrians, junctions, traffic lights 
etc. and better quality infrastructure that alternative road types (Varghese and Boone, 2015). In Figure 
8, we make the assumption that the human driver utilises autonomous highway autopilot on and 
drives manually everywhere else. Figure 7 demonstrates the split risk profile of  SAVs. The blue line 
reflects activated autonomous driving modes, where we would now anticipate close to zero anomalies 
in comparison to manually driven road segments. Effectively, autonomous driving is assumed 
considerably safer as human error is removed from the equation. In fact, Google’s car saw just 1.1 and 
0.2 disengagements per 1000 miles in 2015 and 2016 respectively (Waymo, 2017). Thus, we might 
expect to observe virtually perfect behaviour under autonomous control within the limited distance 
travelled within our dataset. Moreover, the intrinsic behaviour of AVs will be to strictly obey traffic 
rules so we expect to see no speeding behaviour. 
 
HUMAN Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6 Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6
Journey 1 64 91 92 93 47 89 77% 8% 9% 14% 10% 5%
Journey 2 80 65 96 85 23 83 68% 45% 4% 35% 60% 6%
Journey 3 62 87 97 85 100 99 30% 4% 23% 26% 17% 3%
Journey 4 70 75 71 71 86 79 77% 76% 43% 29% 24% 3%
Journey 5 75 79 68 92 53 23 8% 41% 46% 3% 67% 16%
Journey 6 27 58 73 54 93 91% 66% 57% 19% 12%
Journey 7 85 64 89 86% 48% 4%
Average 66 74 83 81 67 75 63% 41% 30% 18% 31% 7%
Speeding FrequencyRisk Scores 
HUMAN Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6 Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6
Motorway 7% 12% 16% 14% 15% 17% 24% 20% 13% 10% 14% 10%
Motorway Link 11% 16% 0% 13% 6% 7% 9% 5% 0% 2% 7% 6%
Primary 35% 23% 13% 16% 38% 35% 58% 64% 76% 70% 60% 43%
Primary Link 47% 49% 71% 58% 41% 41% 8% 8% 11% 16% 14% 41%




Fig. 7.  Location-Based Aggregated Anomalies for each Behavioural Pattern with Semi-Autonomous 
Capabilities. Figure 7 a) depicts Normal, b) Drowsy and c) Aggressive driving behaviours. The blue line 
represents motorway roads where autonomous driving is activated and liability switches to OEMs. Anomalies 
and speeding patterns are assumed to be near zero given the elimination of human error. 
 
Table III demonstrates our risk assessment results as humans are removed from the driving task under 
motorway conditions. Quantifying vehicle-centric risk exposures, as outlined in Section 2, can be 
derived from vehicle monitoring during this period and human risk exposures elsewhere. Product 
liability, product recall and cyber policies will be activated as autonomous mode is triggered. Table 3 
below incorporates the split risk profiles and, on average, risk scores and speeding patterns have 
improved. The lower half of Table III demonstrates the elimination of anomalous and speeding 
behaviour on motorways. Probabilities have been updated to reflect the elimination of anomalies on 
motorways. For instance, 48% of remaining anomalies associated with Driver 1 are now seen on 
primary link roads. Objectively, these risk reductions should be incorporated into insurance premiums 
given the perceived decreased risk. Examining driver 1, the risk score improved by 2 and speeding was 
decreased by 14%. Driver 6 had a risk score improvement of 9, a 12% increase and a 2% reduction in 
speeding. If premiums directly reflected a drivers risk exposure, we could suggest a parallel decrease 
in premium of 12% and further reductions for improved speeding behaviours. However, premiums 
mirror, not only expected claims but also underwriting expenses and profit margins (Desyllas and Sako, 
2013). Nevertheless, a telematics approach to SAV enables insurers to realise the benefits of 



















Table III. Risk Scores and Speeding Results for Level 3 and 4 Vehicle Automation. Risk scores depicted on the 
left are out of 100 (least risky). Speeding frequency represents the proportion of time spend driving over the 
speed limit for each journey. The average result for each driver is displayed and arrows representing either 
improving, deteriorating or unchanging results due to autonomous technology. The lower table represents the 
percentage of anomalies and speeding exhibited per road type which have been recalculated based on the 
elimination of anomalies on motorways 
 
 
During the transition from assisted to automated, risk prices could be inferred through human-
machine comparisons. Although no claims history exists for artificial agents, AV exhibiting similar risk 
scores to human counterparts, say between 95-100, may pay premiums analogous to that human 
operator. Naturally, this excludes cyber and recall risk exposures and considers only vehicle errors and 
faults. Nevertheless, premiums calculations based on relative performance could provide a means of 
initially insuring SAVs and fostering autonomous technology adoption. Alternatively, AV deployment 
will likely hinge on meeting specific failure requirements. For example, Due to the potentially high 
severity of aircraft risks (fatalities) the permissible catastrophic failure rate for sufficient safety 
standards is one per one billion hours(Koopman and Wagner, 2016b). The same standard might apply 
to AV given the potential severity and any deviations from normal behaviour, determined from the 
proposed model, correspondingly increases the likelihood from 1 in 1x10-9 hours. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a means for insurers and risk assessors alike to manage the 
enormous and complex streams of driving data collected and stored by SAVs. Anomalies can be 
detected and risk scores determined without a predefined understanding of anomalous activity. The 
increasingly automated and connected transportation landscape may force insurers to embrace the 
growing level of digital information (big data) and incorporate more proactive approaches to emerging 
risk assessment. Online machine learning techniques, for example, is the process of continuously 
updating and refining models as new data becomes available (Bolón-Canedo et al., 2015). 
Autonomous technology on public roads is still in its infancy. Given the current limited experience and 
data, insurers will need to continually update prior beliefs in a dynamic risk landscape similar to online 
SAV Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6 Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6
Motorway 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Motorway Link 14% 25% 0% 16% 6% 12% 16% 13% 1% 4% 12% 9%
Primary 38% 26% 16% 20% 45% 44% 66% 70% 85% 73% 63% 45%
Primary Link 48% 49% 84% 64% 49% 44% 17% 13% 14% 22% 19% 46%
% of Anomalies per Road Type % of Speeding per Road Type
SAV Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6 Driver 1 Driver 2 Driver 3 Driver 4 Driver 5 Driver 6
Journey 1 64 91 93 93 52 91 77% 4% 6% 14% 10% 5%
Journey 2 80 75 96 85 40 91 68% 15% 2% 35% 10% 6%
Journey 3 62 93 97 85 100 99 6% 3% 23% 26% 17% 3%
Journey 4 79 75 71 71 86 79 8% 76% 43% 29% 24% 3%
Journey 5 80 79 68 94 53 60 8% 41% 46% 2% 67% 8%
Journey 6 27 58 73 81 93 91% 66% 57% 7% 12%
Journey 7 85 64 90 86% 48% 4%
Average 68 76 83 86 70 84 49% 36% 29% 17% 23% 5%
Change 2 2 0 5 3 9 14% 5% 1% 1% 8% 2%
Risk Scores Speeding Frequency
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learning techniques. Sufficient frequency and severity data might take years to acquire. Closer 
collaboration between insurers and OEMs coupled with telematics availability can enable insurers to 
categorise SAVs more effectively and eventually quantify accident frequency and severity rates more 
accurately. 
 
This paper endeavours to identify normal driving behaviour and consequently detect abnormalities. 
However, we were limited with respect to dataset size (500 minutes) and source (i.e. accelerometer 
and GPS). Due to these restriction in existing datasets there are limitation to the model but this 
approach represents a step forward in term of methodological approaches to the problem of SAV risk 
analysis. Machine learning methods typically improve as increasingly more data becomes available. 
When widely implemented, and as more driving data is collected from a more diverse range of drivers, 
roads and environmental conditions,  the proposed anomaly detection model will begin to reflect true 
normal driving behaviour and better detect anomalous activity. Likewise, model parameters can be 
updated to reflect normal autonomous driving. Ultimately, as our telematics dataset grows, the 
modelled normal sensor readings will converge to the true norm. 
 
Although the approach in this paper was applied to manually driven vehicles, the methods used hold 
for vehicles with higher levels of automation.  In fact, the addition of more advanced sensors such as 
cameras, LIDAR and radar will offer an increasing number of risk factors to consider. Although only 4 
driving factors were chosen in this paper, there are a number of alternatives that could better reflect 
driving risk of both human and autonomous system. For instance, factors such as Time-to-Collision 
(TTC) and Time-to-Lane-Crossing (TTLC) will become available with additional sensors. The anomaly 
detection methodology provided in this paper could also seamlessly be applied to these more 
advanced risk factors. Naturally, as more telematics data is collected from a number of additional 
sources, we can begin to comprehensively quantify vehicle risk exposures.   
 
Conclusion 
As we progress towards semi- and fully-autonomous vehicles, the risk and liability landscape of road 
accidents will evolve considerably. Insurers and manufacturers need to better understand this 
emerging technology in order to quantify the risks and prepare for future claims. Vehicles will see split 
risk profiles as control alternates from human to artificial agent and risks migrate between 
technological and human related vulnerabilities. A key problem insurer and risk assessors face is the 
lack of experience and historical data to accurately assess semi-autonomous vehicle risks. This paper 
offers an approach to assess the risks of SAVs by utilising a machine learning anomaly detection 
method to objectively monitor and evaluate vehicle risk exposures. The MVG approach can identify 
risky patterns based on the number and severity of anomalies and weighted average risk score is 
calculated to classify vehicle. We extend previous literature by investigating evolving autonomous 
technology risks in addition to human errors as a step towards solving the problem of semi-
autonomous vehicle risk analysis. The MVG approach enables an objective risk assessment and can be 
seamlessly applied to alternative data sources linked to autonomous technologies. Ultimately, the 
potential loss exposures to both insurers and OEMs in an increasingly automated transportation 
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All developed economies mandate at least third party auto insurance resulting in a vast global liability 
industry. The evolution towards semi-autonomous and eventually driverless vehicles will progressively 
remove the leading cause of vehicle accidents, human error, and significantly lower vehicle accident 
rates. However, this transition will force a departure from existing actuarial methods requires careful 
management to ensure risks are correctly assigned. Personal motor insurance lines are anticipated to 
diminish as liability shifts towards OEMs, tier 1 and 2 suppliers and software developers. Vehicle 
accident risks will hinge on vehicular characteristics in addition to driver related risks as drivers 
alternate between autonomous and manual driving modes. This paper proposes a Bayesian Network 
statistical risk estimation approach that can accommodate changing risk levels and the emergence of 
new risk structures. We demonstrate the use of this method for a Level 3 semi-autonomous vehicle 
for two scenarios, one where the driver is in control and one where the vehicle is in control. This 
approach is especially suited to use telematics data generated from the vehicle inherent technologies. 
We validate the efficacy of this approach from the perspective of the insurer and discuss how vehicle 
technology development will require a greater degree of collaboration between the insurance 
company and the manufacturers in order to develop a greater understanding of the risks semi-
autonomous and fully autonomous vehicles. 
 
Funding: This work was supported by the VI-DAS (Vision Inspired Driver Assistance Systems) a 
European Commission, Horizon 2020 research consortium [grant number690772] 
 











The advancement towards fully autonomous or driverless vehicles will significantly disrupt the motor 
insurance industry. Motor insurance premiums calculations are now based on the frequency and 
severity of historical accidents. As we move from manual to semi-autonomous to fully driverless 
vehicles, accident frequency rates will be reduced as human error, the foremost cause of vehicle 
accidents, is progressively removed. Accident risks will not be eliminated entirely but increased vehicle 
safety will ultimately translate into lower claims losses and premiums (Albright et al., 2015). All 
developed economies mandate at least third party motor insurance (Tse, 2009), however, personal 
motor insurance lines are anticipated to diminish as liability is ultimately shifted from driver to the 
vehicle or product. Risks associated with vehicle accidents will hinge on the vehicle capabilities as 
much as, or more than driver related risks.  
As the personal motor insurance market diminishes, demand for commercial product and product 
liability insurance will increase as partial or full liability is transferred to original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM), tier 1 and 2 suppliers and software companies. New technology related risks 
will accompany the progressive transfer of liability from driver to vehicle. Emphasis will shift from 
driver characteristics to vehicular features, forcing a departure from traditional underwriting 
methods. New risks anticipated to emerge include sensor failure and cyber vulnerabilities which are 
likely to become more prevalent. Single journeys could see split risk profiles as drivers switch between 
manual and autonomous driving modes. That is, the likelihood of an accident fluctuates as drivers 
alternate between manual and autonomous modes. Alternative insurance models may be required to 
accommodate this form of risk structure (Rao, 2016). These emerging risks and liability concerns are 
anticipated to stimulate demand for product liability, product recall and cyber coverages. In view of 
these evolving risk and liability exposures, motor insurance companies will be forced to reconsider 
existing actuarial approaches that rely on risk proxies for driver’s true risk levels. This paper proposes 
a statistical risk pricing approach that can accommodate the shifting nature of vehicle risks and 
changing customer demands as we transition to the next step towards full automation. We employ 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) to model expected claims losses whilst utilising real-time telematics data 
gathered from the vehicles inherent sensor technologies.  
BNs provide an intuitive graphical representation that models the probabilistic relationships between 
sets of correlated variables (Holmes and Jain, 2008). BNs have been applied to various risk assessment 
problems across a range of disciplines such as finance, medicine, safety and law (Fenton and Neil, 
2012). However, to our knowledge, BNs have not explicitly been applied to motor insurance risk 
pricing. BNs have, however, been applied to traffic accident analysis. De Oña et al. (2011), Mujalli and 
De Ona (2011) and de Oña et al. (2013) model accident severity with the use of 18 factors that 
incorporate driver and vehicle characteristics, environmental and road features. Simoncic (2004) 
employs BNs to model two-car accident injury severity levels. Gregoriades and Mouskos (2013) 
employ BNs to identify different roadway conditions and “black spot” areas. Using BNs, Zhu et al. 
(2017) assessed driver behaviour risks and investigated the relationship between accident occurrence 
and driver behaviour under various contextual circumstances. 
The sale of autonomous vehicles will be gradually phased through a series of incremental steps 
towards full autonomy. SAE (International, 2016) classified six levels of vehicle automation spanning 
from zero (Level zero) to full automation (Level 5) as illustrated in 1, on the following page. The next 
anticipated phase in the evolution of autonomous vehicles is Level 3 Automation, the focus of this 
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paper. Table 1, below, demonstrates the transfer of the driving task from driver to system at each 
level. Driver involvement is gradually removed as autonomous functionality progresses. Level 3 
Automation has the potential to significantly alter liability and risk exposures of a vehicle as the vehicle 
begins to exhibit driverless capabilities. Level 3 vehicles can perform many aspects of driving including 
steering, acceleration/deceleration and monitoring of the driving environment but requires the driver 
to always be prepared to intervene at the vehicle’s request (Pillath, 2016b). However, there has been 
arguments against human supervision, particularly after Tesla’s crash (Sparrow and Howard, 2017). It 
will likely be dangerous as human are expected to remain aware and is unlikely to satisfy customer 
demands (Sparrow and Howard, 2017). A significant distinction can be seen in Table 1 between Partial 
(Level 2) Automation, where the driver is responsible for monitoring the driving environment, and 
Conditional (Level 3) Automation, where the driving system can now undertake most aspects of the 
driving task autonomously (International, 2016). This distinction will be important to motor insurers 
as liability can be shifted entirely to the vehicle, particularly as the driver can now attend to other 
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Table 1 - Levels of Driving Automation. This table exhibits the 6 Levels of automation and their respective 
driving system functionalities. Each progressive Level enhances the systems driving capabilities until full 
autonomy is reached at Level 5. The rightmost column demonstrates likely shifts in insurance lines at each 
















Motor Insurance and a Changing Risk Landscape 
Motor insurance is essentially an agreement to transfer risk to the insurer for a fee (premium) 
proportional to the level of risk. However, risk levels vary with each policyholder in terms of the 
likelihood of claims being made (Claim frequency) and the size of claims given an event (Claim 
severity). Pure premiums are priced by multiplying the expected number of claims by the size of each 
claim (Ohlsson and Johansson, 2010):  
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑥 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 
The number and size of future claims made by policyholders are, however, unknown and are modelled 
as random variables (Tse, 2009). Claims and Accident risk modelling is separated into accident-
frequency(Lord and Mannering, 2010), accident-severity (Savolainen et al., 2011) and aggregate or 
total accident risk(Chiou and Fu, 2013). Models are determines by the fit given the specific accident 
and claims data. The first step in insurance ratemaking is to model accident frequency. Frequency is a 
nonnegative integer that traditionally follows a Poisson or negative binomial (NB) distribution(Yip and 
Yau, 2005). The latter corrects the problem of overdispersion, inherent to the Poisson model(David 
and Jemna, 2015). Further examples of accident frequency models include the multivariate, zero-
inflated Poisson and NB, random effects count and duration models(Mannering and Bhat, 2014).  
The next step is to model the likely cost given a claim/accident. Crash-injury severity is typically 
modelled as a level classification outcome, either binary or multiple response, which may range from 
damage only to fatality.  Savolainen et al. (2011) presents a comprehensive assessment of accident 
severity methodologies, some of which include binary logistic and probit models (Kononen et al., 
2011), (Moudon et al., 2011), multinomial logit (Ye and Lord, 2014), (Savolainen and Ghosh, 2008), 
nested logit (Savolainen and Mannering, 2007) and ordered logit and ordered probit models (Zhu and 
Srinivasan, 2011). Typically, Statistical distributions for motor insurance accident severities include 
gamma, pareto, log-normal, log gamma and Weibull which account for heavy tails given the presence 
of significantly large but infrequent claims (Renshaw, 1994), (Achieng, 2010).  
Examining accident/claim frequency and severity independently only provides limited accident 
analysis insights. An integrated frequency and severity model, in the form total or aggregate accident 
risk, is  necessary for comprehensive insights into accident risk analysis (Chiou and Fu, 2013) and for 
actuaries, to determine premiums. Accident risk is modelled as a real number outcome and is 
determined through a frequency-severity approach from which pure premiums are derived. The 
likelihood of a claim (frequency) and the conditional costs (severity) are modelled and pure premiums 
are calculated as the product of the two. However, frequency and severity are assumed independent 
where correlations between claim count and size may be present. Alternative approaches incorporate 
dependencies between the two such as multivariate regression models to calculate accident 
frequency rates for different levels of severity (Shi et al., 2015) (Ma and Kockelman, 2006). 
 
Modelling frequency and severity typically entails employing a number of risk ratings factors in order 
to differentiate policyholders into pools or risk classes. Each pool reflects a risk level from which 
premiums are derived. Risk rating factors typically act as a proxy for the driver’s true risk exposures. 
Differentiating risk pools is achieved through various regression analysis methods such as Generalised 
Linear Models. Influential risk factors are essentially determined by whether or not they correlate with 
historical statistics concerning accident frequency and severity rates (Ohlsson and Johansson, 2010). 
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Factors include driver characteristics – age, marital status, driver license, residence, vehicle use, past 
claims/driving record, traffic violations, occupation, driver training, distance travelled, garage 
ownership – and vehicle characteristics – vehicle make and model, vehicle age, engine capacity, horse 
power and more (Lemaire et al., 2016). For instance, based on historical data, drivers under 20 are 
statistically more likely to be involved in an accident or to receive a fine and are therefore categorised 
in a higher risk pool (TheZebra, 2016).  
Usage-Based Insurance (UBI) is a telematics based alternative whereby a policyholder’s risk profile is 
determined by actual driving use or travel exposure and behavioural characteristics. Telematics is the 
transfer of data to and from a moving vehicle (Anderson et al., 2014a). The two most common UBI 
products are Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) and Pay-How-You-Drive (PHYD) (Husnjak et al., 2015). PAYD 
premiums are typically pay per kilometre/mile and often include when and where the vehicle is driven. 
PHYD premiums, however, account for driving style and behaviour. Risk is associated with driving 
behaviour rather than total exposure (Tselentis et al., 2016). Driver behaviour evaluation could 
support a more accurate representation of a driver’s propensity to risk (Meiring and Myburgh, 2015). 
Telematics systems detect and monitor driver behaviour in real time. In addition to static measures 
(age, residence etc.), telematics-based models can incorporate dynamic measures such as journey 
distance and time taken, time of day, acceleration and braking behaviour, driving smoothness, 
absolute and relative speeding, swerving, harsh cornering and geographical location (Husnjak et al., 
2015). Environmental factors such as weather conditions, visibility and road conditions could be 
utilised to contextualise telematics data but are generally not included.  
Error! Reference source not found. below, depicts a possible risk structure for a Level 3 vehicle. 
Telematics-based risk factors, environment characteristics and potential risk factors regarding the 
automated system are illustrated. Liability is split with regards to Level 3 Automation resulting in the 
emergence of new insurance demands. The overall risk level of a vehicle now hinges on both driver 
and vehicle features. To remove human error from the equation, and consequently reduce accident 
risk levels, the driving task shifts to a system that must continuously collect and analyse data regarding 
the surrounding traffic environment. Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Level 3 
Automation will utilise a large number of sensors that can be grouped into three categories: In-vehicle 
sensors, perception sensors and virtual sensors. In-vehicle sensors, which include gyroscope, 
accelerometer, steering angle sensor, odometer and more, monitor the physical properties of the 
vehicle such as turning speed, acceleration and deceleration rates. Perception sensors monitor the 
surrounding environment and include radar (short and long range), vision and ultrasonic sensors. 
These sensors are used for the detection of objects such as vehicles, obstacles, pedestrians and 
cyclists. Finally, virtual sensors provide further information regarding the surrounding environment 
but are not physical sensors. Digital maps and wireless communications are the two most significant. 
Digital maps provide geometric information regarding roads and are used in conjunction with GPS. 
Wireless communications entail vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or/and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
communication which would alleviate some limitations of the perception sensors (Amditis et al., 
2012). Connected vehicles overcome sensor limitations, providing a more comprehensive perception 
of the environment and increasing driving reliability (Talebpour and Mahmassani, 2016). 
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Figure 1 – ADAS Risk Factors. This graphic depicts a range of possible risk ratings factors for driver, 
environment and system risks. This illustrates the dichotomy of risks and the expected demand for new 
insurance products 
 
Autonomous technologies must be capable of detecting risky situations in order to react appropriately 
to mitigate or avoid a collision. A Level 3 vehicle may rely on telematics data to continuously update 
the “state of the world” so that the system can perceive and react to the traffic environment 
(Anderson et al., 2014a). Level 3 vehicles assume full dynamic control under certain conditions and 
must be able to interact with the surrounding traffic scene. This necessitates mathematical models 
capable of predicting the likely evolution of the traffic scene and determining the risk levels associated 
with each scenario and manoeuvre. Physics-based motion models predict future motion through 
physical characteristics such as a vehicles acceleration rate, vehicle position, steering angle, vehicle 
weight and speed. The risk of an accident is typically inferred from the predicted motion of the 
automated vehicle and the surrounding environment. Time-To-Collision (TTC) is one such risk indicator 
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which denotes the time left to react before a collision is imminent (Lefèvre et al., 2014). The 
mathematical backgrounds to motion prediction, TTC and TTR are beyond the scope of this paper but 
the concept of tracking vehicle and object motions and continuously calculating risk levels can be 
utilised by insurance companies to determine a driver/vehicle’s risk exposure by how aggressively the 
vehicle is handled. How often a driver comes close to a vehicle collision can also be a determining risk 
factor. Understanding what type of collision (vehicle, pedestrian, stationary object etc.) and under 
what road and weather conditions was TTC or TTR at its lowest will be an invaluable risk assessment 
tool for motor insurers to determine the likelihood of an accident and the severity if an event occurs. 
Under current actuarial approaches, a driver who utilises the automated system for the majority of 
the journey would pay a similar premium to an identical driver who consistently operates manually. 
Effectively, drivers with less risk exposure (majority autonomous mode) would be forced to subsidise 
those with higher risk exposure (majority manual mode) (Tselentis et al., 2016).   
Conversely, allocating liability may depend on whether the driver or the vehicle was in control at the 
time of the accident and this requires product liability as a risk measure (Amendo et al., 2016, Gurney, 
2013). Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and the suppliers of both hardware and software 
may be held liable while autonomous functions are activated (Stankard, 2014, DiClemente et al., 
2014). Advancing vehicle capabilities will force a shift towards insuring a few OEM’s from emerging 
liability exposures rather than millions of personal coverages (Bertoncello and Wee, 2015). 
Nevertheless, Level 3 Automation entails some proportion of manual operation and so personal 
insurance will still be required. The shift in liability away from drivers will likely be proportional to the 
transfer of control. In other words, as the system takes full control, full liability should follow. Volvo 
has already accepted full liability for losses while autonomous mode is activated but not while under 
manual operation. Google and Mercedes Benz made similar guarantees (Elmer, 2015). Placing fault 
with the driver in a situation where, for example, the software design was at fault would be 
unreasonable and may impede public adoption and further advancements towards full automation. 
Lemaire et al. (2016) outlines the significance of distance travelled as a key risk ratings factor. Joubert 
et al. (2016) evaluates driving behaviour risk levels based on the number of critical events that have 
occur. A critical event entails violations of pre specified thresholds and include speeding over the limit 
or braking at a particularly hard rate. Safe driving behaviour is then determined by the number of 
event counts. Paefgen et al. (2012) determine driver behaviour via harsh longitudinal and lateral 
acceleration, hard braking and swerving. Bergasa et al. (2014) identify driving behaviour by employing 
critical event count rates and the intensity of each event (low, medium, and high). Acceleration, 
braking and turning critical events are calculated per kilometre. Castignani et al. (2015) similarly score 
drivers based on critical event counts and penalised them further depending on the severity of events.  
The performance of vehicle sensors, the reliability of the systems software and a vehicle’s 
susceptibility to hacking are three emerging risks that will become more influential. As liability shifts 
to manufacturers, new lines of insurance will inevitably emerge and become more prominent features 
of motor insurance. Coverage may include product liability, product recall liability (Murphy et al., 
2017b), reputational and cyber security. Insurers will need to know more about vehicle technologies 
and their limitations and less about the user of the vehicle (Yeomans, 2014a). A vehicle’s capability to 
operate in certain harsh weather conditions, such as snow storms, their adaptability to construction 
zones and road closures, their reaction to unforeseen events, etc. will become important factors. The 
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procedure for detecting and notifying vehicle problems or defects may become important an risk 
measure (Amendo et al., 2016).  
Cyber security and data protection will be significant risks that will increase as AV technologies 
advance to deployment stage. Level 3 vehicles will be equipped with the ability to monitor its 
surrounding environment allowing real time information to be used for autonomous driving. They may 
have external software and hardware extensions which are applied and managed by the vehicle 
manufacturer. OEMs may need to update on-board technologies remotely and thus secure 
connections will be an essential feature (Anderson et al., 2014a). This inevitably establishes new 
responsibilities such as data protection and cyber security (Pillath, 2016b). The potential for cyber-
attacks poses considerable data security threats as computer systems can be used to gain access to 
restricted data or disrupt autonomous driving which can ultimately result in vehicle accidents. 
Amendo et al. (Amendo et al., 2016) suggest that, in theory, future autonomous vehicles linked to one 
manufacturer may be vulnerable and hacking a single vehicle could compromise an entire fleet. By 
2020, a predicted 250 million connected cars will have been produced (Meulen and Gartner, 2015). 
Quantifying and managing such a risk is not without difficulty but is likely to be on par with 
catastrophic insurance risk (Amendo et al., 2016).  
An AV acquires raw data from a suite of sensors, perceives the surrounding environment, classifies 
objects, evaluates their possible movements, plans its own trajectory accordingly and relays that plan 
to the actuators (Anderson et al., 2014a), (González et al., 2016a), (Ziegler et al., 2014). Intuitively, the 
presence of safety-critical errors, cyber intrusions or system inabilities would materialise through the 
actuation process. For instance, the systems inability to identify a pedestrian or their intentions, 
whether the failure was hardware or software, may translate into irregular, aggressive or dangerous 
driving patterns i.e. steering, braking and acceleration behaviour. These driving behaviours and 
patterns can be applied to both driver and vehicle systems and are analogous to PHYD risk assessment 
methods. While software failure and/or cyber security plays a key role in the risk estimation for AVs, 
the risk they pose will have a causal effect on the primary variables proposed for the BN. 
Hazardous or unexpected circumstances can also exacerbate the likelihood of a hardware or software 
failure. These hazards are linked to travel exposure, comparable to PAYD risk factors. Adverse weather 
conditions, unsuitable lighting and road properties present challenges to AVs (Anderson et al., 2014a) 
and can increase the probability of a road traffic collision for an AV. Such elements correspond to 
PAYD schemes where time of day, road type and weather conditions are considered risk rating factors. 
Although the nature of road traffic accident differs from manual to autonomous driving, safety-critical 
errors, human (fatigue, intoxication, aggressiveness) or machine (sensor fault, software failure, cyber 
intrusion), will likely materialise in the form of unsafe vehicle handling. Effectively, vehicle-related 
risks are treated as latent variables (not directly observable) that can be inferred from observed 
actuation results. The causal effects are beyond the scope of this. This UBI approach to autonomous 
vehicles will also enable the proactive and systematic collection of AV performance data for improved 
risk analysis. 
Methodology 
We propose a Bayesian Network (BN) UBI solution where PAYD and PHYD features (exposure and 
driving behaviour) are employed. BNs are chosen due to their ability to handle incomplete data, 
incorporate expert opinion and its ability to iteratively update its parameterisation as new data 
becomes available(Fenton and Neil, 2012). These characteristics may be advantageous given the 
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uncertainty surrounding AV risk levels and insufficient data. We model expected claims losses in terms 
of personal motor insurance and product liability insurance separately. Risk levels (frequency and 
severity) for each are determined by the individual risk exposures of the driver and vehicle. Data from 
each journey is divided into driver and vehicle datasets from which premiums are derived. The risk 
exposures of both driver and system are determined by driving behaviour/performance and 
contextual factors such as weather conditions, near misses and kilometres travelled. Premiums are 
annualised and attenuate with every additional journey. 
BNs are “graphical models for reasoning under uncertainty” (Korb and Nicholson, 2010). They are 
essentially a collection of variables represented by nodes. Each node is connected by directed arcs 
(arrows) which signify direct dependencies or correlations. Typically, the structure of a BN is referred 
to in terms of a family tree where nodes can be either a parent or child. A node is a parent if it has an 
arc directed towards another (child) node, signifying the dependence of the child node on the parent. 
Ancestors are those nodes that appear earlier in the chain and naturally, descendants appear later. 
Our BN is constructed by positing causal and probabilistic dependencies through subjective 
assumptions. Alternatively, the structure of a BN can be learned from available data. One such 
approach is score based with a structure being defined by how well the dependencies and 
independencies correspond to the data. The structure with the highest score is chosen (De Oña et al., 
2011). Nodes not connected by arcs are deemed independent of each other. This is an important 
aspect of BNs. We assume independence between variables but a scoring function could validate this 
approach. 
The variables we employ are categorised into 5 different types: Continuous, Integer Interval, Boolean, 
Ranked and Discrete. Identifying potentially relevant variables can present difficulties, particularly in 
the context of Level 3 Automation as a considerable amount of data is already available. Common 
modelling mistakes include adding complexity without necessarily adding value. Table 2, shown 
below, shows the variables chosen for the purpose of assessing risk levels in addition to their 
respective states.  
Variables are grouped as Query, Behavioural, Situational Environment and Road and Situational 
Individual as shown in Table 2 below. Query factors are our output nodes. Behavioural factors reflect 
the driving style of the vehicle. Both Situational Environment and Road and Situational Individual 
factors vary over time and space. They depend on the traffic situation at each moment in time and 
relate to both the surrounding environment and the individual driver/vehicle (Hamdar, 2012). 
Consistent with traditional actuarial approaches, we model risk levels based on a series of risk ratings 
factors. In anticipation of the utilisation of vehicle sensors outlined previously, these variables provide 
more intuitive risk ratings instead of existing proxies (Frees et al., 2014a). Risk levels, and thus 
premiums, are based on controllable risk factors, such as speeding, as opposed to an involuntary 
association with a particular risk class which is contingent on age, occupation, etc.  
Our three Query nodes (result nodes), claims loss, accident frequency and accident severity are based 
on parent nodes designed to illustrate the driving characteristics of an individual driver/vehicle. 
Information concerning driver performance and behaviour of the driver/system is continuously 
collected and assessed in order to determine risk levels. By monitoring a range of Level 3 vehicles 
simultaneously, insurers can begin to identify, in terms of accident frequency and severity, the most 
hazardous behavioural patterns, environmental conditions and road and traffic settings. Premiums 
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can then be derived from true risk exposures. For this paper, we aggregate claims losses ranging from 
€0 to €30,000 over a time horizon of 1 year while frequency indicates the expected number of claims 
made over the period. For severity, we do not specify coverage types (personal damage, third-party 
injury etc.) and assume a range between €0 and €20,000.  
 
Factor Type Risk Variable Description Node States Node Type 
Query  Total Claims Loss Total expected claims loss. Product of frequency 
and severity 












Behavioural  Driving 
Behaviour Score 
Driver score based on his/her behavioural 
characteristics; Determined by the amount and 
severity of range of behavioural factors; Rated 
out of 100 (safest) 
0 - 25 
25 - 50 
50 - 75 




The number of critical events (speeding, hard 
acceleration etc.) per Km driven  




Severity of critical events in terms of the 
context (near misses (TTC), bad weather etc.) 
2 - Low 
4 - Medium 
6 - High 
8 - Extreme 
Discrete 
Real 
Speeding Speed above the limit per Km driven 0    
0 - 20  
> 20  
Continuous 
Interval 
Hard Cornering Lateral acceleration; excessive turning speed 
and possible control loss; Left and right corners; 
> |0.2|g 
1 : 5 Continuous 
Interval 




Rate at which a vehicle takes off (jerk); Hard 
acceleration may contribute to control loss; > 
0.2g 











Time of Day Time of day he/she drives  Day 
Night 
Labelled 






Time To Collision The amount of time remaining before a vehicle 
crashes; Calculated at the time of a critical 
event 
0 - 2 
2 - 4 





Average Speed The average speed of the vehicle over a 
particular distance/time 
0 - 40 
40 - 80 
80 - 120 
120 - 160 











Table 2 - List of Categorised Risk Variables. This table demonstrates the 16 elected variables, their respective 
states and variable type. Columns 1, 2 and 3 indicate the variable category, variable name and description 
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 present their respective states and variable characteristics. 
 
Identifying the causal relationships between variables is fundamental in order to ascertain a network 
structure. The aim is to direct our arcs in the direction of cause to effect (Fenton and Neil, 2012). Figure 
2, shown below, illustrates our proposed BN structure for estimating risk levels of an individual 
policyholder. Parent nodes of Accident Frequency are Kilometres Driven, Driver Behaviour Score and 
Road Network. Increasing the length of time spent driving or kilometres driven will translate directly 
into an increased probability of being involved in some form of vehicle accident (Lemaire et al., 2016). 
However, the relationship between accident frequency and distance is not a linear one. Distance 
travelled beyond a certain point could translate into higher driving experience or may imply greater 
use of motorway.  
We adopt the behavioural scoring method of Castignani et al. (2015) who “scored” drivers based on 
the number of critical events encountered in addition to the type and environmental setting 
surrounding the particular event. The scoring process is out of 100, indicating the safest journey. At 
the beginning of a journey a driver is assigned a value of 100 which gradually diminishes, depending 
on the number (Critical Event Count) and severity (Critical Event Severity) of critical events. Severity 
values are 2, 4, 6 and 8 corresponding to low, medium, high and extreme severity levels. In our BN, 
Weather Conditions, Time of Day and Time to Collision (TTC) determine the severity. For instance, a 
harsh brake, at night and in wet weather that led to a near collision (TTC less than 2 seconds) would 
be awarded a severity value of 8. Given the enhanced reaction capabilities of autonomous systems, a 
hazardous TTC may differ relative to that of a manual driver’s reaction time. One particular paper 
found that it takes approximately 1.25 seconds for drivers to respond to unexpected, but common 
signals(Green, 2000). Thus, an appropriate hazardous TTC for autonomous vehicles may be that of a 
manual drivers (2 seconds) minus his/her reaction time (1.25 seconds) i.e. .75 seconds. This would 
undoubtedly vary given a vehicles condition, weather conditions and other contextual information. 
 
Weather conditions are an indication of surface water levels and visibility distance. However, we 
suggest that, under adverse weather conditions (such as rain), the system would recognise its 
limitations and transfer control back to the driver, restricting autonomous driving time in adverse 
conditions. Time of day is an additional indicator of visibility distance. TTC considers near misses. We 
utilise TTC as the lead determinant of critical event severity. An event that leads to a near miss is 
considered a more hazardous situation and is associated with higher risk levels. Weather Conditions 
and Time of Day consider dangerous or unsafe behaviour but do not explicitly model near misses.  
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Driving Behaviour Score directly influences Accident Frequency and considers a driver’ true risk 
exposure based on their driving riskiness such as their propensity to speed over the designated limit 
(Speeding), brake harshly (Harsh Braking), acceleration rate or jerk from standstill (Hard Acceleration) 
and the speed at which they manoeuvre around corners (Hard Cornering). The number of Speeding, 
Harsh Braking, Hard Acceleration and Hard Cornering event counts is based on data gathered over 
each 10 kilometres travelled. Braking behaviour is considered the most significant measure of driver 
risk (Handel et al., 2014). It exposes a driver’s aggressiveness and awareness levels as well as depicting 
their interaction behaviour with other road users. Harsh braking could take into account a distracted 
or aggressive driver or perhaps an automated vehicle that failed to observe or predict the evolution 
of the traffic scene. Speeding refers to the deviation from a specific reference speed with the legal 
speed limits being the most obvious reference point signifying normal behaviour. Higher levels of 
speed correlate with higher accident frequency and severity rates (Handel et al., 2014). Hard 
acceleration is reflective of a driver’s aggressiveness and higher acceleration rates (jerk) may manifest 
into loss of vehicle control. Cornering involves the detection of harsh cornering manoeuvres which 





Figure 2 - Bayesian Network for Aggregate Claims Loss Estimation. This demonstrates the structure of the 
proposed BN. Nodes depicted in orange, green, light blue and blue represent behavioural, environmental, 
individual and query factors respectively as outlined arcs represent causal relationships 
 
Parent nodes of Accident Severity include Road Networks, Driver Behaviour Score and Average 
Speed. Motorways are typically associated with low frequency but high severity accidents. The speed 
at which the vehicle typically travels would naturally influence the severity of crashes. Vehicles 
travelling at lower speeds would have lower severity expectations but possibly higher frequency, 
depending on the road network type.  
A conditional probability table (CPT) captures the strength of the relationships between variables. The 
probability of each variable given every conceivable state of the parent nodes is therefore required. 
The difficulty is that CPTs grows exponentially with the addition of extra parents or states. For 
instance, a child node with 3 states and two parent nodes with 3 and 4 states respectively will have a 
CPT with 36 possible scenarios (3x3x4). Various methods can be adopted to limit the complexity of 
our model. Divorce is one approach that involves introducing an intermediary node that essentially 
summarises the effect of parents on the child node. This method only works if two particular parents 
display similar effect on the child and can therefore be grouped into an intermediary (5).  
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Although the same 16 variables are selected for both autonomous and manual driving, they differ with 
regards to node relationships strengths, inherent to CPTs. For instance, an autonomous vehicle 
exhibiting excessive amounts of hard braking may be considered more hazardous than a manual driver 
exhibiting the same level of braking behaviour, thus demonstrating stronger node relationship relative 
to the manual driver. Whereas one may be due to temporary fatigue or distraction, the other may be 
a symptom of a more permanent hardware fault. Alternatively, an unsafe TTC for a manual driver may 
be larger than that for an autonomous vehicle given its superior reaction time. Moreover, speeding 
may be weakly correlated with accident risk, given an autonomous vehicle’s uncompromising 
obligation to traffic law. However, exposure to adverse weather conditions could provide a greater 
indication of risk due to some sensors vulnerabilities to rain, snow etc. Individual dependencies and 
correlation strengths are implied by CPTs and differ from man to machine. These correlations and 
CPTs would learned from data, given the availability of telematics. 
One advantage of BNs is that data can be imported and distributions learned but for this paper a 
conceptual framework is generated and populated with subjective data selected to represent a young 
driver. We model accident frequency and severity as Poisson and lognormal respectively. Intuitively, 
accident frequency is modelled as a non-negative discrete random variable. The Poisson distribution 
is one of the commonly used discrete distributions that can model the number of arrivals of specific 





𝐸(𝑥) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥) = 𝜆 (2) 
Where λ signifies the rate at which an event is expected to occur. Analogous to traditional actuarial 
approaches, λ is determined by the relationship between frequency and the various risk factors. Claim 
severity reflects the monetary loss in the event of a claim and is generally modelled as a non-negative 
continuous random variable. Although the distribution of claim severity will undoubtedly change for 
each policyholder, the individual claims cost distributions are typically positively skewed and non-
negative. We choose the lognormal distribution for the purpose of this paper which has a mean and 
variance shown in equations (3) and (4) below: 




𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌) = [exp(2𝜇 + 𝜎2)][exp(𝜎2) − 1] (4) 
 
As with the Poisson distribution, changes in the various risk factors will be mirrored by changes in 
the parameters of the lognormal distribution i.e. μ and 𝜎. 
Regarding count outcomes, one begins with Poisson or Negative Binomial distributions(Frees et al., 
2016),(Frees et al., 2014b). Poisson distributions assume equal mean and variance – equidispersion. 
However, motor insurance claims count data tend to exhibit overdispersion (variance greater than the 
mean) and excess zero claims relative to that implied by the distribution(Denuit et al., 2007),(Meng et 
al., 1999). This is a well-known consequence of unobserved heterogeneity – missing explanatory 
variables – which can be attributable to unseen differences in individual driving behaviours(Denuit et 
al., 2007). The negative binomial distribution is a Poisson variant that relaxes the equidispersion 
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restriction and corrects the overdispersion(David and Jemna, 2015). With the availability of telematics 
and claims count data, for both driver and system, an appropriate probability distribution would be 
modelled. For the purpose of this paper, simple Poisson and log-normal distributions are employed as 
a basis for claims count and claims cost modelling. 
Results  
We model aggregate claims losses for two scenarios. Both represent a Level 3 vehicle but in the first 
instance, the driver is in control and in the second, the vehicle is in control. We submit subjective data 
that represents a young driver. This subjective approach is consistent with the approximate proxies 
used by today’s actuarial models. With BN networks, this a priori data will be updated with real-time, 
telematics data. The risk levels for both driver and vehicle based on PAYD and PHYD methods and 
factors. 
Figure 3, shown below, demonstrates the final BN for expected driver aggregate claims, comprising of 
16 variables. The network is a probabilistic representation of the characteristics and driving routines 
of the individual driver. Accident severity averaged at €6,000 and accident frequency at 0.32 claims 
per annum leading to an expected aggregate claims loss of €1,900. From this BN, the expected claims 
loss is relatively high, indicating that this particular driver is a high risk, consistent with the driver 
profile.  
Figure 3, on the following page, also illustrates the behavioural scoring results in terms of the number 
and severity of critical events. Evidently, the largest observed frequency is associated with a risk score 
between 70 and 80. This score is based on the distributions of critical event frequencies (speeding, 
hard acceleration, harsh braking and hard cornering) and the severity of each event (TTC, weather 
conditions and time of day). The highest frequencies  are associated with observing speeding 
violations, harsh braking, hard acceleration and hard cornering 5, 2, 4 and 0 times per 10km 
respectively. The severity of critical events is dependent primarily by TTC and weather conditions 
whereas time of day has a lesser influence. Furthermore, 17% of these critical events led to a TTC of 
less than 2 seconds indicating extreme circumstances. Understanding these situations in terms of 
whether the driver or ADAS reacted appropriately is of importance. Estimating the reaction rate of 
both driver and ADAS is a considerably influential factor with regards to accident severity. 58% of the 
events occurred in heavy rain and 90% during daylight hours. The BN can be easily updated given new 
observations from telematics data as the driver undertakes more journeys so that risk levels vary 
according to changing behaviours. This contrasts with typical motor insurance models that remains 
constant for longer periods of time. BN adaptability to new information makes them applicable to the 




Figure 3 - Bayesian Network Motor Insurance Risk Pricing Structure: Driver. This depicts the risk estimation 
structure for an individual policyholder with a Level 3 vehicle. Data is gathered over a year time horizon and 
aggregate claims loss is the expected loss over a year. In accordance with Figure 2, nodes depicted in orange, 
green, light blue and blue represent behavioural, environmental, individual and query factors 
 
The probability distributions of variables for the vehicle are significantly different when the human 
factor is removed as illustrated in Figure 4 below. Accident severity averaged at €3,300 and accident 
frequency at 0.04 claims per annum resulting in an expected aggregate claims loss of €188. Consistent 
with the expectation that automated features will remove driver error and reduce accident risks, the 
aggregate claims loss is one tenth of that concerning the driver.  
Figure 4, on the following page, exhibits a 94% probability of a driver behaviour score between 90 and 
100 with 100 being the safest. Although the automated system may be at risk of occasionally requiring 
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harsh braking or hard cornering in order to avoid or mitigate collisions, we would expect zero speeding 
critical events as Level 3 vehicles will not exceed the limit. Similarly, average speed above 120Km/h 
has 0% probability as the maximum limit for motorways is typically 120Km/h. In our scenario, Level 3 
vehicles may transfer control back to the driver under heavy rainfall. TTC is between 4 and infinity 
seconds implying that there was little need for hard braking or evasive manoeuvres as the system was 
able to accurately assess likely traffic situations and react in advance.  
 
 
Figure 4- Bayesian Network Motor Insurance Risk Pricing Structure: Vehicle. This demonstrates the BN 
associated with estimating automated vehicle risk levels. Consistent with Figure 2 and Figure 3, nodes depicted 





The BN framework we developed is capable of estimating aggregate claims losses from a range of risk 
factors which are based on PAYD and PHYD insurance approaches. We modelled risk levels for both 
driver and vehicle based on driving performance and behaviour characteristics. Level 3 vehicles will 
continuously generate significant amounts of data regarding the traffic environment and one of the 
rationales behind our approach was to utilise this data for risk pricing purposes. Although 16 variables 
were chosen for this paper, there are other possible choices regarding influential risk ratings factors 
from which a type of structural learning algorithm may be appropriate given the availability of 
telematics data. Road geometry such as lane width, shoulder type and the number of vehicle 
occupants all may contribute to frequency and severity levels (De Oña et al., 2011). Road curvature, 
road grade, alcohol use, vehicle type and seatbelt use could also be incorporated (Chen et al., 2015a). 
Variables that are not directly observable but could be incorporated through expert judgement 
include visibility distance, fatigue or drowsiness. A vehicle that swerves regularly may indicate a 
distracted or drowsy driver (Handel et al., 2014). Visibility distance could be inferred from whether its 
day or night or whether there’s clear or stormy weather. These factors are likely to be important in 
relation to the automated vehicle. Moreover, the role of human factors may still play an important 
role. Factors such as residence, garage ownership and vehicle ownership may be indicative to the 
condition and maintenance of the vehicle. For instance, owning the vehicle would encourage proper 
maintenance. Driver training may also prove to be a significant actuarial factor, given the increasingly 
complex vehicle components. Driver license, however, may become less significant if the autonomous 
system performs the majority of the driving tasks. The actuarial significance of such factors requires 
further research, beyond the scope of this paper.  
Increasing levels of automation necessitates closer relations with manufacturers to jointly develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the vehicles limitations. Given this partnership, an interesting 
approach to risk estimation would be to model normal behaviour typically seen on roads. For example, 
the typical braking rate coming up to roundabouts or average speed under heavy rain. Risk levels can 
be determined by detecting unusual events (Lefèvre et al., 2014). Essentially, risk can be estimated by 
the standard deviation away from the normal level. This approach could potentially define 
average/safe drivers and easily identify hazardous driving by the standard deviations above or below 
this levels. For instance, being 20Km/h above or below the speed limit. Vehicles equipped with 
autonomous modes need to predict the evolution of the traffic situation and manoeuvre with respect 
to the safest route. The system can continuously estimate the probability of collision with respect to 
every possible manoeuvre. Monte Carlo simulations have been employed for such estimates (Lefèvre 
et al., 2014). This risk estimation be applied to driver behaviour scoring by the number of time a driver 
performs a manoeuvre that could potentially lead to a collision.  
Conclusion 
Our proposed BN approach is a potential solution to risk estimation of Level 3 Automation. Our 
approach involves the use of telematics data gathered by the vehicles inherent sensors and risk 
system. We conform to existing actuarial approaches in that accident frequency and severity 
modelling is based on a series of risk factors and subsequently combined to form an aggregate claims 
loss distribution. Premiums are derived from this distribution. PAYD and PHYD insurance approaches 
are adopted in other to model the true risk exposures. By estimating risk exposures based on driving 
behaviour and performance, our model can accommodate the split risk structure associated with Level 
3 automation and successive levels. Without relying on extensive knowledge of the vehicle systems 
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capabilities and limitations, this approach facilitates risk pricing for personal motor and product 
liability insurance by focusing solely on driver behaviour and contextual circumstances. This can 
potentially act as a transitionary method whereby comprehensive datasets regarding the automated 
system is collected continuously from every Level 3 vehicle commercially deployed. A better 
understanding of the automated systems limitations and vulnerabilities may be achieved before the 
advent of Level 4 Automation. With the availability of more data, a better understanding of the 
probability distributions, causal links and dependencies (CPTs) may be achieved. 
Insurance companies have long championed safety features of vehicles in order to reduce their risk 
exposure. Fully autonomous vehicles are the ultimate result of relentless safety improvements that, 
ironically, will consign personal auto insurance to a very niche market. This transition is not without 
problems, particularly as control of the vehicle is managed by both the driver and the vehicle itself. 
Simultaneously, drivers are less likely to drive just one car and short term leasing is becoming more 
prevalent. Rough proxies for insurance will become less acceptable by consumers. Machine Learning 
is one of the core technologies employed by the vehicle and similar methodologies, such as Bayesian 
Networks, will be used to estimate UBI insurance premiums primes with existing historical accident 
severity and frequency claims. This will require a greater engagement by insurance companies in the 
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Abstract 
Autonomous vehicles (AV) have advanced considerably over the past decade and their potential to 
reduce road accidents is without equal . That said, the evolution towards fully automated driving will 
be accompanied by new and unfamiliar risks. The deployment of AVs hinges on the premise that they 
are considerably safer than human drivers. However, the ability of manufacturers, insurers and 
regulators to quantifiably demonstrate this risk reduction, relative to humans, presents a major 
barrier. Based on accident rates, it will likely take hundreds of millions of autonomous miles to derive 
statistically meaningful results. This paper addresses this issue and proposes a novel means of 
quantifying AV accident risks by benchmarking against a more familiar and quantifiable risk – Human 
Behaviour. This method is used to proactively quantify AV safety relative to human drivers. Currently, 
anomalous driving behaviour stems from human susceptibilities such as fatigue or aggression. We 
exploit this observation and explore AV driving behaviour where driving anomalies are symptoms of 
technology errors. The comparative behaviours of AV and safe human driving can be used to measure 
AV accident risk. An end-to-end model AV is simulated using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) to 
compare human and AV driving behaviours. Using a machine learning technique called Gaussian 
Processes (GP), contextual driving anomalies are detected, the frequency and severity of which are 
used to derive a risk score. This paper offers a starting point for addressing the challenge surrounding 
AV risk modelling.  
 
Funding: This work was supported by the VI-DAS (Vision Inspired Driver Assistance Systems) a 
European Commission, Horizon 2020 research consortium [grant number690772] 
 





AUTONOMOUS vehicles (AV) have the capacity to  prevent the vast majority of road accidents by 
removing humans from the driving task. That said, as humans become detached, new and unfamiliar 
risks will inevitably emerge. Currently, AVs have not yet reached human level safety (Banerjee et al., 
2018). Quantifying the risks presents one of the most significant challenges for manufacturers, 
insurers and regulators (Kalra and Paddock, 2016). In particular, the ability to quantitatively compare 
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the safety of AVs relative to human drivers is crucial. At present, traditional risk frameworks are 
constrained by limited historical data, experience and the inherent complexities of autonomous 
technologies. This paper explores alternative surrogate measures of risk. We posits a novel and 
proactive means of measuring AV driving risk by benchmarking against human driving behaviour, a 
more familiar and quantifiable risk. The aim of this paper is to offer a proactive and novel basis for 
comparatively measuring AV risks against human drivers, supporting their safe and timely 
deployment.  
The societal acceptance and public adoption of AVs hinges on the premise that they will be 
considerably safer than humans. Thus, the safety of human drivers is a crucial benchmark for 
evaluating the performance of AVs. That said, without accumulating hundreds of millions of 
autonomous miles, it is nearly impossible to derive statistically significant comparisons (Kalra and 
Paddock, 2016). Manufacturers, insurers and regulators will need to explore alternative approaches 
and surrogate risk measurements. Fraade-Blanar et al. (2018b) suggest the use of “leading measures” 
including cumulative mileage, disengagements, driving infractions and behaviour. Essentially, crash 
precedent factors that correlate with AV accidents, offering a more nuanced approach. Safety-critical 
events or crash precedents act as surrogate measures of risk for humans (Lee and Jang, 2016, Musicant 
et al., 2010). These events typically correspond to the vehicle exceeding some threshold that deviates 
from “normal driving” such as lateral and longitudinal acceleration (Arbabzadeh and Jafari, 2018). 
These events occur far more frequently than vehicle accidents and exploring the nature of these 
occurrences, particularly for AVs, offers a more proactive and statistically significant approach.  
Abnormal driving behaviours and safety-critical events are a reliable precedent of human-related 
crashes and typically reflect a drivers ability to respond to driving situations (Lee and Jang, 2016).  AVs 
are not susceptible to such human predispositions but driving risk will not be eliminated. Technological 
risks will materialize such as software, hardware, cyber and human-machine interaction vulnerabilities 
(Ryan et al., 2018c, Petit and Shladover, 2015). Currently, AVs continue to demonstrate erroneous or 
abnormal behaviour in uncertain, complex and unseen environments (Guo et al., 2018). In this paper, 
we assume that safety-critical driving events, classified as unsafe with regards to human drivers, are 
equally unacceptable, if not more so, for AVs. As a result, we propose an statistical anomaly detection 
methodology using deviations from normal human driving as a surrogate benchmark measure of risk 
for autonomous driving. This offers a number of advantages: (i) It enables statistically meaningful 
comparisons between humans and AVs. Namely, the safety of a particular AV can be proactively 
matched to say, the safety of the average human driver or a particular risk group of human drivers 
(The CAS Automated Vehicles Task Force, 2018). Preliminary accident frequency rates can potentially 
be inferred from this. (ii) Unlike AV data, human driving data is readily available through telematics 
and insurance companies. However, this necessitates closer collaboration between manufacturers 
and insurers. (iii) Events are detected without preliminary knowledge of the underlying technical risks. 
Regardless of whether the underlying fault lies with autonomous system or human errors, this 
approach focuses solely on the manifestation of safety-critical driving events.  
The motivating problem is twofold. First, AVs will require millions of autonomous miles to accurately 
estimate risk. This is time consuming, expensive and impractical. Second, AV driving data does not 
distinguish the safety relative to human drivers and this is a problem for regulators and insurers. In 
this vein, we are addressing the relative risk profile of AVs based on comparable and proactive 
telematics-based approaches. It is not an attempt to replicate or proxy AV driven miles but to derive 
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statistically meaningful risk insights at earlier stages of development and deployment (Fraade-Blanar 
et al., 2018a). The results can be supplement ISO standards and other risk assessments methods. This 
proposed methodology offers a means of comparatively quantifying the safety/risk of AVs relative to 
human drivers using leading measures. Leading measures occur far more frequently than accidents 
and this frequency enables timely risk estimates relative to human drivers with lower autonomous 
miles accumulated (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018a). Ultimately, risk is estimated based on their relative 
susceptibility to unsafe driving events. The objective is to offer a methodological approach capable of 
inferring how much safer (or riskier) AVs are to particular groups of human drivers. Alternatively, 
around 275 million miles would be needed to demonstrate a level of safety equivalent to the average 
human driver  (Kalra and Paddock, 2016).  
In this paper, a novel approach is proposed to detect spatial anomalies for driving behaviours using a 
Bayesian Machine Learning (ML), geostatistical tool called Gaussian Processes (GP). We adopt GPs to 
ostensibly model normal driving behaviour in a simulated environment based on 6 human drivers. 
Specifically, normal driving patterns are modelled for each road segment over 3 simulated tracks, 
enabling us to statistically identify spatial anomalies for both human and AV.  We simulate a model 
AV using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to compare against. CNNs are trained to predict 
steering angle and velocity from image inputs. The proposed methodology offers a number of 
advantages. First, identifying spatial anomalies incorporates differing spatial and temporal factors 
specific to particular road segments that influence driving behaviours. Second, we calculate the 
probability of a particular sensor measurement enabling a continuous assessment rather than binary 
classification of “normal” or “abnormal”, similar to Castignani et al. (2017). As a result, there is no 
need to set rules or thresholds to detect risky driving (Castignani et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2017b). 
Spatial anomalies are classified as contextual or conditional anomalies and refer to data observations 
that are anomalous given particular conditions and environments (Chandola et al., 2009). The most 
common approach to anomaly detection is setting a threshold beyond which  is considered a safety-
critical driving event. However, anomalous driving is spatially dependent. For instance, hard braking 
on motorways versus urban roads or swerving right on a road segment that veers left. Thus, similar 
driving events are anomalous depending on the location and driving environment. The proposed GP 
anomaly detection method combines spatial modelling and statistical anomaly detection. The latter is 
based on the assumption that anomalies occur in low probability regions of a stochastic model 
(Chandola et al., 2009). To the authors knowledge, this is the first time GPs are used to detect 
contextual or spatial anomalies in this scope. From these results, we derive a risk function that can be 
used to dynamically reassess the drivers/vehicles score, between 0-100, by taking into account the 
frequency and severity of events as implemented in (Castignani et al., 2015, Castignani et al., 2017, 
Ryan et al., 2018c, Handel et al., 2014). The results are then compared to human drivers.  
The proposed methodology can be universally adopted by manufacturers, insurers and regulators. 
Insures are faced with an evolving risk landscape and will need to adapt their pricing to reflect these 
changing risks. Moreover, manufacturers and regulators need to determine how safe is safe enough 
before different levels of automation are to be publically available. A number of technical, legal and 
ethical issues surround these problems. To begin to address these issues, a means of measuring the 
risks and safety relative to human drivers is required. The anomaly detection and risk scoring approach 
objectively evaluates driving behaviours and can also be applied across the levels of vehicle 
automation. For example, split risk profiles will be prevalent with semi-autonomous vehicles and the 
68 
 
behaviour of the autonomous systems and human driver can be measured individually (Ryan et al., 
2018c). Ultimately, AVs exhibiting similar pattern of unsafe driving behaviours to a particular human 
risk groups have similar driving risk exposures and thus, may possibly assume similar crash frequency 
rates. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 explores related work in human and AV 
driving risks. Section 3 provides details surrounding the data collection in the simulated environment 
for both GP and CNN training purposes. Section 4 explains the methodological approaches taken in 
this paper. Namely, the GP anomaly detection and risk scoring methodology and the construction of 
a model AV system using CNNs. Section 5 presents our experimental results measuring the 
performance of the model AV. Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks and future research 
potential.  
Related Work 
In this section we explore autonomous driving approaches and current research in the field of AV 
safety and risk. 
A. Safety and Driving Risk 
The vast majority of road traffic accidents are the result of driving behaviour (Musicant et al., 2010). 
Namely, abnormal driving behaviours such as weaving, swerving, turning, sudden braking and so forth 
(Chen et al., 2015b). There are a number of different behavioural states such as normal, drunk, fatigue 
and reckless etc., all of which can be characterized by a drivers actions (Al-Sultan et al., 2013). Imamura 
et al. (2008) defines “normal behaviour” as the majority of behaviour exhibited by drivers and 
“abnormal behaviour” as the behaviour influenced by undesirable mental or physical factors. The 
relationship between driving behaviour and crash occurrences is well researched (Wu et al., 2014b, 
Guo et al., 2010). It is often referred to as the analysis of safety-critical events, risky driving, abnormal 
driving, near crashes or near misses (Wu et al., 2014b, Zhu et al., 2017, Musicant et al., 2010). The 
frequency and severity of these events is used as a surrogate measure of risk in place of accident 
occurrences, offering an inherently more proactive approach (Dingus et al., 2006, Musicant et al., 
2010). A number of studies have evidenced strong positive relationships between near misses and 
crashes for humans (Guo et al., 2010). Typically, a range of variables are used to capture and explain 
unsafe driving behaviour including braking, steering, acceleration and speeding patterns. For example, 
Bagdadi (2013) found that safety-critical braking events were positively correlated with crash 
occurrences. Elevated g-force, characterized by hard braking and accelerating, often represent a 
reduced time to respond to driving hazards (Simons-Morton et al., 2013). Ayuso et al. (2016) also 
found that over speeding reduced the distance travelled until crash occurrences. In this paper we 
assume that unsafe driving exhibited by humans is equally unacceptable for AVs and representative 
of some technological failure. 
In machine learning, the process of identifying anomalous events is known as anomaly, outlier or 
novelty detection. The objective is to distinguish between abnormal and normal driving behaviours 
and there have been several anomaly detection methodologies proposed in the context of manually 
driven vehicles. A rules-based approach is common and involves the use of some threshold. 
Specifically, when a particular measurement exceeds a predefined threshold (Wahlström et al., 2017, 
Paefgen et al., 2012). Zhang et al. (2017b) use state graphs to identify contextual and correlational 
anomalies from driving behaviour. Using a Multivariate Normal anomaly detection method, Castignani 
et al. (2017) and Ryan et al. (2018b) detect abnormal driving events. Support vector machines were 
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employed by Chen et al. (2015b) to determine risky driving manoeuvres. Castignani et al. (2015) 
propose a fuzzy logic approach to contextually detect and afford weight to driving events. Aksjonov et 
al. (2018) also uses fuzzy logic to identify distracted driving. Wang et al. (2010) use a semi-supervised 
learning method to measure the danger level of driving states. Extant literature is largely limited to 
human oriented driving risk. Extant literature is largely limited to human oriented driving risk. In this 
paper, a novel spatial anomaly detection approach is employed for the purpose of comparatively 
measuring the risks of ADAS-enabled, semi-autonomous and fully-autonomous vehicles against 
human drivers. GPs have been employed for various anomaly detection applications including 
maritime vessel behaviour (Kowalska and Peel, 2012). However, to the authors knowledge, GPs have 
never been applied in the context of driving behaviour. 
Between 2014 and 2017, 144 AVs drove approximately 1,117,000 autonomous miles. From that, AVs 
were involved in 5,328 disengagements and 42 accidents, of which only 1 was at-fault (Banerjee et al., 
2018). AV disengagements offers perhaps the most robust measure of risk for particular AV fleets and 
signify the transfer of control back to a human given a system failure. Disengagements refer to design 
limitations, system failures or when the safe operation of the vehicle requires manual intervention 
(Favarò et al., 2018a, Banerjee et al., 2018). Given the limited number of accidents, disengagements 
offer more proactive insights into AV risks. Disengagements occur for a number of reasons including 
system failures, covering incorrect perception, incorrect prediction of surrounding road user 
behaviours, GPS discrepancies, communication problems, sensor failings, map calibration etc. 
(Waymo, 2017, Dixit et al., 2016, Favarò et al., 2018b). External conditions also play a role and include 
unclear lane markings, dense pedestrian presence, debris on road, weather conditions and its effect 
on road conditions etc. At times, the human supervisor will manually disengage autonomous mode is 
they feel uncomfortable or unsafe (Favarò et al., 2018b). Banerjee et al. (2018) found that machine 
learning related disengagements, mainly relating to perception, were the leading cause of 
disengagements (roughly 44%) across all manufacturers. That includes the detection of traffic lights, 
lane markings and so forth. The nature of driving-related errors and the influence of different spatial 
and temporal driving factors will certainly vary between human and autonomous system. That said, 
unsafe driving exhibited by humans will continue to be unacceptable when exhibited by AVs. In fact, 
AV may eventually be held to a higher standard. Still, the human-derived benchmark derived in this 
paper offers a starting point for risk modelling. 
The performance and safety of AVs can be tested through real-world or simulation testing. Vehicle-
level or real-world testing is arguably the most statistically relevant approach as the AV operates under 
real driving conditions and interacts with real road users (Kalra and Paddock, 2016). Simulation testing 
is an alternative and effective means of validating the safety and quantifying the risks of AVs. Model 
based simulations, such as Carla and AirSim (Shah et al., 2018, Codevilla et al., 2017), provide a useful 
approach and can incorporate a wider variety of driving conditions in settings than might not readily 
be available with real-world testing (Kim et al., 2017). With either quantifiable risk metrics need to be 
defined. One method is to determine fault rates within each system component, often referred to as 
functionality-based testing (Li et al., 2016). That said, components do not exist in isolation and errors 
will propagate downstream. For instance, safety-critical errors in the perception component will 
propagate downstream to path planning and ultimately control (McAllister et al., 2017). Fault injection 
is an another approach where just edge-case or worst-case scenarios are tested (Koopman and 
Wagner, 2016a, Koopman and Wagner, 2017). Alternative to functionality-based testing, end-to-end 
metrics are “downstream metrics” such as ride comfort, efficiency or number of crashes (McAllister 
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et al., 2017). Unlike human drivers, autonomous technology will improve over time. This suggests that, 
over time, the predictive value of current accident statistics and disengagement rates will likely 
diminish further increasing the complexity. 
 
B. Autonomous Driving 
In general there are two approaches to autonomous driving which differ based on their degree of 
modularity or number of sub-components. Traditional systems, shown in Figure 1 below, are 
organized into an array of components. From Figure 1, the perception layer constructs an 
understanding of the surrounding traffic scene by detecting and tracking objects. Within the 
perception component, localization determines the vehicles position within the driving scene using 
GPS as a basis. Moreover, sensor fusion integrates information from the different sensors to construct 
a more accurate representation of the surrounding environment than any single sensor can 
accomplish alone (Jo et al., 2015). The decision layer includes path planning which determines the 
vehicle trajectory based on the systems perception and can be decomposed into global planning, local 
planning and behavioural planning. Finally, control governs the desired actuator inputs necessary to 
safely follow to planned trajectory (Jo et al., 2015).  
 
                        
 
Alternatively, end-to-end systems jointly train the individual components within the system from 
perception, through prediction to generate control commands as shown in (Pomerleau, 1989, Bojarski 
et al., 2016, Dosovitskiy et al., 2017). This avoids manual decomposition into the components outlined 
above. This architectural shift offers some advantages over the traditional approach by optimizing the 
training of each component relative to the desired task in hand. For instance, McAllister et al. (2017) 
suggests that training components in isolation may result in perception systems weighting the 
detection of less important features, such as clouds, equal to the detection of the vehicle in front. For 
a task such as collision avoidance or vehicle following, this is naturally unfavourable. End-to-end 
systems place emphasis on the end task during training (McAllister et al., 2017). That said, with 
machine learning based systems, the decision making process is often less transparent and more 
difficult to interpret (Salay et al., 2017, McAllister et al., 2017).  
The driving task remains the same whether a human or autonomous system is in control (i.e. steering, 
braking and accelerating). However, the underlying risks differ significantly. That said, the 
manifestation of safety-critical risks will surface as unsafe or abnormal driving. AVs are not susceptible 
to human predispositions such as fatigue, distraction and aggression but technological vulnerabilities 
will surface and materialized risks will naturally emerge as unsafe driving. 
                               
Fig. 1. Two approaches to autonomous driving, the traditional (top) and end-to-end (bottom) 





Data is generated and collected from a 3 simulation tracks shown in Figure 2. Driving data was 
collected for two purposes: to train the GP and CNNs. First, a group of 6 male drivers between the 
ages of 20-26 were used in this study to model normal human driving. Each driver was asked to drive 
safely around each track using a handheld controller. We stored two trips from each human drivers to 
be used to model normal driving behaviour. Namely, steering angles and velocities for each driver at 
each individual road segment is collected and stored to train the GP. In an real-world setting, data 
from a larger group of drivers over a longer period would likely be required. That said, this would be 
readily available through insurance and telematics companies. In this paper, k-means clustering is 
employed to divide each test track into individual granular road segments. In practice, roads segments 
might be represented by a section of road between junctions. For each road segment, we take the 
minimum and maximum steering angle and velocity observed from each driver. From this, we spatially 
model human driving patterns for each indexed road segment.  
 
                                           
 
Second, we generate approximately 1 hour of data to be used in the training of two CNNs in order to 
simulate a model AV. Training data for this was generated and collected by the authors and differs 
from data collected from study participants.  The simulated car, shown in Figure 2, has three front 
facing cameras generating around 30 images per second. These images along with their corresponding 
control commands (i.e. velocity and steering angle) are used to train two CNNs, one to predict velocity 
and another for steering angle with images as inputs. Steering angles are in degrees and left and right 
angles are positive and negative respectively. Velocity is in miles per hour. Most of the training data 
was collected from Track 3 given the higher driving difficulty relative to the others. 
 
Fig. 2. Three simulated Tracks used to test the performance and risks of the proposed autonomous vehicle. 
Scene images provide an indication of the varying driving environments in terms of road surfaces, lane 
marking, slopes, curves and lighting conditions. Below each image is an approximate model of the route with 




Driving environments vary between tracks with respect to lighting conditions, road markings, road 
curvatures, slopes and distances. For the remainder of the paper, test tracks will be referred to as 
Track 1, 2 and 3 from left to right shown in Figure 2. The 3 tracks represent simplified driving 
environments in order to demonstrate the proposed risk framework. The novelty of this paper resides 
in the proactive risk analysis for vehicles across the range of vehicle automation levels. Therefore, we 
avoid delving too deep into the process of training an end-to-end AV in more complex situations likely 
requiring much more training data and more sophisticated models. Weather conditions for all 3 tracks 
are clear with no adverse or inclement weather. There is also no other road users or road junctions. 
The degree of road curvature and road steepness increases from Track 1 to 3. Moreover, lighting 
conditions, which increases the prediction difficulty for CNNs, becomes increasingly more challenging. 
In addition, only Track 3 has a center lane line and the vehicle must remain on the right side of the 
road.  
In practice, closer collaboration with insurers and telematics companies is needed to model normal 
driving patterns from a broader range of drivers and over a larger driving space. Anomaly detection is 
the process of identifying patterns in data that do not conform to expected behaviour. In this vein, 
normal driving can be modelled from a particular risk group, say the safest cohort as per claims 
records, or using the entire dataset with the reasonable assumption that, on average, humans are safe 
drivers.  Additionally, there will be a bias in terms of the distribution of driving data. Some road 
segments will have more data than others and with that, a more accurate representation of normal 
driving behaviour. Conversely, there will be less certainty on roads less travelled and thus comparably 
less anomalies will be detected. For these segments, a generalized anomaly detection model based 
on cumulative driving data, and not contextualized, can be applied. Moreover, the majority of vehicle 
accidents involve two or more vehicles and much of the complexity of driving comes from interactions 
between vehicles. This will become increasingly more important with the emergence of blended or 
mixed autonomous environments. However, the primary objective of this paper is to identifying 
abnormal, adverse or unsafe driving behaviours that can be scaled up to real-world driving given 
available data. With more advanced simulations or real-world driving, the same methodology can be 
seamlessly applied.  
Normal driving for both human and AV are based on human driving data. As outline in Section 2, this 
offers a number of advantages. Utilizing human driving data overcomes AV data limitations and 
supports cross-comparative analysis between humans and AVs. That said, overfitting to human driving 
can potentially lead to undesirable results. For instance, some characteristic human behaviours might 
be considered unsafe by the AV and, as a result may be identified as abnormal in our methodology. 
This might include particular car-following behaviours or speeding patterns. This has the potential to 
inflate the risk score of the AV. Conversely, AVs may be held to a higher standard than human drivers. 
In reality, some driving that may be normal for humans may be unacceptable for AVs. Nevertheless 
the posited methodology offers a proactive benchmark at a time where there is limited data and 
knowledge surrounding AV risks.  
Methodology 
Using Convolutional Neural Networks, an AV is trained to predict steering angles and velocity and 
navigate without human intervention, see (Ryan). The performance of the AV is simulated and 
evaluated on three distinct test tracks. To quantitatively assess the risks, we spatially model normal 
human driving patterns for each track based on 6 drivers using 2 trips from each driver. Road segments 
are defined using K-means clustering. For each road section, normal driving patterns are modelled 
using a Gaussian Processes. This is used as a benchmark and provides a model of normality from which 
we can identify and analyse anomalies. The GPs were modelled using an open source Gaussian Process 
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framework written in Python, called GPy, originating from the Sheffield machine learning group (The 
Sheffield Machine Learning Group). The methodology is divided into two steps: 
A. Gaussian Processes (GP) Anomaly Detection 
B. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) 
 
A. Gaussian Processes (GPs) Anomaly Detection 
The objective is to model normal driving patterns based on human driving and to statistically identify 
outliers based on the driving behaviour of the model AV. To achieve this we model normal human-
based driving using GPs and statistically identify anomalies based on the probability of observing 
sensor measurements. Observations from the model AV that are beyond μ ± 1.96σ, for steering angles 
and velocities, covering 95% of data instances. These are called spatial or contextual anomalies 
(Chandola et al., 2009) and indicative of unsafe driving events. As outlined earlier, a key advantage of 
this approach is that preliminary knowledge if the underlying risk is not needed. Rather, the proposed 
approach focuses solely on the materialized unsafe driving events such as abnormal speed, swerving, 
hard braking, hard cornering, harsh accelerating etc. For humans, these can be the result of fatigue, 
distraction, aggression and so forth but for AVs, these symptoms likely stem from some software or 
hardware failure. The GP anomaly detection and risk scoring approach measures risk for both human 
and AV based on the frequency and severity of safety-critical or abnormal driving events, regardless 
of the underlying risk.  
GPs have been employed in a number of different applications. For example, they are often used in 
vehicle trajectory estimation. Goli et al. (2018) estimate vehicle trajectories using lateral and 
longitudinal velocities, latitude and longitude coordinates as inputs to the GP. Kim et al. (2011) model 
vehicle trajectories using GP regression enabling them to identify normal and anomalous traffic flows. 
GPs have also been widely implemented for maritime vessel anomaly detection (Kowalska and Peel, 
2012, Smith et al., 2012). Kowalska and Peel (2012) use GPs to model normal vessel behaviours to 
detect illegal, suspicious or unsafe behaviours. They construct two GPs for both lateral and 
longitudinal velocities with vessel position (latitude, longitude) as inputs. Anomalies are identified as 
the squared residual between actual observation and mean prediction based from the GPs (Kowalska 
and Peel, 2012). 
A stochastic process is a collection of random variables and is specified by the probability distribution 
for every finite subset of variables (Williams and Rasmussen, 1996).  A GP is a stochastic process fully 
specified by its mean function 𝑚(𝑥) and covariance function 𝑘(𝑥, 𝑥′). Essentially, a GP is a collection 
of random variables, any finite number of which have a joint Gaussian distribution (Williams and 
Rasmussen, 1996, Rasmussen, 2004). With GP regressions, the predicted output 𝑦 can be written as 
(Schulz et al., 2018): 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) +  𝜀 (1) 
  
The term 𝑓(𝑥) is a random variable in itself with its own distribution and the noise term 𝜀 reflects 
inherent observation randomness. We assume 𝑓(𝑥) is distributed as a GP and can be written in the 




𝑓(𝑥) ~ 𝒢𝒫(𝑚(𝑥), 𝑘(𝑥, 𝑥′)) (2) 
 
Equation 2 states that the function 𝑓(𝑥)  is distributed as a GP with mean function 𝑚(𝑥) and 
covariance function 𝑘(𝑥, 𝑥′) (Rasmussen, 2004). For each input, x, there is an associated random 
variable, 𝑓(𝑥) , representing the value of stochastic function, 𝑓 , at that location (Rasmussen, 2004). 
Here, the random variables represent the value of the function 𝑓(𝑥), represented by steering angles 
in Figure 3 below, at location 𝑥. The variables x and x’ represent nearby or closely related input spaces. 
In our case, these represent locations or road segments as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 demonstrates 
modelled steering angles for a portion of Track 3. K-means clustering is used to simply cluster locations 
in close proximity into approximately evenly sized road segments. For instance, Track 1 comprises of 
120 different road segments. Segments are ordered between 0 and 119.  
                            
 
Distance is measured as the distance along the road network and not Euclidean distance. Specifically, 
the distance between road location indices. Therefore, the maximum distance between inputs is 
between the start and finish points in the recursive tracks i.e. simulated tracks 1 and 2. GPs are also 
capable of handling higher dimensional input vectors for real-world applications using, for example 
GPS latitude and longitude coordinates. Additional inputs could include road properties (i.e. curvature, 
lane width), traffic density and possibly even the AVs intentions (e.g. turn right, keep straight etc.) to 
predict abnormal driving. However, for the purpose of this paper and given our fixed road 
environments, we use road locations as inputs. For more details on the calculations, see Schulz et al. 
(2018) who walk through a straightforward example of calculating the posterior mean using the radial 
basis function kernel based on a small dataset. 
The choice of covariance function for the GP implicitly makes underlying assumptions regarding the 
statistical process such as smoothness and stationarity. One of the most common covariance functions 
 
                        
Fig. 3. Gaussian process reflecting steering angles from human driving behaviour over a section of Track 3. 
Each location (x-axis) represents a location index. Within each road location, minimum and maximum 
steering angles demonstrated from a number of human driven laps represent modelled outputs. The solid 













or kernels used, and is employed in this paper, is the squared exponential kernel or Gaussian Kernel 
or radial basis kernel function (Melo, 2012, Robert, 2014, Schulz et al., 2018):  
 
𝑘(𝑥, 𝑥′) =  𝜎𝑓
2 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ( −
1
2𝑙2
|𝑥 − 𝑥′|2 ) (3) 
 
𝜎 and 𝑙  are hyperparameters representing the noise variance (vertical scale) and length scale 
(horizontal scale) respectively (Robert, 2014). As mentioned, the input variable x represent the input 
space. The central idea is that if the covariance or kernel function considers 𝑥 and 𝑥′ to be similar then 
we expect the output of the function at these points to be similar too (Williams and Rasmussen, 1996, 
Rasmussen, 2004). We can see that the covariance is almost just 𝜎𝑓
2 for closely related inputs. Each 
road segment index defines the inputs into the GP regression model demonstrated in Figure 3. 
A GP defines a probability distribution over possible functions. Considering a 1-dimensional regression 
problem, the objective is to map an input x to an output ƒ(x). Figure 4 a) shows several randomly 
sampled functions from the prior distribution of a particular GP. Absent knowledge or data, we assume 
an average value of zero. At any particular input value x, we also characterize the variability and the 
shaded region represents ± 1.96𝝈. The pattern shown reflects the lack of knowledge known in advance 
of any data, and the specified prior is independent of x. Now, consider some data observations Ɗ =
[𝑋, 𝑦]. GPs derive a posterior distribution over functions based on the prior and likelihood, given data 
observations, as shown in Figure 4 b). Now, uncertainty is reduced around data observations. The 
combination of the prior and observed data produces the posterior distribution over functions 
(Williams and Rasmussen, 2006).  
 





Full Bayesian inference over hyperparameters is not typically used in practice as it is a non-trivial task 
(Schulz et al., 2018). Point estimation is generally used by maximizing the marginal log likelihood, 
similar to maximum likelihood estimation and also referred to as Type II maximum likelihood (Schulz 
et al., 2018). This approach is taken to find appropriate estimates of the parameters  𝜎 and 𝑙. In 
machine learning, hyperparameter tuning is the process of finding optimal sets of hyperparameters 
based on some loss function or evaluation metric (i.e. marginal log likelihood in this case). There are 
a number of approaches to finding hyperparameters including grid search, manual search and random 
searches. Grid search constructs a model for all combinations of specified parameters. Random search 
randomly selects parameter combinations and has shown to decrease computational time (Bergstra 
and Bengio, 2012). In this paper, we used straightforward grid search. By initially defining a set of 
coarse parameters and further narrowing down to finer parameters, we found appropriate values for 
the noise variance and length scale that fit our dataset well. 
The covariance function or kernel remains constant across each road segment in Figure 3, where road 
segments are indexed from 0 to 30 for this example. The shaded blue region represents the area within 
μ ± 1.96σ . Other studies have chosen other thresholds such as 2.5σ or 3σ from the mean (Chandola 
et al., 2009, Castignani et al., 2017, Ryan et al., 2018c). If the model AV exceeds μ ± 1.96σ for varying 
μ at each road segment, then an anomaly is detected. This refers to both modelled steering angles 
and velocity individually. This is a statistical anomaly detection technique where a kernel function is 
used to estimate the probability distribution function for normal instances. From this, a new data 
instance that lies in the low probability region is deemed anomalous (Chandola et al., 2009). An 
important feature of the GP is that it accounts for uncertainty given that no true correct driving pattern 
is deemed ‘best’ or ‘safest’. Rather, a safe state space is modelled,  within which the AV is expected 
to operate in.  
After anomalies are identified, the severity is measured. Naturally, anomalies can range from small 
deviation to near-misses and collisions. In terms of steering anomalies, the vehicle can swerve slightly 
towards the road edge or completely cross lane lines. Although both are unacceptable, they differ in 
severity. Severity is calculated as the Euclidean distance beyond μ ± 1.96σ so that events further from 
normal driving are considered more severe. Severity measurements are continuous and standardized 
between 0 and 1 based on maximum and minimum observations, over all tracks, to take into account 
different sensor measurement. Velocity based anomalies (miles/hour) would be weighted more that 
steering anomalies (radians) without this standardization. For illustrative purposes, severity measures 
are grouped into three bins ranging in severity – green, yellow and red. Bins are used to visually 
communicate our results more clearly.  
Risk scores are calculated as the weighted sum of anomalies normalized by the distance travelled. This 
provides a linearly increasing risk function with respect to the frequency and severity of anomalous 
driving patterns. The risk score is calculated as: 
 









Where R represents the weighted sum of anomalies, 𝑠𝑖 represents the severity of anomaly i and d 
reflects the distance travelled. Naturally, more severe events will increase the risk score at a greater 
rate. This risk score is defined for individual trips. Additionally, anomalies could also be weighted by 
event type. For instance, hard braking events may be weighted higher than hard cornering events. 
This requires further research and expert elicitation and is currently beyond the scope of this paper.  
Lastly, we localize these events and map the coordinates with their severities. The identification of 
high risk road segments  can offer a more comprehensive risk profile of the AV. Autonomous systems 
are vulnerable to different spatial and temporal factors such as poor lane line conditions, traffic 
density, pedestrian density, inclement weather, unpredictable road users and so forth. The spatial 
analysis undertaken in this paper can support a better understanding of these spatial and temporal  
factors by identifying anomalies, identifying the contributing spatial factors and subsequently reverse 
engineering the fault. Namely, we can potentially match or regress AV faults with these factors (i.e. 
road conditions, traffic density, pedestrian presence, road curvature etc.). However, our model AV is 
not reliable enough to derive meaningful inferences regarding influential spatial factors. At times, the 
model AV make irregular or erratic predictions in seemingly innocuous road sections. This may be the 
result of limited training data, imperfect training data and the varying environments and complexity 
of each track. In a real-world setting, with a more advanced AV, a greater understanding of the spatio-
temporal factors can be achieved by mapping anomalies and their corresponding severities.  
B. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) Training 
CNNs are similar to deep neural networks in that they are made up of a sequence of layers comprising 
of neurons. However, convolutional layers are arranged in 3-dimensions: height, width and depth. The 
weights of our CNNs are trained to minimize the squared error between steering angle and velocity 
commands predicted by the network and the command output of the human driver. Essentially, each 
image generated by the human driver is accompanied by a corresponding steering and velocity 
command. The network is then trained to replicate, as close as possible, the demonstrated behaviour. 
We adopt the network architecture proposed by Bojarski et al. (2016), illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
The network consists of 9 layers which includes normalization, 5 convolutional and three fully 
connected layers (Bojarski et al., 2016). Separate CNNs are trained for steering and velocity predictions 
and have identical network structures. They are then used simultaneously to control the AV. 
78 
 
                            
 
The network was trained using Python with the Keras library to create and train the CNNs. The CNNs 
were trained to minimize the mean-squared error using dynamic gradient descent. The dataset was 
split into 80% for training and 20% for validation. 4 epochs were used for both steering and velocity 
CNNs as validation accuracy began to diminish after this, indicating overfitting. For steering, validation 
accuracy reached roughly 0.0105. However, given that data is derived from human driving, we are not 
training the network with exactly correct data and we found that the best approach to identify the 
best model was to use the GP anomaly detection approach. For example, some models with better 
training and validation accuracy might be near perfect for most of the journey but may have one 
severe instance where they completely cross lane lines.  
The first three convolutional layers use a 5x5 kernel or filter and the remaining two, a 3x3 (Bojarski et 
al., 2016). Filters or kernels are used to group together adjacent pixels and treat them as a collective, 
in this case a 5x5 and 3x3 squared areas. Filters consist of the networks learned weights that are 
trained using backpropagation techniques. They slide or “convolve” across the input image, focusing 
on different image patches. The outcome is a 2-dimensional activation map that gives the responses 
of the weights within a particular filter. Each convolutional layer consists of a number of filters where 
different filters pick up different qualities in the image. This results in a number of activation maps in 
 
                        
Fig. 5. Proposed convolutional neural network architecture for both steering angle and velocity prediction.  
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each layer and explains the increasing depth at each convolutional layer. They progressively squeeze 
the spatial dimensions of an image while also increasing the image depth. The dimensions of each 
layer are shown in Figure 5. Generally speaking, each additional convolutional layer recognizes 
increasingly more complex shapes and patterns, beginning with simple lines and curves. 
 
Results 
The model AV navigated all three test tracks successfully without any major incident. However, we 
observed a number of abnormal behaviours that were appropriately detected by our GP anomaly 
detection model. In this section, driving scores for the model AV and a single randomly selected human 
driver is calculated and compared for each test track. We took the second lap of the representative 
human driver so that he had enough time to become accustomed to the controller but had not 
become proficient enough to navigate without minor incidents.  
In insurance risk pricing, drivers are traditionally classified into risk groups based on static risk factors 
such as age, license and past claims (Lemaire et al., 2016). Using regression models, typically 
generalized linear models, the frequency and severity of accidents are modelled for each particular 
risk group. Insurance telematics offers a risk classification approach not only based on static risk 
measurements but on dynamic factors such as driving behaviour and usage patterns. A number of risk 
factors such as hard braking, accelerating, swerving, cornering, speeding, smoothness and so forth are 
used, which reflect a drivers attentiveness, level of aggression, how observant they are and their 
ability to plan manoeuvres with respect to surrounding road users (Handel et al., 2014). Risk scores 
are commonly used by insurers as an input  to adjust insurance premiums (Castignani et al., 2015, 
Handel et al., 2014). Scores offer actuarially significant risk factors that correlate with the drivers 
actual risk exposure (Handel et al., 2014). Based on these scores, drivers are classified into risk groups 
and crash frequencies are modelled for each group based on historical claims records. The relationship 
between driving performance and accident frequency rates can be parameterized and verified by 
examining the crash history of human drivers. We posit that, AV with similar driving behaviours can 
adopt these parameters also as a means to derive proactive risk estimates in the short term rather 
than wait for hundreds of millions of autonomous miles to be driven. 
Test track 1 is considered the most straightforward, free of harsh turns, adverse lighting conditions 
and slopes. Figure 6 demonstrates the results for Track 1 with the modelled GP for both steering angle 
(top) and velocity (bottom) shown on the left for the model AV only. The solid lines represents the 
mean control output for each specific road location and the surrounding shaded region represents μ 
± 1.96σ. Anomalies, indicated by green, yellow and red markers are used to derive the risk score also 
shown in Figure 6. The model AV and human driver were assigned a risk score of 32.6 and 14.3 
respectively. Given that the simulation is relatively straightforward and the limited training dataset, 
we expect the human drivers to be much safer on all 3 tracks. Nevertheless, the GP anomaly detection 
and risk scoring methodology offers proactive risk insights.  
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Figure 7 illustrates the results for the model AV on test track 2. A risk score of 59.2 and 25.2 were 
computed for the AV and human driver. The AV exhibited unsafe driving patterns more frequently and 
severely. The identification of high risk areas will likely be an important part of risk assessing AVs once 
they are publically deployed. For example, AVs may be more vulnerable under certain driving 
conditions such as inclement weather, urban driving, poor network connections, poor road conditions 
etc. For example, hotspots can be identified where AV frequently exhibit poor behaviour. Further 
consideration of spatiotemporal factors can also support the detection of contextual anomalies. 
However, in this simulation, the model AV often acts unpredictably and valid insights into spatio-
temporal patterns will require real-world driving data. 
                                    
 
Fig. 6. Gaussian processes (left) relating to steering angles (top) and velocity (bottom) for Track 1 for the 
model AV. The shaded region represent μ ± 1.96σ. Anomalies range in severity from green (lowest) to yellow 


















Risk Score 32.6 14.3
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Although we examine only steering and velocity as risk factors, additional factors should also be 
considered such as headway distance, driving smoothness, acceleration and deceleration, weather 
and traffic density, time-to-collision (TTC), time-to-lane-cross (TTLC) and so forth. The GP anomaly 
detection approach can be applied to real-world setting and can be seamlessly applied to the above 
additional factors.  
The results for the model AV on test track 3 are shown in Figure 8 below. The majority of observed 
anomalies were more severe than seen in Tracks 1 and 2 as seen by the frequency of “red” anomaly 
markers shown in Figure 8. More severe anomalies were seen on the two sharpest turns on the track 
which was expected as we observed the AV narrowly avoided a lane crossing situation here. Risk 
scores of 64.2 and 26.9 were derived for the AV and human respectively. Another notable observation 
is a number of under speeding patterns. Driving slower or faster to surrounding traffic can be 
potentially hazardous (Ma et al., 2018) This also  raises some ethical and legal concerns regarding 
whether an AV should match the surrounding traffic speed if normal patterns were above the limit.  
 
                          
Fig. 7. Gaussian processes (left) relating to steering angles (top) and velocity (bottom) for Track 2 for the model 
AV. The shaded region represent μ ± 1.96σ. Anomalies range in severity from green (lowest) to yellow and red 

















Risk Score 59.2 25.2
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The results conform to events identified by monitoring the model AV driving. We visually interpret the 
AVs driving to subjectively identify events for cross-validation against detected events. Under an initial 
pre-deployment stage, detected events can be cross-validated with other sensors i.e. cameras through 
human interpretation of events. Moreover, comparative analysis between humans and AVs can be 
carried out through an initial pilot study and the efficacy of the methodology can be verified. Another 
approach to validating these results may be to draw from rules-based approaches that simply identify 
events that exceed a threshold. Results here could be used to support our findings but this is beyond 
the scope of this paper. To validate estimated risk levels and our risk scores, naturalistic driving data 
matched with accident records from insurance companies is required. With this information, human 
risk levels can be validated against accident frequency rates and AV risk can be inferred through a 
comparative analysis.  
Risk scores offer a number of benefits to manufacturers, insurers and regulators: (i) Statistically 
meaningful comparisons between human and AVs can be obtained given that risk scores for both 
human and AV are derived from the same human-based benchmark. We can objectively determine 
the relative safety of AV and humans based on the objective frequency and severity of driving errors. 
Manufacturers and regulators need to prove that AVs are at least as safe as, if not considerably safer 
that human drivers. Risk scores offer an accelerated means of achieving this rather than waiting for 
hundreds of millions of autonomous miles (Kalra and Paddock, 2016). (ii) In-depth knowledge of the 
       
 
Fig. 8. Gaussian processes (left) relating to steering angles (top) and velocity (bottom) for Track 3 for the 
model AV. The shaded region represent μ ± 1.96σ. Anomalies range in severity from green (lowest) to 


















Risk Score 64.2 26.9
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underlying risk is not required. For instance, anomalous driving patterns may be the result of an error 
in the perception, decision or control systems or further within sub-systems. Risk scores are based 
solely on the materialization of faults as abnormal driving. However, detected anomalies can act as a 
warning signal and the source of the risk can be later reverse engineered. (iii) Accident frequency rates 
can potentially be inferred based on the comparative behaviours between AV and human. This will 
allow insurers to more accurately quantify and price the risks of AV. For example, an AV demonstrating 
a level of safety to a particular human risk group can potentially assume the same accident frequency 
rates as that risk group. It may then be expected that AVs will need to reach safety levels of the most 
safest risk groups before being publically available. Ultimately, this demands closer collaboration 
between manufacturers, insurers and regulators. 
Exhibited behaviour can tell us how much safer AVs are relative to human drivers based on the 
frequency and severity of abnormal or unsafe driving. This paper looks to identify these abnormalities 
and derive a comparable risk score as a guide towards better understanding the safety of AVs relative 
to human drivers. The “safer than the average driver criterion” has become a popular benchmark for 
AV comparisons and has directed much of the discourse surrounding AV safety (Nees, 2019). Using 
telematics data for comparable risk estimates, we can compare AVs not only to the “average human 
driver” and also other risk groups within an insurers book of motor policies. With closer collaboration 
between insurers and OEMs AV can be quantitatively assessed against the safest and riskiest human 
drivers. The ability to estimate the relative safety of AVs is crucial for OEMs, regulators and insurers 
to ensure safe deployment, limit liability, encourage pubic adoption and societal acceptance and 
modify risk pricing mechanisms. 
Abnormal or safety-critical events offer a surrogate measure of risk. The efficacy of this approach 
could be greatly improved by incorporating actual crash potential. Telematics-based risk analysis 
methods do not explicitly account for collision risk and driver interaction risk. With access to camera 
or radar data, metrics such as time-to-collision and time-to-lane-crossing could potentially be 
accessed. That said, the analysis of abnormal driving behaviour inherently incorporates interactions 
risk as abnormal or safety-critical actions are typically a symptom of a hazardous interaction with other 
road users. For instance, hard braking, from a human perspective, typically stems from a reduced time 
to respond to driving hazards (Simons-Morton et al., 2013). Hazards causing a deceleration may 
include the vehicle in front, a vehicle crossing in front or a pedestrian crossing in front of the vehicle. 
Essentially, driver actions are typically a response to external cues and other road user behaviours.  
 
Discussion 
The question of how safe is safe enough is a disputed topic within the domain of AV safety research. 
It may be that AVs will be deployed once they are as least as safe as manually driven vehicles (human 
drivers, on average) or perhaps a far more stringent safety records are needed. It has been suggested 
that waiting for the “perfect” AV may lead to avoidable accidents in the interim. However, people tend 
to have lower tolerance for machine mistakes (Kalra and Groves, 2017). An AV safety threshold or risk 
tolerance is currently undefined and subject to a continuing legal and ethical debate. In any case, this 
paper takes a step towards addressing this issue by offering a proactive means of comparatively 
measuring safety against humans 
Using data already collected from AV manufacturers, or through a collaborative small-scale study 
between telematics-based insurers and manufacturers, comparative risk estimates of AV driving can 
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be established. To date, manufacturers such as Waymo have accumulated significant mileage on 
public roads. For example, Kalra and Paddock (Kalra and Paddock, 2016) investigated how many miles 
would AVs have to be driven to statistically demonstrate a failure rate lower than the human driver. 
By applying the methodology in (Kalra and Paddock, 2016), we can estimate the number of failure free 
miles needed to establish a reliable risk estimate. In this case, failures relate to the occurrence of 
safety-critical events. As per (Kalra and Paddock, 2016), using the equation below to estimate a lower 
bound on the number of failure-free miles needed to derive a failure rate that can be claimed at a 
given confidence level 
𝐶 = 1 −  𝑅𝑛 
which can be rearranged to find n: 
𝑛 = ln(1 − 𝐶) /ln (𝑅) 
 
Where C is the confidence level and 𝑅 =  1 − 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒. We could infer how many 
failure-free miles is needed to demonstrate safer braking behaviour or lane keeping abilities than a 
particular risk group of human drivers. However, to determine the number of miles needed to derive 
statistically significant comparisons, naturalistic human and AV driving data is required and so is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that safety-critical 
occurrences will be more frequent than collisions, thus reducing the miles needed to derive statistical 
results. Moreover, the failure rate could be modified to represent the weighted sum of occurrences, 
as per the risk score formulation 
AVs are also limited to specific operational design domains (ODD), limiting their operational capacity. 
This means that, until Level 5 automation is reached, AVs are likely to be limited to particular 
roadways, favourable weather conditions, speeds and times as well as predefined geo-fences where 
high-definition map data is available (General Motors, 2018, Koopman and Wagner, 2016a, Fraade-
Blanar et al., 2018b). For a given pre-market AV, GPs can be fit to these fixed roadways. Once enough 
data has been collected, statistically significant comparisons between AVs and humans can be made. 
Based on behaviour analysis and calculated risk scores, policymakers can determine whether or not a 
particular fleet of AVs is ready for commercial use, based on their relative performance. However, as 
mentioned, the level of safety required is yet to be completely defined. 
The proposed methodology is based on the assumption that normal driving is reasonable 
approximation of “safe”. Abnormal driving is shown to be a major factor in transportation safety and 
is commonly identified by first quantitatively modelling “normal” driving and subsequently classifying 
abnormalities (Zhang et al., 2017b, Castignani et al., 2017, Mohamad et al., 2011, Chen et al., 2015b). 
These abnormalities are typically symptoms of some underlying human predisposition (Mohamad et 
al., 2011). Abnormal driving is indicative of unsafe driving manoeuvres and these events occur far less 
frequently than normal driving. Normal driving can be modelled objectively from raw telematics data 
whereas labelling safe and unsafe driving yields greater complexity, is subjective and can be biased. 
That said, we cannot say with certainty that all “normal” driving is safe but it a good approximation. 
There may be situations deemed unsafe but are normal. For instance, it may be normal on a particular 
road to drive a percentage above the speed limit. For an AV, it may be important to distinguish 
between normal and safe as it may need to conform to normal driving in order to drive safely such as 
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maintaining traffic speed. Ultimately, humans are safe drivers on average, and so modelling normal 
human driving patterns offers a reasonable reference or standard to hold AVs to. As AVs have no yet 
reached human-level performance (Banerjee et al., 2018), using normal driving behaviour as a 
benchmark is appropriate. Moreover, it has been pointed out that AVs should behave in a manner 
that is comprehensible to humans and so should behave as a normal, safe human driver would (Guo 
et al., 2018). 
 
Conclusion 
As we transition from manual to fully autonomous vehicles, the current accident risk landscape will 
evolve considerably. The lack of historical data or knowledge of autonomous technologies poses 
significant challenges to risk assessors. To enable the safe deployment of AVs, a greater understanding 
of AV performance is needed. The objective of this paper is to address this and take a step towards 
better understanding AV risks. Risk modelling based on accident rates is reactive by nature and 
requires millions of miles of driving data.  This paper offers a novel and more proactive means of 
assessing the risks of AVs based on driving behaviour. The Gaussian process-based anomaly detection 
approach facilitates an objective analysis of AV driving behaviour in comparison to safe human driving. 
Anomalous or unsafe driving patterns offer greater insights and this proactive approach can accelerate 
understanding of AV risks. The methodology was applied, in a simulated setting, to an end-to-end 
autonomous system, one which is inherently difficult to interpret. The anomaly detection approach 
objectively assesses driving behaviour rather than delving into individual sub-components within the 
complex system.  
To further develop the concept, thousands of hours of real-world driving data is required, both from 
manually driven and autonomous vehicles, to show more robust results. From this we can determine 
how often the AV drives poorly, how severely and under what driving conditions. The proposed 
approach necessitates a closer collaboration between manufacturers and insurers who have the 
necessary human driving data and actuarial risk models. Our research provides a timely contribution 
to methods of quantifying AV driving risk. It is an essential task, both in terms of developing the science 
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Abstract 
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are expected to considerably improve road safety. That said, accident risk 
will continue to inflict societal costs. The ability to manage and measure these risks is fundamental to 
ensure societal acceptance and public adoption of AVs. In particular, the ability to quantitatively 
compare the safety of AVs relative to human drivers is crucial. Managing risk exposures through 
driving operational design domains (ODD) will also become prevalent. Ultimately, the deployment of 
AVs will hinge on the premise that they are safer than humans. In this paper, we posit a methodology 
to quantitatively evaluate AV risks and minimise their risk exposure once they are publically available. 
Two contributions are offered. First, we provide a proactive means of evaluating AV risks based on 
driving behaviour and safety-critical events. This offers statistically meaningful comparisons between 
humans and AVs given the limitation of current historical data. Second, we propose a novel risk-aware 
path planning methodology for AVs based on telematics behavioural data. Driving data from a cohort 
of young human drivers over roughly 270,000 km in Ireland is used to demonstrate the posited 
methodology. An unsupervised geostatistical tool called Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is used to 
identify “behavioural hotspots” and the risk exposure at each edge or road segment is modelled. The 
results are incorporated into a path planning algorithm to find safe route paths for AVs, minimising 
risk exposures. In addition, Self-Organising Maps (SOM) are employed to identify similar risk groups 
and individual spatial risk patterns are considered. 
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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have the potential to considerably reduce road accident rates by 
disconnecting humans from the driving task. That said, AVs have not yet reached human level safety 
(Banerjee et al., 2018). Quantifying and managing emerging and unfamiliar technological risks 
presents some of the most significant challenges for manufacturers, insurers and policymakers. Still, 
autonomous technology is in its infancy and with limited historical data, the capacity to accurately 
measure the potential risk reduction is restricted (Ryan et al., 2018c). Moreover, once deployed, risk 
management will become a crucial task for manufacturers and policymakers alike. In particular, 
defining operational design domains (ODD) which relate to geographical areas and situational 
circumstances under which the AV is safe to operate in. This paper addresses these issues and explores 
the potential and applicability of vehicle telematics, from both human and AV to address these 
problems. In particular, telematics-based driving behaviour is investigated as an alternative, surrogate 
measure of risk for AVs. Using human-based driving data, we posit a methodology to identify 
‘behavioural hotspots’ and construct a novel risk-aware path planning process intended for AVs. The 
proposed methodology offers a proactive means of measuring driving risks and the results can enable 
AVs to anticipate and avoid hotspots, adapt its behaviour accordingly or prepare to handover control 
back to the human driver.  
Human traffic accidents often cluster to form hot spots or high-risk locations. Safety-critical driving 
events cluster in a similar fashion. In this regard, the objective of this paper is to identify these 
behavioural hotspots and model ‘edge risk’ defined as the risk exposure of road segments. We model 
edge risk based on unsafe driving behaviours rather than traffic accident frequencies and incorporate 
the results into the path planning process with the aim of minimising driving risk. The methodology is 
applied to a cohort of human drivers involving roughly 274,000 km of driving in Ireland. The region of 
study and distribution of events are shown in Figure 1. We define behavioural hotspots as locations 
with relatively higher frequency of safety-critical driving events. An unsupervised, geostatistical 
method called Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is used to spatially model behavioural hotspots. From 
these results, we derive ‘edge risk’ for each edge in the road network and this is incorporated into the 
path planning process as a novel cost function. Specifically, edges represent road segments and lie 
between nodes signifying junctions. We further analyse the novel driving dataset using self-organising 
maps (SOM) to identify subgroups with similar driving behaviours to investigate patterns for individual 
risk groups. From the results, we modify Dijkstra’s path planning algorithm to plan routes, taking into 




Fig. 1 – The region of analysis within Munster, Ireland (Left) and the mapped coordinates of approximately 
44,000 safety-critical braking and steering events (right).   
According to SAE International (2016), there are 6 levels of automation ranging from 0 (fully manual) 
to 5 (fully autonomous). To ensure safety, the deployment of semi- and fully-autonomous vehicles will 
likely be controlled and restricted to known operational conditions. Until Level 5 is achieved, AVs are 
likely to be limited to particular roadways, weather conditions, speeds and times as well as predefined 
geo-fences where high-definition map data is available (General Motors, 2018, Koopman and Wagner, 
2016a, Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018b). In particular, vehicles with levels 3 and 4 automation still require 
a human driver in a supervisory role and ready to take back control under particular circumstances 
(SAE International, 2016). Individual Level 3 & 4 vehicles will each have their specific operational 
design domain (ODD) constraints (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018b). Manufacturers, regulator, 
policymakers and insurers will be tasked with minimizing the risk exposure of varying levels of AVs in 
this manner. In this regard, using unsafe driving behaviour as a measure of risk, ODDs can be 
dynamically defined based on spatio-temporal distributions of safety-critical events.  
The proposed methodology is designed to incorporate human and AV hotspots. In this paper, we focus 
on locations where human drivers are predisposed to unsafe driving behaviours, as identified by the 
telematics data gathered within the field of study. There is a strong positive relationship between 
crash frequency and the spatial frequency of safety-critical events (Ryder et al., 2018, Yang et al., 
2019). We utilise human driving due to the proprietary nature and scarcity of AV data. Prior knowledge 
regarding the likelihood of encountering unsafe human drivers can be utilised by an autonomous 
system. The homogenous nature of our results limits this facility and a larger and more diverse sample 
is required for practical implementations. However, the results can still be exploited to identify high-
risk locations associated with drivers of this nature. Moreover, safety feedback can be relayed to 
drivers in this cohort as an additional feature. The proposed approach can be seamlessly applied to 
AV data, once available, to identify high risk locations specific to AVs. Given access to AV and human 
driver telematics data, the methodology can be widely adopted and human-based and/or AV-based 
behavioural hotspots can be included. In this way, hotspots can be avoided or the AV can adapt its 
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behaviour or signal the human for a potential takeover. Ultimately, our research maximises autonomy 
by minimising risks. 
Behavioural hotspots are a natural extension of road traffic accident hotspots, a phenomena that has 
been extensively studied (Anderson, 2009, Xie and Yan, 2013, Anderson, 2007). Hotspots, blackspots 
or high risk sites are considered as locations associated with a higher likelihood of crash occurrences. 
This can be defined by vehicle accident rate (accidents per kilometre driven) or accident frequencies 
(accidents per road kilometre) (Anderson, 2007). A similar definition can be applied to behavioural 
hotspots as locations with an increased likelihood of safety-critical event occurrences based on the 
rate or frequency of events. Given the strong relationship between safety-critical events and road 
traffic accidents, behavioural hotspots act as an estimate of accident hotspots. Although less 
researched, several studies have explored telematics-based hotspots and the relationship with 
accident hotspots (Ryder et al., 2018, Yang et al., 2019, Dunlop et al., 2016), however, not in the 
context of AVs or path planning. Coupled with historical accident records, a regression model can be 
formulated to estimate accident hotspots based on behavioural hotspots, modelled in this paper. 
Ryder et al (2018), for example, accurately estimated accident hotspots using safety-critical driving 
events as covariates in their spatial accident frequency model. Such a calibrated model can be used to 
estimate crashes where accident data is unavailable or supplement estimates when accident data is 
available. 
AVs are not susceptible to human predispositions such as fatigue, distraction and aggression but 
technological vulnerabilities will surface. The adoption and societal acceptance of AVs hinges on the 
premise that they will be considerably safer than human-driven vehicles. Thus, the safety of human 
drivers is an crucial benchmark for comparing the performance of AVs. Estimating how much safer 
AVs are to the average human driver or a particular risk cohort of drivers will be essential to their 
widespread deployment and adoption. That said, without accumulating hundreds of millions of 
autonomous miles, it is nearly impossible to derive statistically significant comparisons (Kalra and 
Paddock, 2016). Manufacturers, insurers and regulators will need to explore alternative proxy risk 
measurements. Fraade-Blanar et al. (2018b) suggest the use of leading measures including cumulative 
mileage, disengagements, driving infractions and behaviour. That is, crash precedent factors that 
might correlate with AV accidents, offering a more nuanced approach.  
Safety-critical events or crash precedents act as surrogate measures of risk (Lee and Jang, 2016, 
Musicant et al., 2010). These events occur far more frequently than vehicle accidents and exploring 
the nature of these occurrences, particularly for AVs,  offers a more proactive understanding of driving 
risk. Unsafe driving behaviours and safety-critical events are a reliable precedent of human-related 
crashes and typically reflect a drivers ability to respond to driving situations (Lee and Jang, 2016). The 
relationship between crash precedent factors and vehicle accidents has been well established in the 
fields of road safety and insurance ratemaking for humans (Ryder et al., 2018). In this paper, 44,000 
harsh braking and steering events are investigated from young drivers in Ireland over 6 months. 
Braking and steering (i.e. hard cornering and swerving) patterns typically reflect a drivers 
attentiveness, level of aggression, how observant they are and their ability to plan manoeuvres with 
respect to surrounding road users (Handel et al., 2014). With regards to AVs, system failures or errors 
can stem from a number of sources including hardware and software problems, improper road 
infrastructure, unpredictable road users, weather related problems and so forth (Dixit et al., 2016). 
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Monitoring safety-critical events, rather than raw traffic accidents, offers proactive and statistically 
meaningful comparisons between human and AV driving safety. 
The results of this research are based on human driving but this paper offers three novel contributions 
towards addressing the problem surrounding risk assessment and risk management of AVs: 
i. Identified human-based hotspots can be utilised by the AV. Unsafe driving of surrounding road 
users may affect the safe decision making of AVs. Thus, the results obtained from this research 
can be used, within the region of study, to provide prior information to the AV so as to avoid 
or prepare for locations with higher probability of encountering unsafe human drivers.  
ii. Policy and technical considerations surrounding ODDs can be improved by incorporating 
safety-critical events of AVs. With access to AV data, the proposed methodology can model 
spatio-temporal distributions of these events specific to AVs. Risk-aware path planning based 
on these results can minimize risk, further supporting their safe introduction into society.  
iii. The use of safety-critical events, rather than accident frequencies, affords a more proactive 
evaluation of AV driving risk. Moreover, it also supports comparative evaluation between 
human and AV.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores related work in the field of 
driving risk and spatial analysis. Sections 3 and 4 describes the driving dataset employed followed by 
our methodological approach. Section 5 presents our results and demonstrates some examples of the 
proposed risk-aware path planning. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications, 
applicability and novelty of the posited methodology.  
 
Background 
The advancement of autonomous systems is predominantly driven by the potential to considerably 
improve road safety. However, modelling the risks involved continues to be a critical challenge for 
manufacturers, insurers and policymakers. The deployment, societal acceptance and public adoption 
of AVs hinges on reliable and safe performance. The spatial analysis of human and AV related 
behavioural hotspots will likely play an important role in understanding the emerging technology risks 
and in minimising these risks. In this section, we review literature around driving risk, AV 
vulnerabilities, spatial risk modelling and path planning.    
The overwhelming majority of accident occurrences are the result of unsafe driving behaviour 
(Musicant et al., 2010). The relationship between driving behaviour, safety-critical events and crash 
occurrences is well researched (Wu et al., 2014b). It is often referred to as the analysis of safety-critical 
events, risky driving, near crashes or near misses (Wu et al., 2014b, Zhu et al., 2017, Musicant et al., 
2010). The frequency and severity of these events is used as a surrogate measure of risk in place of 
accident occurrences, offering an inherently more proactive approach (Dingus et al., 2006, Musicant 
et al., 2010). A number of studies have evidenced strong positive relationships between near misses 
and crashes (Guo et al., 2010). A range of variables are typically used to capture and explain unsafe 
driving behaviour including braking, steering, acceleration and speeding patterns. Bagdadi (2013) 
found that safety-critical braking events were positively correlated with crash occurrences. Elevated 
g-force, characterised by hard braking and accelerating, often represent a reduced time to respond to 
driving hazards (Simons-Morton et al., 2013). Ayuso et al. (2016) also found that over speeding 
reduced the distance travelled until crash occurrences.  
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AVs are not predisposed to human related errors but risk will not be eradicated. Technological risks 
will materialise such as software, hardware, cyber and human-machine interaction vulnerabilities 
(Ryan et al., 2018c). Between 2014 and 2017, 144 AVs drove approximately 1,117,000 autonomous 
miles. From that, AVs were involved in 5,328 disengagements and 42 accidents, of which only 1 was 
at-fault (Banerjee et al., 2018). AV disengagements offers perhaps the most robust measure of risk for 
particular AV fleets and signify the transfer of control back to a human given a system failure. 
Disengagements refer to design limitations, system failures or when the safe operation of the vehicle 
requires manual intervention (Favarò et al., 2018a, Banerjee et al., 2018). Given the limited number 
of accidents, disengagements offer more proactive insights into AV risks. Disengagements occur for a 
number of reasons including system failures, covering incorrect perception, incorrect prediction of 
surrounding road user behaviours, GPS discrepancies etc. External conditions also play a role and 
include unclear lane markings, dense pedestrian presence, debris on road, weather conditions and its 
effect on road conditions etc. At times, the human supervisor will manually disengage autonomous 
mode is they feel uncomfortable or unsafe (Favarò et al., 2018b). Banerjee et al. (2018) found that 
machine learning related disengagements, mainly relating to perception, were the leading cause of 
disengagements (roughly 44%) across all manufacturers. That includes the detection of traffic lights, 
lane markings and so forth. It is also important to recognise that AVs will improve over time. The 
reliability of historical accident and disengagement rates might diminish over time as the vehicle gets 
better (Favarò et al., 2018a, Ryan et al., 2018a, Favarò et al., 2018b). In addition, focus is primarily on 
accident frequency rates but severity rates of future AV accidents will also play an important role in 
comparing AV against humans (Shannon et al., 2017). 
Hotspots are defined as high risk locations where the frequency of accidents is relatively higher than 
other similar locations. A number of approaches have been proposed in the identification and 
modelling of hotspots. KDE is one of the most popular tools for modelling point event distributions 
(Xie and Yan, 2008, Xie and Yan, 2013, Thakali et al., 2015). Ouni and Belloumi (2018) model the spatial 
patterns of vulnerable road user collisions for different timeframes using planar KDE. Kaygisiz et al. 
(2015) use a network-based KDE to identify hotspots and analysed the spatio-temporal factors 
influencing hotspots. Where planar KDE uses Euclidean distances, network-based uses distances along 
road networks (Xie and Yan, 2008). The majority of related research studies rely on a sufficient number 
of accident occurrences. Less attention has been given to the spatial analysis and prediction of safety-
critical events and accident precedents. Lee and Jang (2016) identify hotspots based on aggressive 
driving behaviours. In addition, Ryder et al. (2018) spatially modelled critical driving events for 
applications in insurance and AVs. They found a positive relationship between critical events and crash 
frequency and crash rates at these locations (Ryder et al., 2018). With autonomous systems, risk 
factors might extend to system component failures, external conditions, cyber security events and 
human-machine interactions.   
The architecture of autonomous systems can be broadly decomposed into perception, path planning 
and control (Hu et al., 2018). The perception layer constructs an understanding of the surrounding 
traffic scene by detecting and tracking objects using a range of sensors and includes localization and 
sensor fusion (Jo et al., 2015). Control involves the parameterisation of steering, throttle and brake 
systems (Hu et al., 2018). Path planning can be divided into global, behavioural and local planning 
(Paden et al., 2016). In the global stage, global routes are formulated using digital maps and GPS 
systems (Hu et al., 2018) where road networks are structured as directed graphs with edge weights 
relating to the cost of navigating a road edge. Ultimately, desired routes are found by finding a 
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minimum cost path within the network (Paden et al., 2016). Two common algorithms designed to find 
the shortest path are Dijkstra’s algorithm the A-star (A*) algorithm which is an extension of first 
(González et al., 2016b, Bast et al., 2016). A number of alternative cost functions can be applied in 
addition to the shortest path. For example, minimise traffic, prefer motorways, minimise carbon 
footprint, maximise comfort and so forth (Lathrop et al., 2017, Bast et al., 2016). This paper extends 
this research and incorporates edge risk as a cost function. 
 
Data Collection and Preliminary Analysis 
Data was collected from 44 telematics devices given to a relatively homogenous group of human 
drivers. Drivers are all male and between the ages of 20 and 28, all based roughly within County 
Limerick, Ireland. The experiment lasted 6 months and the devices collected a wide array of driving 
information including lateral and longitudinal movements, geospatial and engine information. In this 
paper, we explore safety-critical events in the form of hard braking and steering  manoeuvres. Our 
dataset consists of approximately 13,000 and 33,000 hard braking and steering events respectively. 
Events are automatically detected by the telematics device with thresholds of -8 km/h per second or 
-0.22 g (g-force) for hard braking events and +-0.22 g for harsh steering events similar to Sheehan et 
al. (2017). There are a number of methodologies aimed at identifying near-crashes, safety-critical 
events and other incidents (Ryan et al., 2018c). However, the simplest and most common approaches 
employ static threshold similar to those employed in this paper. For the purpose of this paper, static 
thresholds are assumed reasonable.  
 
Fig. 2 – Braking (Left) and steering (Right) events distributed over the time of day 
The occurrence of safety-critical events depends on spatial and temporal factors, for example, time of 
day, day of the week, road type and properties, traffic density, pedestrian presence etc. Such factors, 
and more, influence the complexity of driving situations and the risk exposure of the driving 
environemt. Figure 2 above illustrates the distribution of braking and steering events by the time of 
day. Time of day is an imporant factor that can implicitly incorporate latent factors such as traffic 
density, pedestrian presence etc. As per Figure 2, the majority of braking events occur between 17:00 
– 18:00.  Around 40% of safety-critical events took place on secondary roads  and approximately 20% 




We opted for males within this age bracket for several reasons. First, limited resources restricted the 
potential sample distribution. If a more diverse range of drivers were selected, individual risk groups 
would not have been adequately represented. Rather, we opted for a relatively homogeneous risk 
group to derive the most statistically significant results from the study. Moreover, this particular risk 
group is of most interest in terms of road safety and is typically considered the highest risk from a 
motor insurance perspective. As a result, we expected a larger dataset (i.e. greater number of events) 
from this driver cohort. 
In reality, “unsafe” manouevres considered in this paper may have been executed by skilled drivers as 
a safe response to an unpredictable driving situation. However, Musicant et al. (2010) suggested that, 
from a statistical standpoint, most situations can be avoided through safe driving styles and the 
frequency of undesireable events is an indication of unsafe driving.   
Methodology 
This paper offers a novel approach to identify behavioural hotspots and model road network risk with 
the aim of facilitating risk-aware path planning and a more proactive means of quantifying AV risks. 
The methodology is applied by using a group of human drivers to identify locations where unsafe and 
unpredictable driving behaviour is more likely. KDE is used to spatially model behavioural hotspots. 
AVs have not yet been released on public roads in Ireland and driving data is proprietary. Namely, only 
manufacturers have access to complete datasets regarding their own AV fleets, as expected. However, 
with access to such data, the same approach can be seamlessly applied to spatially model unsafe AV 
behaviour, disengagements or traffic infractions. Even so, the results provided can support safe 
autonomous driving in the targeted location. Although the particular characteristics of these high risk 
locations may have similar negative effects on AVs, we cannot assume the same relationship and infer 
such results for AVs. However, the unsafe and unpredictable nature of human driving in these areas 
likely increase the driving complexity for AVs whose path planning process requires accurate 
predictions of the behaviour of surrounding road users. Thus, the results can be used by AVs to 
prepare for potentially unsafe encounters. Based on our results, we incorporate road network risk into 
the path planning process. We then modify Dijkstra’s algorithm to account for both risk levels and 
distance.  
An unsupervised clustering technique called self-organising maps (SOM) is employed to further 
analyse the data and differentiate drivers into risk groups. Understanding individual risk groups can 
offer further insights into the distribution of safety-critical events. Similarly, AVs could be categorised 
into risk groups given that they will have varying vulnerabilities based on vehicle type, hardware 
components, software performance, individual usage, vehicle condition and other vehicle 
characteristics. Different Level 3 and 4 vehicles will offer different services, comprise of different 
hardware and software components and will have different ODDs (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018b). 
Moreover, Individual behavioural hotspot can be identified for drivers/AVs within individual risk 
groups. However, given data limitations, this is beyond the scope of this paper. The methodology is 
divided into two steps: 
A. Kernel Density Estimation 
B. Self-Organising Maps 
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A. Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) 
KDE is a unsupervised, non-parametric, geostatistical machine learning technique used to analyse the 
spatial patterns of vehicle accidents. KDE is a well-established and frequently used tool for identifying 
high risk locations. KDE produces a smooth density surface over Euclidean space by calculating event 
intensity (Xie and Yan, 2008). A key feature of KDE is the consideration of spatial autocorrelation 
between accidents over a geographical space which naturally accounts for unmeasured confounding 
variables specific to a particular space (Thakali et al., 2015). Variables such as pedestrian and traffic 
density, road conditions and road properties may be implicitly considered based on the density of 
events of a particular location. The formulation of the KDE is shown in Equation 1: 













Where 𝜆(𝑠) is the density at location s, r relates to the bandwidth or radius, where only points within 
this bandwidth are used to estimate 𝜆(𝑠). 𝑘 is the kernel function reflecting the weight given to point 
𝑖 based on 𝑑𝑖𝑠, denoting the distance  of point 𝑖 to location s, and r, the bandwidth (Xie and Yan, 2008). 
To model the density of a location, the kernel function weights observations based on their distance 
from location s. Naturally, further away observations are weighted less than those closer, and only 
observations within the bandwidth are considered. The Gaussian kernel function is commonly used 















Figure 3 below demonstrates the behavioural KDE on sections of the map. Areas highlighted in darker 
red have higher densities. We can see that some density estimates consider spatial autocorrelations 
where connected road segments are jointly estimated to have higher event densities. Roundabouts 
and junctions in particular are linked to a number of road edges and are susceptible to unsafe driving 
events. Defining behavioural hotspots from this is relatively subjective. Some approaches look at 
densities 3 standard deviation from the mean as hotspots. However, in the path-planning process, 
density estimates in their continuous form are considered so behavioural hotspots do not need to be 
explicitly defined. For visualisation purposes, density estimates are split into three evenly spaced 





Fig. 3 – Hot spot identification using kernel density estimation (KDE) to model the density of anomalous events 
in close proximity whilst also incorporating spatial dependence. The leftmost image displays two roundabouts 
as high risk sections with higher relative densities of events. The rightmost image highlights relatively high risk 
exposures along two edges. 
A GPS system in the telematics device collects latitude and longitude coordinates for every 
undesireable event. However, GPS is not completely accurate and can be a number of metres off the 
actual position (Sun et al., 2017). KDE lessens the effects of inaccurate GPS coordinates as densities 
are modelled of euclidean distance given a particular bandwidth. In Figure 3, events are evidently not 
mapped exactly to road edges. That is, events location may have been detected a few metres left or 
right of the road and not exactly where the event occured. The causes difficulties regarding map-
matching where the the location of events needs to be mapped to a road edge. However, the KDE 
uses Euclidean distances and so largely overcomes this problem. After the KDE identifies the density 
of all road locations, we model the density/risk exposure for each road edges to enable risk-aware 
path planning. For each road edge, we take the maximum density estimate for each coordinate on 
that edge.  For example, two or more density estimates may be found on a single road edge, see the 
rightmost image in Figure 3. Specifically, a number of densities may be found on different section of a 
single road edge. We choose the maximum density and match that to the particular edge to derive 
the edge risk. We modify the Dijkstra’s path planning algorithm to incorporate these edge risk 
exposures in conjunction with the distance to the destination in order to enable risk-aware path 
planning.   
Dijstra’s path planning algorithm determines the shortest distance in a path to a destination point, 
taking into account lowest cost or effort between the starting and destination points. It is based on a 
greedy graph search algorithm that utilises nodes (junctions in our case) in its calculation, storing 
routes with low cost and disregarding high cost routes (Parungao et al., 2018). Initially, a cost is 
assigned to each edge (i.e. line between two nodes) which is typically distance from source/starting 
point to each other node but can be modified to reflect other costs or weights. Next, we want to find 
the minimum distance (or cost) to each node. As we currently do not know this, the minimum distance 
to each node is set to infinity. We then begin the check neighbouring nodes and reassign minimum 
distances to each node with the cost assigned to the edge travelled. If the distance travelled is lower 
the minimum distance currently assigned to the node, then the minimum distance of that node is 
updated to reflect the new path travelled. If the particular route travelled is not lower than the 
minimum distance, the node value is not updated as this is not the optimal route. As we search the 
graph, we iteratively mark nodes as “visited” and update minimum distances between new unvisited 
current nodes and its neighbouring nodes. Eventually, we find the minimum distance to the final 
destination node and take that route. Evidently, the algorithm lends itself easily to incorporating 
additional weights or costs as well as, or in place of, distance. In this paper, we define risk based on 
the exposure of safety-critical driving events within the region of study. Routes are calculated based 
on minimising the evenly weighted combination of distance and risk exposure by initially assigning 
this new cost to each edge.  
B. Self-Organising Maps (SOM) 
A SOM is a type of single-layer neural network (Kohonen, 1990). They are used to map high 
dimensional structures into two-dimensional space and are made up of multiple nodes on a two-
dimensional grid space or feature map. The SOM clusters input data by allocating each input to an 
individual neuron. Each neuron or node on the grid corresponds to weighted values of the input 
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variables. That is, each neuron represents a weight vector and weights are continually updated to 
minimize the Euclidean distance of the input data within a single neuron (Lee and Jang, 2017). A 
central characteristic of SOMs is that the topological features of the original data inputs is preserved 
on the map.  Input data with similar characteristics will be mapped to the same region of the map. 
Input data refers to each individual driver, the high-dimensional input space is the driving variables 
and the layer of neurons arranged as a map represent the two-dimensional output. From this map, k-
means cluster is employed to derive a number of individual clusters. Figure 4 demonstrates this 
approach. A key advantage of SOMs is their ability to learn structures and classify data without 
supervision. This may be an important feature as the quantity of data and number of data sources  
expands alongside increasing levels of automation and connectivity.  
 
Fig. 4 – Two step clustering using Self-organising maps and k-means clustering techniques 
A number of variables were used to explain the varying levels of driving risk across this cohort of young 
drivers. Average number of braking, steering, acceleration and speeding events per trip were used to 
measure a drivers driving risk based on how they drive. These features are largely controllable. That 
is, the driver has a relatively high level of influence on these factors (Handel et al., 2014). A good/safe 
driver can potentially avoid any speeding or hard cornering events as they are likely not necessary for 
any safe manoeuvring. Braking and swerving can also be limited but may sometimes be necessary for 
evasive manoeuvres during uncontrollable events in order to avoid any accidents (Handel et al., 2014). 
 
Results 
The objective of this paper is to model road network risk exposures and propose a risk-aware path 
planning algorithm that takes into account risk exposures of global path trajectories. The practical 
implications of this methodological approach to risk analysis and management are:  
1) Understanding the risk exposure on a geographical level can support dynamic ODDs and can 
be incorporated into the AVs decision making. That is, the AV can avoid, adapt its behaviour 
or handover control.  
2) The methodology is applied to human drivers but can be seamlessly applied to AV data once 
available. Nevertheless, knowledge of human-based hotspots can provide prior information 
to the AV of encountering unsafe human drivers. The same information can be given to human 
drivers based on their own past experience or on the experience of their particular risk group. 
3) The adoption of safety-critical driving events, rather than accident rates, support a more 
proactive risk framework for insurers and manufacturers to quantify risks relative to humans. 
Telematics-based features are comparable between humans and AVs, facilitating a 




This results below demonstrate detected hotspots and the proposed risk-aware path. We also explore 
risk factors that can be utilised to proactively assess AV and human driving risks and further support 
risk-aware path planning. The proposed methodology and results can be utilised to support the timely 
introduction of AVs onto public roads. Autonomous technologies has not yet reached human level 
safety. As a result, we derive an approach to limit and minimise the risk exposure and maximise 
autonomous driving. Some road locations observe a higher frequency of unpredictable and unsafe 
driving and these driving situations increase the complexity of the driving task, possibly beyond the 
current capabilities of AVs. The results of the KDE behavioural hotspot identification and further data 
analysis with SOM clustering are presented below.  
A. Behavioural Hotspots and Risk-Aware Path Planning 
We trained a KDE to model road network risk based on human driving in Munster, Ireland.  Unsafe 
braking and steering events are jointly modelled. For visualisation purposes, density estimates, which 
is the measure of risk,  are grouped into three evenly spaced risk classes ranging from yellow to orange 
and red. Figure 5 below shows the locations of braking and steering events in addition to the estimated 
risk level of each road edge. We can see that high risk areas (red) are appropriately estimated, given 
the number of observations on these roads. However, some road section that had observed no safety-
critical events were classified into the “yellow” risk class. This is due the result of using Euclidean 
distances as discussed in Section 2. Namely, neighbouring road edges may be included into the density 
estimate of a specific point. That said, for the purpose of path planning, identifying higher risk areas 
(i.e. red and orange) is the most important aspect to enable safe autonomous driving.  
 
Fig. 5 – Road networks classified by the density of safety-critical events ranging from yellow to orange and red. 
White points represent safety-critical braking and steering events.  
Figure 6 below demonstrates the results of the risk-aware path planning process based on three 
separate trips (in each row) originating from different locations but leading to the same destination 
that is the University of Limerick. The proposed risk-aware path planning uses a cost function based 
on the combination of distance and risk exposure, and minimises this. Risk is defined by the kernel 
density estimates for each road edge and normalised between 0 and 100. Average risk is the average 
road edge risk estimate over the entire trip. Maximum risk refers to the road edge with the highest 
risk exposure for that given path chosen. In Figure 6, images in the left column illustrate planned paths 
based on minimising distance. Images in the right column are paths that minimise a combination of 
distance and risk.  The average risk, max risk and distance in metres are shown on the right-most side 
for each trip. As expected, average and max risk decreases for each trip for the risk-aware path 
planner. Although the difference in distance travelled for trip 2 and 3 are insignificant, trip 1 is 
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approximately 2,500 metres longer. That said, different weights can be placed emphasising either the 
risk exposure or distance.  
 
 
Fig. 6 – Path planning based on the shortest distance (Left images) and based on a combination of shortest 
distance and lowest risk exposure (Right images) for three different trips. Only road edges in red are shown, 
reflecting higher levels of risk. 
In the results above, we have modelled road network risk exposures and identified behavioural 
hotspots within the region of study. From this, we have modified Djikstra’s path planning algorithm to 
find a route that minimises a weighted combination of distance and risk. Results from human-based 
data can be incorporated by an AV to identify high-risk human locations and can avoid, adapt to or 
handover control based on the likelihood of encountering an unsafe human driver. The same approach 
can be applied to AV data and the AV can consider the implications of potentially encountering either 
a safety-critical situation itself due to technical limitations or an unsafe human driver, based on human 
driving data.  From the results above, we can see that the modified risk-aware paths avoids particular 
high-risk locations. ODD specifications can be supplemented by these types of results. Exploiting 
telematics-based risk factors, as suggested in this paper, overcomes some of the limitations 
surrounding AV risk analysis. The results obtained above are based on objective driving patterns. 
Regardless of whether a human or autonomous system is in control, safety-critical driving events such 
as abnormal braking, accelerating patterns etc. remain the same and indicate some underlying fault.  
In the above example, static behavioural hotspots were discovered. However, risk exposures will vary 
over time also and KDE for different time of the day can be modelled. There is a range of spatial and 
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temporal factors influencing the location of behavioural hotspots, some of which were mentioned in 
Section 3. For example, between times 17:00-18:00, risk exposures increases. This may be intuitive 
given that this is rush hour after work. Likewise, roundabouts observe a high frequency of both unsafe 
braking and steering events. The vast majority of AV testing occurs in California where roundabouts 
are rare. Given that AVs likely have limited training on roundabouts and given the risk levels in general 
at these locations is higher, it may become a significant risk factor to consider for the introduction of 
AVs in Ireland. Moreover, there is a significant number of higher risk locations (red) around a 
University location. This may in part be due to a relatively larger number of inexperienced drivers 
expected around a university. Therefore, the distance to particular landmarks may also become a risk 
factor for AVs. Other spatial and temporal factors that are likely manipulating behavioural hotspots 
include traffic density, pedestrian presence, weather, road works, lane line quality. These spatio-
temporal factors will all influence the AVs performance. However, the extent of the influence that 
these factors will have on AVs requires further research and access to AV driving data.  
B. Auxiliary Data Analysis 
The objective of this section is to provide additional data analysis and discuss the applicability of 
personalized risk modelling for individual human risk cohorts, individual AVs and/or specific AV fleet 
models. Essentially, the methodology can be applied on an individual basis to provide further feedback 
to the human driver or AV system. Certain drivers (human or AV) may be susceptible to different risk 
exposures. Drivers can be warned of potential high risk locations or feedback can be provided 
afterwards based on his/her personal driving record or the experience of other drivers in their 
particular risk group. This could also be applied to AVs. Particular AV models will be designed for 
specific ODDs and thus have varying levels of performance under different circumstances (e.g. 
motorways or urban driving vehicles). Feedback regarding the details of the safety-critical events can 
be used to improve the system or to simply better understand its limitations. “ 
The factors employed to cluster drivers into individual risk groups are displayed in Table 1 including 
the mean number of unsafe braking, steering, acceleration and over-speeding events per trip as well 
as the mean distance and duration travelled. These factors have been shown to be significant accident 
risk indicators [Pfaegen et al.]. The features were used as inputs to our SOM to cluster individual 
drivers into risk groups. The k-means algorithm is subsequently used on the results of the SOM to 
specify a number of groups. The resulting groups contained 17, 10 and 11 drivers in each respectively.  
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of features within each cluster and offers more information 
regarding the distribution of safety-critical events across study participants. The table displays the 
relative percentages for each feature. For example, 12% of all braking events per trip are from drivers 
in cluster 1, whereas 70% are caused by drivers in cluster 3. This implies 5.8 times less braking events 
per trip relative to drivers in cluster 3. This is a significant discrepancy highlighting the varying degrees 
of risk levels within a risk group considered homogenous and treated as such from an insurance 
standpoint. Although the clustering method employed is unsupervised, there is a clear risk distinction 
between clusters. We can reasonably assume that risk levels increase from cluster 1 to 3. Risk group 
3 has a lower proportion of steering events in comparison to risk group 2 but much more braking and 
accelerating events. Moreover, group 2 has a higher proportion in relation to trip distance and 
duration. A number of factors can influence this including the type of road travelled or time of day. 
For example Paefgen et al. (2012)  found that braking and accelerating events occur less frequent on 
country roads and proportionately more turning events. Alternatively there may be a link between 
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shorter trip distances and times and steering events but, given the limited sample size, we cannot 
reasonably make an assumption on this behaviour. Lastly, we see that speeding is relatively similar for 
all risk groups. Given the particular age group we are investigating, this may be reasonable. 
Table. 1 – Three clusters resulting from the trained self-organising maps and k-means clustering for drivers 
within the telematics trial. The features used to cluster drivers are displayed on the left. Percentage represent 
the relative proportion between groups.  
These results are derived from young male drivers and not reflective of the entire population. 
However, if we were to consider individual driver or risk groups a more personalized methodology 
could be applied. Behavioural hotspots specific only to that risk group or driver could be modelled and 
different paths might be established depending on the characteristics of that risk group. Driving 
feedback can be offered on an individual or risk class basis. Moreover, different AV fleets will have 
varying levels of vulnerabilities and capabilities. No two manufacturers will have identical approaches 
to autonomous driving and some will be more advanced than others in terms of performance and 
level of testing. Different hardware and software components will likely be exploited. A range of 
factors might differentiate fleets or individual vehicles including their makeup, condition and driving 
usage. Different fleets will exhibit different behaviours and frequency and severity of driving errors 
will differ. Utilising this information can not only enable statistically meaningful comparisons between 
specific AVs and human driver risk groups but road network risk exposures can be identified on an 
individual basis AV fleets. With an increasing number of data sources and enormous amounts of data 
generated from autonomous systems, machine learning techniques such as SOMs may be important 
in order to generate a better understanding of unfamiliar AV risks.  
The results given were based on fully manually driven vehicles. With the availability of data from 
autonomous systems from different manufacturers, the same approach can be applied and individual 
spatial analysis for each risk group can be achieved. Specific AVs can be categorised into similar risk 
groups and accident frequency and severity rates can be inferred based on comparable driving 
between AV and humans. As we progress through the levels of vehicle automation, new factors 
applicable to AV hardware and software components will also become available. Some of these factors 
were discussed in Section 2 and might include failure rate of individual sensors and system 































In this paper we model road network risk and behavioural hotspots based on the driving behaviour of 
44 human drivers with over 270,000 km of driving data in Ireland. This paper makes a number of 
contributions to the field of transportation research and safe autonomous driving. First, we propose 
a risk-aware path planning system based on the spatial patterns of unsafe driving. The methodology 
is applied to human driving data but can also be seamlessly applied to AV driving data. The intended 
purpose of this methodology is its independent application to both AV and human driving data. This 
approach enables AVs to identify locations where the Av itself may be vulnerable and/or where they 
are likely to encounter unpredictable and unsafe human drivers, and plan routes accordingly. 
However, AV data is not readily available therefore we utilised human-based data to demonstrate and 
test the proposed methods. Second, we explore the applicability of surrogate measures of risk. 
Telematics-based surrogate risk measurements can be exploited to evaluate AVs in a proactive 
manner (rather than using accident records) and can be directly compared to human drivers as the 
same set of risk features are utilised. To date, evaluating the performance of AVs to human drivers 
has proven to be a significant challenge. To this end, given access to AV and human telematics data, 
the proposed methodology can support the safe and timely introduction of AVs onto public roads and 
can be widely adopted by manufacturers, insurers and regulators. 
The success, adoption and societal acceptance of AVs is premised on the anticipation that they will be 
considerably safer than human drivers. This necessities the ability to measure and manage AV risks. 
To date, autonomous systems have not yet reached human level safety. Manufacturers, insurers and 
policymakers need to determine how safe is safe enough before AVs are permitted on public roads. 
might be reasonable to deploy AVs once they are better than the average human driver given that it 
would result on few crashes in total. However, it may be that AV will be required to be considerably 
safer or near perfect (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018b). Moreover, the likely shift in liability from human 
driver to manufacturer and other affiliated suppliers increases the risk exposure for these companies 
demanding closer collaboration between manufacturer and insurers (Sheehan et al., 2017, Fabian et 
al., 2018, Murphy et al., 2017a). Nonetheless, comparisons between human and autonomous driving 
is required. With the limited driving exposure of AVs, this demands alternative approaches and 
surrogate risk measurements (Fraade-Blanar et al., 2018b). Ultimately, AVs will not eradicate driving 
risk although they are expected to considerably improve road safety. With that, measuring and 
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6.   Conclusion 
Introduction 
The evolution of vehicle automation will transform risk and liability landscapes. The transition will 
bring new and unfamiliar risks, beyond the capabilities of existing risk modelling techniques, currently 
constrained by the lack of historical accident records. There exists a significant gap in the literature 
surrounding the risk assessment and risk modelling of AVs given that this technology is still in its 
infancy. This Thesis fills this lacuna by advancing several novel methodologies designed to support the 
risk assessment and quantification of vehicles across varying degrees of automation. The success, 
adoption and societal acceptance of AVs is premised on the anticipation that they will be considerably 
safer than human drivers. This requires alternative and accurate means of underwriting and 
quantifying these emerging risks.  
At the beginning of this Thesis, we define the problem space and four research objectives, each of 
which were addressed in at least one of the peer-reviewed articles in this Thesis. The problem space 
is divided into four main factors: 
1. Lack of data: AV technologies are not yet publicly available and as a result, limited data is available 
to underwrite and model the underlying technological risks. Moreover, data is proprietary to 
manufacturers, requiring collaborative ventures between manufacturers, insurers and regulators 
to perform any risk analyses. The lack of historical data impedes deployment as insurers and 
regulators lag behind technology advancements.  
2. Risk trajectory across the levels of automation: The risk structure will evolve as the vehicle 
progresses through the levels of vehicle automation. Technological risks will change or increase 
as the autonomous system gains more control. The dynamic nature of emerging autonomous risks 
demands proactive and adaptable methods of risk assessment.  
3. Split risk structure: Vehicles will see split risk profiles as control alternates from human to artificial 
agent and risks migrate between technological and human related vulnerabilities. Earlier levels of 
vehicle automation, between 1-3, will see these unique risk structures. To accurately measure 
accident risk, a method to measure both the autonomous vehicle and driver separately is 
necessary.  
4. Complex technologies: Autonomous systems are inherently complex and the technology is 
continually evolving and improving. The composition of vehicle sensors and software will also vary 
across manufacturers and levels of automation. Systems rely on sophisticated and multi-faceted 
components with interdependent relationships, increasing the potential sources of risk beyond 
what was traditionally just the human driver. Such complexities will prove challenging for 
insurance underwriting and risk modelling with limited experience or historical data in 
autonomous technologies.  
The overarching motivation for this Thesis is to present novel alternative methodologies to address 
the problem areas identified above and overcome the inadequacies of conventional reactive risk 
assessment models. A number of novel methodologies are proposed to overcome these limitations. 
We postulate throughout this Thesis that telematics data is  especially suited to address these 
problems. In Chapter 1, we outlined four objectives shown below. Each of these objectives represent 
gaps in the AV risk analysis literature. These research objectives were designed sequentially so that 
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each preceding objective supports the next. This Thesis fills these gaps in the literature by addressing 
each objective through at least one of the peer-reviewed articles presented in the preceding chapters. 
1. Establish telematics-based ML techniques to model telematics-based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of vehicle automation.  
 
2. Demonstrate the efficacy of novel telematics-based vs traditional risk models for AV risk 
analysis and further establish driving risk factors applicable across the levels of vehicle automation. 
 
3. Establish methods to quantitatively measure AV risk relative to human driven risks using 
human-level safety as a unique safety benchmark.  
 
4. Establish a risk management methodology to limit liability and risk exposures for AVs using 
identified risk metrics, extending methods derived in previous objectives.  
This chapter highlights the connection between each research objective and peer-reviewed research 
article and further clarifies how each objective is addressed. The following sections provide conclusive 
arguments for the novel methodology contributions presented in this Thesis and clarify the 
connections between these contributions and the defined research objectives.  
Thesis Contributions 
Each peer-reviewed research article addresses at least one research objective. Table 1 below provides 
an illustrative overview, mapping the objectives to the research papers in which they were addressed. 
The table demonstrates the connections between articles that fully (solid line) or partially address 
each objective. In the following subsections, we explain, in more detail, the connections between the 
objectives in each paper. 
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Table 1. List of objective (left) and peer-reviewed articles (right). Solid arrows indicate that the objective was 
fully addressed by the journal article. Dashed arrows indicate the objective was partially addressed in this 
journal article. 
 
Chapter 2: Semi-Autonomous Vehicle Risk Analysis: A Telematics-Based Anomaly Detection 
Approach 
 
Chapter 2 proposes a novel method to quantify SAV risks for vehicle automation levels 2, 3 and 4 
where split risk structures exist. A novel unsupervised ML-based multivariate Gaussian (MVG) anomaly 
detection methodology is presented. Vehicle telematics data is used to identify anomalous sensor 
reading from accelerometer and GPS sensors and risk scores are calculated in two theoretical 
scenarios for manual and semi-autonomous vehicles based on the observed frequency and severity of 
anomalies. This Chapter addresses objectives 1 and 2: 
1. Establish telematics-based ML techniques to model telematics-based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of vehicle automation.  
This Chapter proposes a novel methodology for SAV risk analysis to quantify the split risk structures 
evident in SAVs for insurance risk assessment purposes. An unsupervised Multivariate Gaussian (MVG) 
based anomaly detection method is employed to dynamically reassess vehicle risks by classifying 
abnormal driving patterns based on accelerometer and GPS sensors. The MVG approach allows us to 
quantify vehicle risks by the relative frequency and severity of observed anomalies. This methodology 
1. Establish telematics-based ML 
techniques to model telematics-
based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of 
vehicle automation.  
  
2. Demonstrate the efficacy of novel 
telematics-based vs traditional risk 
models for AV risk analysis and 
further establish driving risk 
factors applicable across the levels 
of vehicle automation  
4. Establish a risk management 
methodology to limit liability and 
risk exposures for AVs using 
identified risk metrics, extending 
methods derived in previous 
objectives.  
Ryan, C., Murphy, F. and Mullins, M. 
(2018) ‘Semi-Autonomous Vehicle Risk 
Analysis: A Telematics-Based Anomaly 
Detection Approach.’ Risk Analysis, , 
39 (5), 1125-1140 
Ryan, C., Murphy, F. and Mullins, M. 
(2020) ‘End-to-End Autonomous 
Driving Risk Analysis: A Behavioural 
Anomaly Detection Approach.’ IEEE 
Transactions on Intelligent 
Transportation Systems.   
Ryan, C., Murphy, F. and Mullins, M. 
(2020) Spatial Risk Modelling of 
Behavioural Hotspots: Risk-Aware 
Path Planning for Autonomous 
Vehicles.’ Transportation Research 
Part A: Policy and Practice.  
Sheehan, B., Murphy, F., Ryan, C., 
Mullins, M. and Liu, H.Y. (2017) ‘Semi-
autonomous vehicle motor insurance: 
A Bayesian network risk transfer 
approach.’ Transportation Research 
Part C: Emerging Technologies, 82, 
pp.124-137.  
3. Establish methods to 
quantitatively measure AV risk 
relative to human driven risks 
using human-level safety as a 
unique safety benchmark.  
113 
 
contributes to extant literature, by extending previous research in vehicle risk analysis to SAVs and 
AVs, providing a means of dynamically quantifying driving risk relating to the human driver and 
autonomous system in a single vehicle. This is the first research paper to employ MVG anomaly 
detection for SAV risk analysis. This provides practitioners and academics a novel methodology to risk 
assess SAV as a whole or deconstruct the risk structure into human and autonomous system driving. 
From this, insurance pricing can provide a single premium or split premium, distributing liability 
appropriately between human driver and manufacturer.  
 
2. Demonstrate the efficacy of novel telematics-based vs traditional risk models for AV risk analysis 
and further establish driving risk factors applicable across the levels of vehicle automation.  
Chapter 2 proposes a novel MVG anomaly detection approach for abnormal or unsafe sensor readings 
as a means of generating proactive risk factors applicable across the levels of automation and between 
AVs and human drivers. These are derived from GPS and accelerometer sensors. We demonstrate the 
efficacy of telematics-based risk analysis by quantifying driving risk for a small dataset and 
extrapolating results to reflect applications to semi-autonomous functionalities. We also demonstrate 
the applicability of spatial analysis of classified anomalies as a means of generating a more 
comprehensive risk profile and incorporating spatio-temporal risk factors. The methodology 
contributes to existing driving risk analysis literature by underlining the potential of telematics to 
overcome some of the challenges and extending existing telematics methods for SAV risk analysis and 
insurance ratemaking. To date, limited attention has been given to emerging AV risks and the 
applicability of telematics methods in the risk analysis and insurance domains. This paper fills this gap 
in the literature.  
Currently, in the motor insurance domain, conventional risk assessment is predominantly based on 
risk proxies as a reflection of a driver’s true risk exposure. Static underwriting factors include driver 
characteristics – age, marital status, driver license, residence, vehicle use, past claims/driving record, 
traffic violations, occupation, driver training, distance travelled, garage ownership – and vehicle 
characteristics – vehicle make and model, vehicle age, engine capacity, horse power etc. We postulate 
that telematics-based risk analysis such as usage-based insurance (UBI) currently used for some 
human drivers, can be extended to autonomous systems facilitating proactive analysis, 
accommodating the split risk structure and enabling cross comparative analysis between humans and 
AVs on a more granular scale.  
 
Chapter 3: Semi-Autonomous Vehicle Motor Insurance: A Bayesian Network Risk Transfer 
Approach 
 
All developed economies mandate at least third party auto insurance resulting in a vast global liability 
industry. The evolution towards semi-autonomous and fully autonomous vehicles will progressively 
remove the leading cause of vehicle accidents i.e. human error. That said, this transition will force a 
departure from existing actuarial methods, demanding careful management to ensure risks are 
correctly assigned. In this vein, this paper proposes a novel Bayesian Network statistical risk estimation 
approach designed to accommodate changing risk levels and the emergence of new risk structures. In 
particular, split risk structures associated with SAVs. We demonstrate the use of this method for a 
Level 3 semi-autonomous vehicle for two theoretical risk scenarios, 1) where the driver is in control 
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and 2) where the autonomous system is in control. The methodology fills a gap in the literature by 
postulating a novel methodology to utilise telematics data generated from the vehicle to address the 
shifting risk and liability landscape and split risk structures for SAVs. The methodology provides 
practitioners and academics with a novel approach to quantify AV driving risk using risk factors that 
are also applicable to human drivers. This Chapter addresses objectives 1 and 2: 
1. Establish telematics-based ML techniques to model telematics-based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of vehicle automation.  
We postulate and construct a novel Bayesian Network (BN) to model the frequency and severity of 
accident risk for SAVs, bridging the gap between human-based and AV-based risk analysis for 
insurance ratemaking and claims reserving. This BN statistical risk estimation methodology is designed 
to accommodate the emerging risk structures pertinent to levels of automation 3 and 4. Such a risk 
structure involves the periodic swapping of control between human and AV, alternating risk 
distributions in the process. This risk structure demands alternate risk models currently beyond the 
capabilities of conventional risk analysis that rely on comprehensive historical data. The proposed 
methodology is unique and provides a means to more accurately and proactively quantify SAV risk 
exposures.  
BNs provide an intuitive graphical representation that models the probabilistic relationships between 
sets of correlated variables. BNs are chosen due to their ability to handle incomplete data, incorporate 
expert opinion and its ability to iteratively update its parameterisation as new data becomes available. 
These characteristics may be advantageous given the uncertainty surrounding AV risk levels and 
insufficient data. We model expected claims losses in terms of personal motor insurance and product 
liability insurance separately. Risk levels (frequency and severity) for each are determined by the 
individual risk exposures of the driver and vehicle. Data from each journey is divided into driver and 
vehicle datasets from which premiums can be derived for either. 
2. Demonstrate the efficacy of novel telematics-based vs traditional risk models for AV risk analysis 
and further establish driving risk factors applicable across the levels of vehicle automation.  
The methodology identifies actuarially meaningful risk factors applicable to both human driver and 
autonomous system. This methodology fills a lacuna in the domain of risk analysis of AVs for insurance 
ratemaking and claims reserving. It also contributes to the domain of comparative risk analysis 
between human drivers and AVs as our constructed risk factors are applicable to both.  
Under conventional risk analysis methods, a driver who utilises the automated system comparatively 
more would pay a similar premium to an identical driver operating predominantly in manual mode. 
This means that drivers with less risk exposure (i.e. maximise autonomous mode usage) would be 
forced to subsidise those with higher risk exposure (i.e. maximise manual mode usage). Thus, the 
methodology first addresses a shortcoming in conventional risk analysis methods by identifying the 
need for more granular telemetry data to account for this split risk structure. We categorised three 
risk factor groups including Behavioural (i.e. speeding, steering, acceleration patterns etc.), Situational 
Environment and Road (i.e. time of day, road type, weather) and Situational Individual (i.e. distance 
travelled, time-to-collision etc.). An important feature of this methodology is that these risk factors 





Chapter 4: End-to-End Autonomous Driving Risk Analysis: A Behavioural Anomaly Detection 
Approach 
 
The deployment of AVs hinges on the premise that they are considerably safer than human drivers. 
However, the ability of manufacturers, insurers and regulators to quantifiably demonstrate this risk 
reduction relative to human drivers presents a considerable challenge. Based on accident rates alone, 
it will likely take hundreds of millions of autonomous miles to derive statistically meaningful results. 
This paper addresses this issue and proposes a novel means of quantifying AV accident risks by 
benchmarking against a more familiar and quantifiable risk – Human Behaviour. This Chapter 
addresses objectives 1 and 3: 
1. Establish telematics-based ML techniques to model telematics-based risk factors and quantify 
driving risk across the levels of vehicle automation.  
A novel approach is proposed to detect spatial anomalies for driving behaviours using a Bayesian 
Machine Learning (ML) geostatistical tool called Gaussian Processes (GP). GPs are adopted to 
ostensibly model normal driving behaviour in a simulated environment. This technique models normal 
human driving patterns the results of which are used to statistically identify anomalies based on the 
model AV driving patterns. We model normal human driving using GPs and statistically identify 
anomalies based on the probability of observing sensor measurements. This is a novel application of 
GPs and to the authors knowledge, has not been previously applied to the task of driving anomaly 
detection. The model AV is created using a convolutional neural network to predict 
acceleration/deceleration rate and steering angle directly from camera images in an end-to-end 
manner. Sensor observations generated from the model AV that are beyond μ ± 1.96σ are denoted 
spatial or contextual anomalies and indicative of unsafe driving events. We further derive a risk 
function that can be used to dynamically reassess the risk level of drivers (human or AV), by taking 
into account the frequency and severity of events. This is a novel contribution to the field and provides 
practitioners and academics a method to quantitatively compare humans and AVs in a more proactive 
approach by extending existing telematics-based risk analysis techniques.  
3. Establish methods to quantitatively measure AV risk relative to human driven risks using human-
level safety as a unique safety benchmark.   
This Chapter postulates a novel methodology to quantify the risk of AVs in such a way that the safety 
of AVs can be established relative to human drivers on a far more continuous scale than currently 
applied. Presently, safety comparisons are obtained by accident frequency rates and severity 
distributions. These events are rare by nature. As explained in Chapter 4, this can take hundreds of 
millions of autonomous miles to generate statistically meaningful results. The proposed methodology 
utilises granular telematics data to derive risk factors common to both human and autonomous 
systems. Acceleration, deceleration and steering patterns were used in this paper but a range of risk 
factors identified in previous chapters could be used. Human driving groups are used as a safety 
benchmark or reference point to quantify AV driving risk against. The results provide a unique 
quantitative comparison between the model AV and human drivers based on the calculated risk scores 
of the model AV from our GP anomaly detection methodology. Essentially, the relative frequency and 
severity of safety-critical or anomalous driving events between the AV and particular group of human 
drivers gives a quantitative comparative risk measure. The presented methodological approach 




Conventional risk analysis and risk modelling hinges on historical data and is reactive by nature. The 
presented methodology offers a novel means of comparatively quantifying the safety/risk of AVs 
relative to human drivers using leading measures. Leading measures are risk factors extracted from 
vehicle telemetry, reflecting high risk behaviour or usage. They occur far more frequently than 
accidents and this frequency enables timely risk estimates relative to human drivers with lower 
autonomous miles accumulated. Ultimately, risk is estimated based on their relative susceptibility to 
unsafe driving events. This approach enables manufacturers, insurers and regulators to derive 
statistically meaningful risk insights at earlier stages of development and deployment.  
 
Chapter 5: Spatial Risk Modelling of Behavioural Hotspots: Risk-Aware Path Planning for 
Autonomous Vehicles 
 
AVs have the potential to considerably reduce road accident rates by disconnecting humans from the 
driving task. However, AVs have not yet reached human level safety and a number of deployment 
barriers exist. In particular, methods to quantify and manage emerging and unfamiliar technological 
risks presents some of the most significant challenges for manufacturers, insurers and policymakers. 
AV technology is in its infancy and with limited historical data, the capacity to accurately measure the 
potential risk reduction is restricted. Moreover, careful management of these risks will become a 
crucial task for manufacturers and policymakers alike. One important risk management strategy is the 
definition of operational design domains (ODD) relating to geographical areas and situational 
circumstances under which the AV is safe to operate in. This paper fills a gap in the literature relating 
to these issues by proposing a novel methodology to model behavioural hotspot based on telematics 
data. The resulting data is then used to construct a unique risk-aware path planning technique and to 
quantify driving risk. Safety-critical events are tracked from a fleet of human drivers over 
approximately 274,000km driving in Ireland from which behavioural hotspots are modelled. Although 
this chapter touches upon all four objectives, it primarily addresses objective 4: 
4. Establish a risk management strategy to limit liability and risk exposures for AVs using identified 
surrogate measures of risk and methods derived in the objective above.  
Traffic accidents often cluster to form hot spots or high-risk locations. We show that safety-critical 
driving events cluster in a similar fashion. This paper proposes a methodology to identify these 
behavioural hotspots and model road network risk for each road segment in the field of study. Road 
network risk is based on unsafe driving behaviours rather than traffic accident frequencies. Network 
risk is modelled based on these safety-critical events and incorporated into the path planning process 
with the aim of minimising driving risk. The methodology is applied to a cohort of human drivers 
involving roughly 274,000 km of driving in Ireland. An unsupervised, geostatistical method called 
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is used to spatially model behavioural hotspots. The resulting road 
network risk level distribution is incorporated as an additional loss or cost function used in the path 
planning process to find the safest and shortest path. Dijkstra path planning algorithm is modified to 
plan routes, taking into account both driving risk and distance to destination. 
The proposed methodology offers a proactive means of measuring driving risks the results of which 
can enable AVs to anticipate and avoid hotspots, adapt its behaviour accordingly or prepare to 





The emergence of automated driving will yield new and unfamiliar risks, significantly disrupting the 
insurance and regulatory markets. Traditional risk models and underwriting approach are constrained 
by the lack of comprehensive data. The risk structure of vehicles will continue to evolve as automation 
advances. Risk assessment methodologies need to quickly react and adapt to this. The advent of semi-
automation brings split risk profiles and human-machine interaction risks. Traditional, reactive risk 
modelling approaches will fail under these conditions. This Thesis addresses these issues and advances 
novel, alternative and proactive methodologies using telematics data and real-time data-driven 
models to accurately assess the risks of vehicles across the levels of vehicle automation. The proposed 
telematics methodologies are particularly suited to the challenges described throughout this Thesis 
as they provide objective measurement of driving patterns and provide impartial risk assessments for 
either human driver or autonomous system. Limited attention has been given to potential risk 
assessment approaches and methodologies in the extant literature and rarely for applications in the 
insurance domain. This Thesis contributes to this field by providing the first comprehensive approach 
to the risk analysis of varying levels of vehicle automation and advancing novel methodological 
approaches and telematics-based solutions to addressing many of the problems related to the 
evolving and disruptive risk landscape.  
Connected and autonomous vehicles have the potential to considerably reduce road accidents rates 
and greenhouse gas emissions, improve travel efficiency and liberate time spent driving. The societal 
benefits are significant but their deployment hinges on their acceptance by society and the ability to 
accurately demonstrate their improved safety in the development stage. The former is likely 
dependent on proving the latter. We hope that this Thesis takes a step towards achieving this, 
supporting the safe and timely introduction of automated technologies onto public roads. Insurers 
and regulators have a pivotal role in enabling their deployment. Technological advancements will be 
in vain without available insurance policies or the existence of appropriate regulatory frameworks. 
However, currently insurers and regulatory lag behind technological advancements. This Thesis 
demonstrates that closer collaboration between manufacturers, insurers and regulators and the 
further development of the telematics-based methodologies such as those in this Thesis will facilitate 
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